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I. INTRODUCTION
The local tax on real property in the United States is generally an ad
valorem levy,' measured as a specified percentage of the fair market
value of taxable land and improvements. The need to assign a market
value to each taxable parcel (and even to nontaxable parcels, if the reve-
nue lost by their exemption is to be calculated) offers fertile ground for
dispute. The resulting case law provides some unexpected insights into
the nature of the tax itself.
Valuation decisions set the tax that a given property owner must pay. A
decision involving one owner may affect other taxpayers in the jurisdic-
tion as well because the size of the aggregate property tax base; together
with the revenue needs of the district, determines the tax rate. 2 But certain
valuation decisions are of even more general significance, 'for their solu-
tion implies an answer to the difficult and little-addressed issue of what
exactly constitutes the property value subject to tax. While lawyers are
familiar with definitions of "property" as a set of legal interests,3 popular
association of that term with the object of those interests-here, the real
estate itself-has had a clear effect upon valuation decisions. 4 Moreover,
even a definition of "property" as a set of legal interests leaves the exact
components of that set unspecified. This is a central problem in the valua-
1. A recent listing of the statutory language defining the basis for assessed valuation in each state
may be found in the ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNiIcANT FEA-
TURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 1979-80, at 142-44 [hereinafter cited as ACIR]. Almost all states use
some variation of "fair market value" as their statutory criterion. Assessments may, however, be
made against a given fraction of that figure, a device which permits a given nominal tax rate to
produce differing effective tax rates for various classes of property. California is a notable exception
to the general rule of assessment at "fair market value." California's "Proposition 13" amended the
state constitution to define "full cash value" as either the 1975-76 value of property or the "ap-
praised value," i.e., fair market value, of property on the date of a later change in ownership or new
construction, with a maximum 2% annual inflation adjustment. CALIF. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2. While
this article deals primarily with the taxation of real property, many of the valuation principles dis-
cussed here are applicable to the taxation of personal property as well. A listing of each state's statu-
tory criteria for the assessment of personal property may be found in ACIR, supra, at 145-46.
2. This procedure is subject to constitutional or statutory limitations upon the tax rate. E.g., CAL.
CONST. art. XIII A, § I (limit of 1%); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21(C)(l)(b), (e) (Michie/Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1983) (general limit of 21/2%, unless increased by two-thirds vote in a local referendum);
WASH. CONST. amend. 55 (limit of 1% upon local and state aggregate levies). '
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8 (1936) ("real property" used in RESTATEMENT to
mean specific interests in land). In this article, the term "legal interests" is used generally to denote
judicially enforceable interests, without distinguishing between legal and equitable interests in land.
Cf. id. § 6 (legal interests developed by principles, standards, and rules of courts of law; equitable
interests by courts of chancery).
4. See infra notes 60-61. Statutes including physical objects within the definition of "property"
for tax purposes include, for example, CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 103 (West 1970) ("property"
-includes "all matters and things" capable of private ownership); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §
102(12)(a), (b) (McKinney 1972) ("property" includes "land itself" and "buildings and other arti-
cles and structures" affixed to it).
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tion of parcels subject to divided legal interests, where the value of the
rights retained by the owner may be far below the value of the undivided
fee.
In practice, courts have generally relied upon one of three alternative
views of "property" in such cases, each with a corresponding definition
of "value." First, property may be equated with the rights held by the
owner, however circumscribed by public regulation and private agree-
ment, with a concomitant definition of value as the actual sale price the
owner could realize for his interest. Alternatively, property may be con-
sidered the unencumbered fee, permitting "value" to exceed the amount
which the holder of a restricted interest could command in an actual sale.
Finally, property may be identified with the physical land and improve-
ments, entailing a corresponding search for "real" or "intrinsic" values.
A choice among these approaches is rarely the topic of extensive judicial
scrutiny. Yet resolution of this issue is crucial, not only for routine com-
putational chores of the assessor and the valuation tribunal, but also for a
general understanding of the operation of the tax itself.
In the absence of direct answers, this definitional question may be ap-
proached through examination of valuation disputes offering a choice
among clear yet mutually exclusive definitions of "property" and
"value." This article examines cases in three such categories. The first
concerns property subject to a long-term lease unfavorable to the lessor.
In this situation "property" may be equated with either of two quantities.
It may be defined as the owner's interest, and its value measured by the
sale price of the parcel as encumbered by the lease. Alternatively, it may
be viewed as the sum of the owner's and lessee's interests, and valued by
the hypothetical sale price of the unencumbered fee. In cases presenting
this question of law, the definitional issue must be addressed, even if indi-
rectly.
A second area concerns what has been termed "specialty" property.
Specialty property consists of buildings of particular and sometimes
unique value to their owners which is not reflected in the market prices
these structures would command if offered for sale to others. An early
such case involved the New York Stock Exchange. 5 The Exchange's
owners claimed that no other party would view it as anything but a "tear-
down proposition," a useless structure which actually reduced the market
value of the bare land. In such a case, a statutory standard of "market
value" as the basis for the tax may be interpreted in two ways. It may be
held to require a nominal or even a negative valuation, reflecting the ac-
tual sale price realizable by the owner. Or value to the owner, as demon-
5. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64 (1927),




strated by the investment, may be considered to justify a cost-based valu-
ation. The difficult choice thus presented between what often appears to
be an outrageously low assessment of useful and costly improvements on
the one hand and, on the other, a rejection of the literal terms of the stat-
ute further illuminates the difficulties in the valuation process. Where the
lease decisions require a definition of the legal interests constituting the
"property" to be valued, the specialty decisions direct similar attention
to the meaning of "market value." Together, these two components de-
termine the base of the property tax.
The third area concerns property subject to various types of legal re-
strictions upon the owner's use. Decisions concerning these restrictions,
from zoning ordinances to easements, offer a similar set of alternative
definitions of the tax base. The unrestricted value corresponding to the
sum of all parties' interests in the real estate may be in fact unattainable
by the owner in the market. Yet the amount realizable for the owner's
remaining interests may reflect private, non-arm's-length and profit-moti-
vated arrangements that produce a deliberate reduction in sale price. Here
again, two alternatives are available, each with its own drawbacks. A
court may tax a purely hypothetical "market value," although this re-
quires contrary-to-fact speculation as to price. On the other hand, it may
adopt the actual sale price of the parcel as its "value" for tax purposes,
although this will allow the owner's unilateral and self-interested actions
to diminish the jurisdiction's tax base.
These inquiries usually arise as discrete and isolated questions, but
when taken together they offer a means of investigating the definition of
the tax base itself. This article will examine the implications of the defini-
tions of "property" and "market value" employed in the long-term lease
and specialty cases for the valuation of land and improvements subject to
easements and similar legal restrictions. A definition of "property" as the
sum of all legal interests in a given parcel has permitted a workable reso-
lution of the long-term lease problem. This approach is clearly superior to
its alternatives and has been adopted in a majority of those jurisdictions
that have considered the issue. The valuation decisions considering spe-
cialty property have produced no similar clarity of analysis, but they do
serve a useful function by demonstrating that realizable sale price sets no
universal ceiling upon "fair market value."
This article will consider the applicability of the "summation-of-inter-
ests" definition of property to the easement question generally, and will
conclude that it is preferable to its alternatives in that context as well. The
"summation-of-interests" definition in the easement context contradicts
precedent established early in this century and accepted by a majority of
jurisdictions. However, this precedent is based upon a number of logical
717
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errors: it equates property rights with property value, assumes that "prop-
erty" must be defined as the rights retained by the owner of the fee, and
sets the realizable sale price of the owner's interest as an upper limit upon
"fair market value" for tax purposes. Finally, a concluding section will
consider briefly the actual steps in the valuation process by which a new
approach to the assessment of restricted property might be initiated.
More than forty years ago, James Bonbright surveyed the property tax
as part of his landmark treatise on valuation, and determined that the field
so lacked intellectual coherence as to make inquiries into its general prin-
ciples useless. 6 The present investigation reaches a more optimistic con-
clusion. The tax is sufficiently rational to permit a critical comparison of
alternative approaches to specific valuation questions, and to allow appli-
cation of methods derived from the better-reasoned cases to other con-
texts presenting analogous difficulties. Although a surprising number of
basic issues and principles concerning the property tax have never been
resolved, the analysis found in a century of case law provides a basis
upon which those tasks may begin.
1I. VALUATION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A LONG-TERM
LEASE
A. "Contract" Versus "Fair Market" Rent
Valuation of property burdened by an unfavorable long-term lease of-
ten presents difficult factual issues as to the rent it could command if un-
encumbered, but the legal question posed is straightforward. Consider
property subject to a forty-year lease written twenty years ago, calling for
level annual rent far below the amount it could command if a new lease
were written today. Should the assessment be based upon the actual sale
price of the owner's interest, limited as it is by twenty more years of the
low return specified in the lease, the "contract" rent, or should it be
based upon the sale price that would be offered if no lease existed? The
latter figure reflects the full potential income a prospective purchaser
could expect under a new lease.
A clear majority of the decided cases favor assessment on the basis of
6. 1 J. BONBRIGHT. THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 508-09 (1937).
The confusion as to the meaning and measure of value that one finds in the administrative
practice and in the judicial rulings on real-estate assessment is not the type of confusion that can
ever be cleared up by the professional appraiser or by the value theorist. The trouble lies far too
deep to be cured by either of these economic skin specialists. It lies in the absence of any valid





fair market rent,7 relying heavily upon the reasoning of early decisions in
Massachusetts and New York. Courts there found that capitalization of
contract rent erroneously equated the value of the landlord's interest with
the value of the property subject to the tax. In a 1923 opinion, Donovan v.
Haverhill,8 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote, "The tax
whether assessed to the owner of the fee or to the person in possession is a
tax upon the whole land and not merely on the interest of the person
taxed." 9 The New York Appellate Division accepted and expanded this
reasoning in a 1962 decision, People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Commission:
[A] division of ownership or the independent holding of separate legal inter-
ests in taxable property will not affect the mode of assessment. For instance,
mortgagor and mortgagee interests, vendor and vendee interests, landlord
and.tenant interests, life tenant and remainder interests and cotenant inter-
ests are not separately assessed ....
Consequently, it is clear that, notwithstanding real property is subject to a
long-term lease, there should be but a single assessment of the property
without a separation of the interests of the lessor and lessee .... 10
While this view has been accepted by a majority of the courts confront-
ing the question, the attraction of actual, realizable sale price-a measure
based upon, leases in effect at the time of.valuation-as the basis for as-
sessment has produced several contrary decisions.' IThe Vermont Su-
7. Caldwell v. Department of Revenue, 122 Ariz. 519, 596 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979); Clayton v.
County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1972); Martin v. Liberty County
Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga. App. 346, 262 S.E.2d 609 (1979);'Springfield Marine Bank v. Prop-
erty Tax Appeal Bd., 44 Ill. 2d 428, 256 N.E.2d 334 (1970); Oberstein v. Adair County Bd. of
Review, 318 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 286 Minn. 440, 176 N.W.2d 530 (1970); Swan Lake Moulding Co. v. Department of Revenue,
257 Or. 622, 478 P.2d 393 (1970); Yadco, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 651, 237 N.W.2d 665
(1975); Martin v. Mesquite, 590 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Board of Supervisors v. Nassif,
223 Va. 400, 290 S.E.2d 822 (1982); Doces Enters. v. Shaw, Nos. 19505-07 (Wash. B.T.A. Oct.
24, 1980); cf. Teavee Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Hardesty, 297 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1982) (business and
occupation tax; valuation not limited by contract price below current market levels).
The very weight of judicial authority favoring this position has now become a factor exerting inde-
pendent influence over more recent decisions. See, e.g., Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Taxation, 286 Minn. 440, 176 N.W.2d 530, 535 (1970): "
[The taxpayers] argue that since the property is burdened'with an unprofitable-lease the property
value is considerably lower than it would otherwise be. However, the majority of cases provide
that an unprofitable lease should not be used to determine value for property tax purposes.
Rather, the fair rental value should be used.
8. 247 Mass. 69, 141 N.E. 564 (1923).,.
9. 141N.E.at565.
10. 17 A.D.2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501,505-06 (1962). The New York Court of Appeals, the
state's highest court, approved this approach in Merrick Holding Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 45
N.Y.2d 538, 382 N:E.2d 1341,410 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
11. Ort Children Trust Four v. Supervisor of Assessments, No. 81 (Md. T.C. Jan. 23, 1981);
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preme Court, for example, simply noted in 1976 that the tax was to be
proportioned to the "fair market value" of the property, and concluded,
"It is obvious that the presence of a lease/option agreement concerning a
parcel of property is an element which enters into giving a saleable or
market value to the property." 12 The Michigan Supreme Court went even
further in C.A.F. Investment Co. v. Township of Saginaw:
[T]rue cash value must equal the fair market value of the property to the
owner .... [T]o equate economic income with hypothetical income in ev-
ery situation where actual rent under a long-term lease is less than the pre-
vailing market rental would be to ignore the effect of the lease on a prospec-
tive investor's judgment regarding the fair market value of the property. 13
The symmetrical opposition of these views is somewhat misleading.
An apparently unambiguous determination by a state's highest court may
dissolve in confusion when applied at a lower level-a fate experienced
on both sides of this issue. In a case involving a one-year lease, the effect
of which upon sale price would be minimal under either approach because
of its short duration, the Michigan Court of Appeals nevertheless offered
a restrictive interpretation of the state supreme court's utilization of con-
tract rent in assessment, 14 holding: "The requirement of using actual
rental income . . . was limited to the facts of that case." 15 Similarly, a
1972 trial court decision in New York began with an acknowledgment of
the decade-old authority for capitalization of fair market rent, but imme-
diately added language of exactly the opposite import:
[W]ith the traditional test of "market value," what investor will purchase
real property without primary concern for the "bottom line"? The prudent
investor's first concern is with his return now and in the foreseeable fu-
ture-not what his bundle of rights may be many years hence .... 16
In the tradition of many valuation opinions, the court set compromise fig-
ures, leaving its own position on the long-term lease question unresolved.
A number of courts have made similar attempts to settle specific long-
term lease cases without reference to any general rule. Sometimes the
C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981); Townsend v.
Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515 (1976).
12. Townsend v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515, 517 (1976).
13. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164, 171 (1981).
"Economic income" was required by statute to enter the valuation process. See infra note 32.
14. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 Mich. 442, 221 N.W.2d 588 (1974), appeal on
remand, 79 Mich. App. 559, 262 N.W.2d 863 (1977), affd sub nom. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township
of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981) (affirming original decision).
15. Ramblewood Assocs. v. City of Wyoming, 82 Mich. App. 342, 266 N.W.2d 817, 819
(1978).





question is declared to be one of fact;17 sometimes general but circular
declarations of principle are employed, such as a directive that actual
rental income may be disregarded only when that figure does not reflect
the "true value" of the property. 18 Such decisions offer no aid in resolv-
ing the definitional issues underlying the valuation controversy itself.
B. The Effect of Statutory Language
Most constitutional and statutory language prescribing the legal basis
for assessment has little impact upon the long-term lease question. Such
enactments invariably employ phrases such as "fair market value," "ac-
tual cash value, .... full and fair cash value," "just value," or "true and
fair value," to name but a few. 19 These terms do not address the question
of what exactly constitutes the property to be valued; rather, they suggest
the existence of a straightforward, nonhypothetical measure rendering
that inquiry unnecessary. The Vermont Supreme Court was responding to
such a suggestion when it found it "obvious" that contract rent under a
long-term lease must control valuation for property tax purposes. 20 The
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the same attitude in a 1978 decision,
although it failed to adopt a general rule for dealing with such situations:
17. E.g., Wynwood Apartments, Inc. v. Board of Revision, 59 Ohio St. 2d 34, 391 N.E.2d 346
(1979) (long-term lease question a factual determination, therefore reviewable only for lawfulness
and reasonableness). Yet in the Wynwood case, the county board of revision had specifically framed
the issue in terms of a general legal principle:
The problem confronted by the board herein was expressed as follows: "In a situation like this,
where there is income producing property which is under lease and the contract rent is lower
than the economic rent, should contract rent or economic rent be relied upon in pursuit of estab-
lishing the fair market value of the property?"
391 N.E.2d at 347. The term "economic rent" is sometimes used in property tax cases such as this as
a synonym for "fair market rent." This usage, of course, is distinct from the economist's definition
of "economic rent" as the return to a factor of production with fixed supply, e.g., P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMics 527, 557 (11th ed. 1980). See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,
629 (1981) (appellants defined "economic rent" as the difference between cost of production and
market price).
18. The court stated in Demoulas v. Town of Salem, 116 N.H. 775,367 A.2d 588,593 (1976):
We do not mean to suggest that consideration of actual income is improper in all cases. We hold
only that, where the actual income from long-term leases does not reflect the true value of the
property because the leases were made in a time of boom or depression or as a result of poor
management, the board may reject or give little weight to the capitalization of actual net income
method.
Cf. State v. Cook, 60 N.J.L. 70, 36 A. 892, 893 (1897) (assessment of mining property; "yearly
rental of the premises may also be taken into consideration as an element in the ascertainment of true
value, where the property is so situated that the yearly rental reflects upon true value").
19. For a listing of the legal basis for assessed valuation in each state, see ACIR, supra note 1.
20. Townsend v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515, 517 (1976) (long-term lease
and purchase option must be considered in assessment).
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Since "fair market value" is generally said to be "the value that would be
fixed in fair negotiations between a desirous buyer and a willing seller, nei-
ther under any undue compulsion to make a deal"; it cannot be said, either
in law or logic, that the actual income accruing to [the lessor] under the
particular facts of this case is not a significant factor to be considered in
determining what a third party would pay to acquire the property in ques-
tion. 21
Yet if the "property in question" comprises the interests of both the les-
sor and lessee, a third party would not consider what arrangement might
have existed between those two, but rather what rent he could expect to
receive when offering the property anew on the market. Failure to define
explicitly the "property in question" leaves the choice between these al-
ternatives unresolved.
A set of Massachusetts decisions predating that state's decision on the
long-term lease illustrates how little aid a standard such as "fair cash
value" provides. 22 At one time the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found the "fair cash value" criterion as unambiguous as the Ver-
mont court finds it today. For example, Judge Holmes in a Massachusetts
opinion gave a characteristically terse definition of the "cash value" of
property as "the amount of cash for which it will exchange in fact.' '23
This nonhypothetical, "in-fact" standard was weakened, however,
when in 1919 the Massachusetts court addressed the problem of specialty
valuation. In a confusing opinion, 24 the court approved two contradictory
rulings: one limiting valuation to "the sum which the owner after reason-
able effort could, at the date as of which the assessment is made, obtain
for it in cash"; 2 5 the other equating "cash value" with value "in the
hands of any owner, including the present owners." 26 This illustrates the
problem of valuing unmarketable property-which may have a low sale
price and a high value to its owner-but offers no solution. This unsatis-
factory decision may have given the court an appreciation for the defini-
tional problems contained within the deceptively simple statutory lan-
guage when it approached the long-term lease question four years later. In
21. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Middlebury Bd. of Tax Review, 174 Conn. 380, 389 A.2d 734, 738 (1978)
(citations omitted).
22. "Fair cash value" continues to be the basic valuation standard in Massachusetts. MASS
ANN- LAWS ch. 59, § 38 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1983).
23. National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 317, 29 N.E. 532, 533 (1892).
24. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 233 Mass. 190, 124 N.E. 21 (1919)
(definition of "fair cash value" of mental hospital for property tax purposes).
25. 124N.E.at28.
26. Id. at 23.
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any event, the later opinion was explicitly based upon a concept of prop-
erty which embraced both the lessor's and lessee's interests. 27
Courts have found little aid in statutory guidance because property tax
legislation generally does not address these definitional problems. For ex-
ample, the Michigan "true cash value" standard28 and the Massachusetts
"fair cash value" standard29 do not explain the divergent results of
C.A.F.30 and Donovan3 '-especially when the Michigan statute calls for
consideration of "economic income," defined by the court as contract
rent.32 Neither do Arizona's "full cash value" 33 and Vermont's "fair
market value" 34 standards illuminate those states' contradictory positions
on the long-term lease. 35 Such formulas are usually amplified by the
"willing buyer-willing seller" criterion.36 Yet this merely strengthens the
impression that a realizable sale price is to be found, without clarifying
what is to be sold. 37
27. Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69, 141 N.E. 564 (1923).
28. MICH. CONsT. art. IX, § 3.
29. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, sec. 38 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1983).
30. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 Mich. 442, 221 N.W.2d 588 (1974), appeal on
remand, 79 Mich. App. 559, 262 N.W.2d 863 (1977), affdsub nom. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township
of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981) (affirming original decision). See supra text
accompanying notes 13-14.
31. Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69, 141 N.E. 564 (1923). See supra text accompa-
nying note 8.
32. "We conclude that 'economic income' as used in M.C.L.A. § 211.27; M.S.A. § 7.27 means
actual income." C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 Mich. 442, 221 N.W.2d 588, 594
(1974), appeal on remand, 79 Mich. App. 559, 262 N.W.2d 863 (1977), affdsub nom. C.A.F. Inv.
Co. v. Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981) (affirming original decision).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.27(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1983)) requires an asses-
sor to consider the present "economic income" of property in setting its taxable value. For the con-
trary usage of "economic rent," see supra note 17.
33. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-201(4) (1980 & Supp. 1982-83) (setting "full cash value" as
the basis of assessment).
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3481 (1981) (setting "estimated fair market value" as the basis of
assessment).
35. Caldwell v. Department of Revenue, 122 Ariz. 519, 596 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979); Town-
send v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515 (1976).
36. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.060 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.011(1) (West Supp. 1983);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-35-29 (1972 & Supp. 1982); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 15-8-111(2)(a) (1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-606 (1976 & Supp. 1982); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7149 (Vernon
1960) (repealed 1979).
37. Consider the reasoning of the New York Appellate Division in the 1961 Lincoln Square
eminent domain decision:
While it is a fair presumption that a willing buyer would project his offer on the basis of what
return he could obtain rather than on what the seller was receiving, it would be contrary to
general experience to believe that he would ignore existing leases which had an appreciable
period to run, with the consequent effect that the return he expected would not be realized for
some years.
In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 A.D.2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786, 796 (1961), affd
mem., 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1963), affd, 16 N.Y.2d 497, 208
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The Georgia and Vermont long-term lease decisions illustrate the mal-
leability of such standards. In Martin v. Liberty County Board of Tax
Assessors,38 the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted a statute requiring
that assessments reflect both the current use of property and any coven-
ants or restrictions burdening it.39 On the other hand, in Townsend v.
Town of Middlebury,40 the court dealt with a Vermont statute limiting
such consideration to "state or local law or regulation affecting use of the
land." 41 It might seem, then, that the Georgia legislature intended private
restrictions and agreements to affect property tax assessments, while the
Vermont legislature took a contrary position. The respective courts took
exactly the opposite approach, however, concluding that contract rent
should govern valuation in Vermont but not in Georgia. The Georgia
court defined "property" as the sum of all interests in the land and im-
provements: "Assuming ... that the lease results in a decreased value of
appellant's interest in the property, there would be a proportional increase
in the 'fair market value' of the leasehold. The 'fair market value' of the
estates merge to establish the 'fair market value' of the fee." 42 The Ver-
mont court, however, defined the "property" at issue as the owner's in-
terest in the taxable realty, and found the extension of the legislature's
recognition of public restraints to private agreements "not contrary to the
logic of the statute." 43
Because neither statute addressed the definitional issue, the outcome of
these decisions could not be predicted by reference to legislation. In fact,
any such effort would* probably have forecast opposite results in each
case. If certainty as to the amount to be paid is a primary goal for any
N.E.2d 172, 260 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1965). No one could argue that the market value of the owner's
interest would be unaffected by a long-term lease. The court's error lay in assuming that the owner's
interest was the sole subject of valuation. The court of appeals called attention to this mistake but
found reversal unnecessary, as the appellate division had presented no specific computation as the
basis for its valuation figures. 260 N.Y.S.2d at 441. The valuation of property subject to a long-term
lease in the context of a condemnation award is considered further infra at text accompanying notes
74-89.
38. 152 Ga. App. 346,262 S.E.2d 609 (1979).
39. At the time of the Martin decision, the statutory requirement that the assessor "consider"
covenants or deed restrictions dedicating land to a particular use, or "'any other factors deemed perti-
nent in arriving at fair market value," was contained in 3A. CODE § 92-5702 (1975). It is now found
in GA CODE ANN § 48-5-2(1 )(B) (1982).
40. 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515 (1976).
41. VT STAT. ANN- tit. 32, § 3481(l) (1981).
42. Martiz, 262 S.E.2d at 611.
43. Townsend, 365 A.2d at 516. This reinforces Llewellyn's contention that there exist "two
opposing canons on almost every point" of statutory interpretation-here, while "expression of one
thing excludes another," nonetheless "the language may fairly comprehend many different cases
where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example." Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision, 3 VAND L. REV 395, 401,405 (1950),
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system of taxation, 44 these cases are a poor reflection upon the perfor-
mance of the courts and legislatures.
C. Reasoning from the Nature and Purposes of the Tax
Given the minimal guidance provided by statutes, the development of
the majority approach-valuation based upon fair market rent, rather than
below-market contract rent-has drawn heavily upon the courts' sense,
not always explicit, of the aims and attributes of the tax. Prominent
among such considerations in long-term lease cases have been the goals
of taxing all interests in the property, however divided; of achieving hori-
zontal equity, with the concomitant need to determine which taxpayers or
parcels are to be considered similarly situated; of.assessing property at its
highest and best use; of taxing the "property itself"; of easing the burden
of tax administration; and even of maximizing the tax base. Each of these
issues sheds some light upon the long-term lease problem, but only the
first provides a solution rather than a provocative rephrasing of the ques-
tion, because it alone attempts to define the "property" subject to tax. An
examination of principles involved in the cases dealing with the long-term
lease confirms the superiority of the majority approach.
1. Taxing All Interests in Property
The most important and persuasive of these rationales interprets the tax
as a levy upon all legal interests in a given parcel, one which treats realty
subject to claims of both lessor and lessee in the same manner as equiva-
lent property occupied by the owner. "[i]t is not generally proper or nec-
essary that separate legal interests in a piece of property be independently
assessed .... [T]here should be but a single assessment of the property
without a separation of the interests of the lessor and lessee . . . . 45
Whatever interests constitute the "property" taxed when the owner occu-
pies the premises continue to constitute the "property" after it is leased.
A legislative decision to tax property values rather than the owner's in-
come mandates an assessment of all interests comprising that property,
whether or not the owner has reserved them for himself. Because a sale of
the landlord's and tenant's interests together would permit the pre-
44. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary ....
The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great impor-
tance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears .... is not near so great an evil,
as a very small degree of uncertainty.
3 A. SMiTH. THE WEALTH OF NATONS, Bk. V, Ch. 2, part II, at 257 (8th ed. 1796).
45. People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n, 17 A.D.2d 225,233 N.Y.S.2d 501,504-05 (1962).
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mises to be offered for rent at current market levels, a determination that
rented property should be assessed in the same manner as identical prop-
erty occupied by the owner effectively answers the long-term lease ques-
tion. 46 The strength of this reasoning has been largely responsible for
adoption of the summation-of-interests approach and valuations reflecting
full market rents by a majority of the courts considering this issue.
Much of this analysis, however, is unique to the long-term lease con-
text, and not transferable to consideration of divided interests in land gen-
erally. A landlord's interest in property burdened by an unfavorable lease
is diminished by reason of the encumbrance by exactly the amount of the
"bonus value" enjoyed by the tenant-the present value of the difference
between contract and market rent.47 Most other examples of divided legal
interests lack this symmetry. A prohibition on construction of improve-
ments, 48 for example, might enormously diminish the value of the
owner's interest without necessarily enhancing any other; by contrast, an
easement permitting access to a parcel of land might be responsible for
almost all its market value but not significantly impair the value of the
servient estate. 49 In such situations an appraisal that simply ignored the
46. For example, this criticism of Michigan's adoption of contract rent as the basis for assess-
ment, in C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 Mich. 442, 221 N.W.2d 588 (1974), appeal on
remand. 79 Mich. App. 559, 262 N.W.2d 863 (1977), affdsub nom. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township
of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981) (affirming original decision), requires no addi-
tional support, although proponents of the criticism provide further arguments based upon horizontal
equity:
The decision of the court is not correct. The Michigan property tax is a tax on each item of
nonexempt property, and the single annual assessment reaches all property rights and interests.
... One of the rights in property is the right to current possession. If the rent paid to the lessor
for this right is less than the current market value, then the value of the right of current posses-
sion must, of necessity, be increased. When this enhanced value for the right of possession is
combined with the value of the right to receive income from the property, the aggregate value of
the property will reflect current economic rent . . . .Admittedly, a sale of the lessor's interest
would have reflected the unfavorable lease, but this is not enough. A sale of the lessee's interest,
conversely, would have resulted in a return disproportionately higher than his relatively low
rental expense would suggest. The court should have considered the combined possible return
on sale.
Stanley, Tunstall & Opper, State and Local Taxation, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 587, 599 (1976).
47. "Where the contract rent is less than the economic rent, the owner in fact transfers a portion
of the land value to the user." A. RING, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE 37 (2d ed. 1970).
48. E.g., Lodge v. Inhabitants of Swampscott, 216 Mass. 260, 103 N.E. 635 (1913) (deed re-
strictions upon erection of improvements held to reduce "fair cash value" for tax purposes).
49. Numerous cases dealing with the taxation of property subject to an easement have ignored
this possibility and simply assumed that total market value of the servient and dominant estates is
conserved in this transaction. "When an easement is carved out of one property for the benefit of
another, the market value of the servient estate is, thereby lessened, and that of the dominant in-
creased, practically by just the value of the easement; the respective tenements should therfore be
assessed accordingly." Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751,752 (1914). This point
is discussed in more detail infra at text accompanying notes 268-71.
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existence of the encumbrance might seriously distort aggregate market
values. While a tax on the sum of all such interests might prove equally
appropriate under these circumstances, the straightforward device of
disregarding the encumbrance cannot be the means of achieving that
end. 50
The majority approach to the long-term lease cases does offer a pattern
applicable to arrangements which, like the lease, may affect a number of
persons but only one parcel of real estate-such as a mortgage or a life
estate-no matter what agreement these parties may have reached among
themselves as to liability for actual payment of the tax. 51 When a legal
restriction affects more than one unit of taxable property, the principle of
taxing all interests in a given unit provides only a part of the solution to
this more complex valuation problem. For the long-term lease, however,
it offers a consistent and nearly complete answer.
2. Horizontal Equity
Considerations of horizontal equity have been cited by a number of
cases adopting the majority approach to the lease question. "Taxing stat-
utes should not be construed so as to create inequalities between taxpay-
ers who own comparable parcels of substantially the same market value
but who, for a variety of reasons, receive disproportionate incomes from
the lease thereof." '52 This is an important argument, made more powerful
by the variety of legal transactions through which an owner could dimin-
ish the realizable sale price of a parcel of property without altering either
the physical situation of the property or the economic position of the
owner.53 The argument is not complete in itself, however, for it requires a
50. People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n, 17 A.D.2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504-05 (1962),
recognized this distinction but quoted Bonbright for the comment: "Why the easement should have
received the exceptional treatment we are unable to say." I J. BONBPRGHT, supra note 6, at 497.
51. Some states provide for separate taxation of leasehold interests. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-
3 (1982) ("All real property including, but not limited to, leaseholds, interests less than fee, and all
personal property shall be liable to taxation .... "). Neither this statute nor its predecessor was at
issue in Martin v. Liberty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga. App. 340, 262 S.E.2d 609 (1979),
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 38-43, because the lessor had agreed to pay all property
taxes upon the real estate at issue in that case.
The Vermont Supreme Court suggested in Townsend v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365
A.2d 515, 517 (1976) that legislative action of this type would be necessary in order to tax the
"bonus value" enjoyed by the lessee. Yet this ignores the legislative action that has been taken in
establishing a system of local taxation of property. Any long-term lease decision provides at least an
implicit definition of "property"; the court cannot simply await a legislative solution.
52. Martin v. Liberty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga. App. 346, 262 S.E.2d 609, 612
(1979).
53. For example, in Martin the lessor chose to receive a disproportionate share of the rental
payments in the first four years of a 35-year lease.
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prior determination as to the subject matter of the tax. Without this step,
there is no way of identifying those equal properties which are to be
treated equally. 54 Are they parcels yielding equal income to their owners,
those with equal realizable sale values, those with equal return to all par-
ties holding interests in them, or those with similar physical features? Un-
til this choice is made, appeals to horizontal equity could support any
given method of valuation.
3. Taxing the Capacity for Income
The concept of "highest and best use" provides another standard for
assessment: it suggests that properties of equal income-producing poten-
tial are to be treated equally, whatever the current yield to their owners.
"[I]t is the capacity for earning income, rather than the income actually
derived, which reflects 'fair cash value' for taxation . . ... 55 This is a
Under appellant's argument that the terms of the lease are to be considered in the assessment
of the "fair market value" of property for tax purposes, the tax liability of one who elects, as did
appellant, to receive the greater part of the consideration in the early years of the lease, would be
correspondingly greater during those years. Had the board been obliged to consider "use" of the
property during the first four years of the lease of appellant's property, we doubt if he would be
so ardent an advocate of the argument he currently advances.
Id. This suggests that, if contract rent and thus the sale value of the owner's interest were to be the
test of taxable value, an owner could take as a lump sum the present value of all payments required by
the lease, leaving only the reversionary value as the basis for assessment.
54. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981), illus-
trated this problem. The majority argued that the constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation,
MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 3, required capitalization of contract rent in assessment: "Properties encum-
bered by different lease terms . . . would not have the same cash value on the open market. It would
be incongruous, indeed violative of the rule of uniformity, to assess two properties the same despite
the fact that their usual selling prices are different." 302 N.W.2d at 173 (citations omitted). The
dissent, on the other hand, reasoned that the requirement of uniformity required capitalization of fair
market rent: "To allow business acumen to form the controlling basis of property tax assessment in
Michigan would obliterate the principal concept of consistency. Such a conclusion would seem fun-
damentally unfair and would result in the doctrine of uniformity becoming a mere sham." Id. at
189-90 (Moody, J., dissenting). A requirement of uniformity, without more, cannot determine
whether taxes are to be uniform between owners whose interests are of equal value, or between
owners whose properties contain interests of equal total value.
55. Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 44 IIl. 2d 428, 256 N.E.2d 334, 336
(1970). Accord Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184, 186 (1934) ("As a general
principle, earning or income-producing capacity, as distinguished from actual earnings, is to be re-
garded as a factor in valuation for taxation purposes .... "); Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol.
Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 34 N.E.2d 623, 626 (1941) ("The rental value of the land is competent as
showing its market value, although its earning capacity rather than its actual income would seem to
be more appropriate for this purpose." (citations omitted)); In re Property of Pine Raleigh Corp., 258
N.C. 398, 128 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1963):
The statute, G.S. § 105-295, in fixing the guide which assessors must use in valuating prop-
erty for taxes, includes as a factor "the past income therefrom, its probable future income." But
the income referred to is not necessarily actual income. The language is sufficient to include the
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helpful elaboration, but one in which the definitional problem simply as-
sumes a new form.
Under what circumstances is the property's "capacity for earning in-
come" to be determined? Surely some legal restrictions are to be given
weight. At a minimum, those imposed by the taxing jurisdiction itself,
such as zoning classification, 56 rent control, 57 and landmark preservation
programs limiting future development, 58 must be examined to determine
their effects upon the market value of the property. These effects may
largely depend upon potential purchasers' estimates of the possibility that
such restrictions could be lifted or modified in the future. Such encum-
brances may be distinguished from the long-term lease, as the latter is
undertaken voluntarily by the owner. Having had no part in imposing the
lease, the taxing jurisdiction need not account for it in assessment. 59 This
rationale deals adequately with the lease, but demonstrates again that a
solution sufficient in this area may resist easy translation to other types of
encumbrances and restrictions.
4. Taxing the "Property Itself'
Some courts have attempted to answer valuation questions by charac-
income which could be obtained by the proper and efficient use of the property. To hold other-
wise would be to penalize the competent and diligent and to reward the incompetent or indolent.
56. California requires tax assessors to take into account any enforceable restrictions upon the
use of land, and establishes a rebuttable presumption that zoning restrictions are permanent. Meyers
v. County of Alameda, 70 Cal. App. 3d 799, 139 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1977); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §
402.1 (West Supp. 1983). An even stricter view was expressed in Kensington Hills Dev. Co. v.
Milford Township, 10 Mich. App. 368, 159 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1968): "Zoning restrictions are real
and, during their duration, limit the use of the property as much as deed restrictions." Contra Trinity
Place Co. v. Finance Adm'r, 38 N.Y. 144, 149, 341 N.E.2d 536, 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (1975)
("[The fact that the plaza land may not be used for other purposes without city permission is not
determinative of its value .... What has been zoned can be rezoned.").
57. See, e.g., Rockaway Crest Section 1, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 38 A.D.2d 759, 329 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1972); Block v. Tax Comm'n, 33 A.D.2d 899, 306 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1970); New York Cent.
R.R. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 A.D.2d 543, 271 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1966).
58. See NEw YoRK Crrv ADMIN. CODE § 207-8.0 (1978), which incorporates procedures for tax
exemptions and remissions into consideration of requests for alterations of landmarks and historical
districts. In a major landmark preservation case involving the Grand Central Terminal, Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 331, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914,
918 (1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the New York Court of Appeals recognized that "the value
of the property necessarily depends on the return permitted or available."
59. "[Ihe advantageous leases were yielded to the three tenants with the landlord's eyes open.
... The county was not a party to these plans; nor was it, or is it, a coentrepreneur who was required
to share in [the taxpayer's] good or bad fortune." Merrick Holding Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 45
N.Y.2d 538, 545, 382 N.E.2d 1341, 1344, 410 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1978). The Arizona Court of
Appeals expressed a similar attitude in Caldwell v. Department of Revenue: "[Tihe voluntary alien-
ation of a leasehold interest does not destroy the comparability of the sale of other properties not
similarly encumbered." 122 Ariz. 519, 596 P.2d 45, 47 (Ct. App. 1979).
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terizing the tax as a levy upon the "property itself.' "60 This resembles a
definition of "property" as the sum of all legal interests but risks serious
confusion by suggesting the tangible, physical object as the subject of the
tax. 61 The market value of ownership rights in the land cannot be set
without reference to intangible legal attributes. "Properties may have
similar physical characteristics, but differences in economic factors will
determine the usual selling price of the properties. Properties encumbered
by different lease terms, zoning restrictions, or deed restrictions, al-
though physically similar, would not have the same cash value on the
open market." 62 Unless a court is willing to ignore zoning, rent control,
and historic preservation restrictions, on the one hand, or to allow owner-
imposed and non-arm's-length agreements to lower an assessment on the
other, the task of distinguishing among various types of encumbrances
cannot be avoided.
5. Administrative Considerations
Concern for the efficient administration of the property tax has played a
role in long-term lease decisions, as courts adopting the majority position
and valuing property in light of its full market rent have occasionally ad-
60. E.g., Caldwell v. Department of Revenue, 122 Ariz. 519, 596 P.2d 45, 47 (Ct. App. 1979)
("It is the value of the real property itself that is to be determined .... ); People ex rel. Gale v. Tax
Comm'n, 17 A.D.2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (1962) ("[Rleal property taxes are assessed on the
basis of the full value of the property itself. In all cases the assessment is against the 'real property
itself'. . . . The tax levied is a tax upon the whole land, and not merely on the interest of a particular
person therein."). Gale drew upon a statute, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 304(1) (McKinney Supp.
1982-83), which provides that assessments are to be "against the real property itself which shall be
liable to sale pursuant to law for any unpaid taxes or special ad valorem levies." But the question as
to whether the owner is personally liable for unpaid taxes, or whether these become simply a lien
against the property assessed, is distinct from the valuation issue as to what conditions are taken into
account in setting the "fair market value" of the real estate.
61. Bonbright contended that decisions in the early part of this century indicated a shift from
identification of "property" with a tangible object to "the newer concept of property, which centers
attention in opportunities and expectations of income rather than in physical things." I J. BON-
BRIGHT. supra note 6, at 109. He also stated:
Because the law of early capitalism concerned itself so largely with rights of full, undivided
ownership, and because these rights attached mainly to specific, tangible objects, like land or
chattels, the property rights in these objects were closely identified with the objects themselves.
... A court, no less than the layman, will sometimes refer to a tract of land or a shipment of
wheat as property, and will sometimes refer to the legal interests of people in this land or in this
shipment as property.
Id. at 100-01. Bonbright foresaw that this "process of education," id. at 109, would lead to greater
emphasis upon capitalization of income as a method of valuing "property." But the long-term lease
cases demonstrate that such capitalization can itself prove insufficiently sophisticated unless the cir-
cumstances under which the income is to be measured are explicitly identified-and that process can
shift attention from the owner's interest to the sum of all interests in the physical "land itself."
62. C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164, 173 (1981).
See supra text accompanying note 13.
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verted to the danger that an opposite result would encourage tax evasion
through mutually disadvantageous leases63 or other rental arrangements
without economic effect. 64 Similarly, the difficulty of evaluating the
terms of all leases within a taxing jurisdiction is sometimes cited in sup-
port of a decision to capitalize fair market rent rather than contract rent. 65
These considerations can lend additional weight to a decision justified
by independent reasoning, but cannot in themselves support a given out-
come. Valuation of commercial property will of necessity involve occa-
sional analysis of complex documents and financing arrangements.66 A
decision to capitalize fair market rent introduces complexities of its own,
substituting the assessor's computations for either a verifiable income fig-
ure67 or the actual sale price of the encumbered property. Courts choosing
to reject the majority position and value property on the basis of below-
market rent have had little trouble rationalizing the administrative conse-
quences of their position. 68 Given the administrative difficulties inherent
63. E.g., Clayton v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 394, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690
(1972).
64.. E.g., Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 294, 124 S.E.2d 206, 211
(1962) ("If I own land worth $10,000 1 cannot escape taxation by renting it to a friend for one dollar a
year. And tax assessors cannot be expected to ascertain whether the lessee is a friend or a controlling
stockholder of the lessor.").
65. E.g., Martin v. Mesquite, 590 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) ("We cannot adopt a
rule that would require the tax assessor to examine the provisions of each commercial lease, calculate
the rent under various contingencies, evaluate the taxpayer's claims of legitimate expenses, and apply
a capitalization factor to determine market value.").
66. A sale-leaseback, for example, requires a determination as to whether the rental payments
constitute interest for the use of money in addition to payment for the use of property. E.g., Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Middlebury Bd. of Tax Review, 174 Conn. 380, 389 A.2d 734 (1978); Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d 715 (1971); City of Atlantic v. County
Bd. of Review, 234 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 1975). Unless the actual lease is to be ignored, its terms must
be analyzed in order to identify elements of noncash return to the lessor (such as construction of
improvements) or payments by the lessee for nonoccupancy benefits (such as the use of money).
67. Considerations of this type have led the New Jersey Supreme Court, which has in a series of
well-reasoned opinions rejected capitalization of below-market rent as a basis for assessment, Hum-
ble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 71 N.J. 401, 365 A.2d 929 (1976); City of New
Brunswick v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702 (1963), to require that contract
rent upon large, well-managed apartment projects operating under short term leases be treated as
prima facie evidence of fair rental value. Parkview Village Assocs. v. Borough of Collingswood, 62
N.J. 21, 297 A.2d 842 (1972). "A court or taxing agency should be most hesitant to find that the
tenants of a residential property being operated commercially are being charged inadequate rent."
297 A.2d at 849.
68. E.g., Townsend v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515, 517 (1976) ("we
believe that any attempted fraud of this nature would be readily discoverable through resort to the
judicial process"). The Vermont court, in fact, saw no administrative barriers to increasing the num-
ber of assessments, for it recommended that the legislature permit leases and options to be taxed to
their holders if capitalization of below market rent in assessment offended the principle of horizontal
equity. Id. Cf. Lodge v. Inhabitants of Swampscott, 216 Mass. 260, 103 N.E. 635, 636 (1913) (As to
deed restrictions, the court held: "No doubt assessors cannot be compelled to inquire into all the
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:713, 1983
in any system of ad valorem taxation, the incremental burdens posed by
various approaches to the lease question can have no decisive effect upon
the long-term lease question.
6. Maximizing the Tax Base
An even more pragmatic approach to valuation has led some courts to
cite the need for a stable tax base as justification for disregarding an unfa-
vorable long-term lease. 69 Generally, these courts have attempted to rec-
oncile this result with the statutory standard of market value by an appeal
to "true" or "intrinsic" values. 70 This reasoning was most in evidence in
the 1930's, when the cataclysmic drop in market values accompanying
the Depression threatened to erode the economic support of local govern-
ments. Constitutional and statutory limitations prevented them from re-
covering through rate increases what they lost through diminution of the
tax base. 7 1 Yet even if maximization of that base were accepted as a
details affecting the title to property, but when their attention is called to matters relating to its value
they are bound to pay due regard to them.").
69. E.g., Minnesota v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14 (D. Minn. 1938); Somers v. City
of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184 (1934); People ex rel. 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Boyland, 281
A.D. 588, 121 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1953). In Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167, 175 (Me.
1974), the court stated:
Stability in municipal income is a factor which must always be considered. To require owners
of property which is not income-producing to pick up the deficiency resulting from reducing the
tax burden of income property owners each time there is a temporary downward trend in the
economy, would surely not be either feasible or equitable.
70. E.g., People ex rel. 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Boyland, 281 A.D. 588, 121 N.Y.S.2d 238.
241 (1953) ("There are times when property must bear a share of taxation proportionate to value even
though it may then have no income, or an income inadequately focused to true value."). By contrast,
Bonbright refused to draw any implication of normal or intrinsic worth from the term "value," stat-
ing that "an abnormal, or evanescent, or extortionate, or dangerously low market price represents
just as true a current value as does a normal, or permanent, or fair, or reasonably high market price."
I J. BONBRIGHT. supra note 6, at 29 n.23.
71. "'The fact that property cannot be sold at a particular period of depression should not be taken
as conclusive that its value has been materially reduced." Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5.
174 A. 184, 186 (1934). Bonbright commented, "During a depression, therefore, assessors and
judges must conspire in a gigantic legal lie about property values-a lie which is concealed by all
sorts of loose talk about the stability of real values as contrasted with the collapse of mere market
prices." 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 471. In 1936 the United States Supreme Court took judicial
notice "of the fact that late in 1929 there occurred a great collapse of values of all classes of prop-
erty," and held failure to consider the effect of the Depression upon property values a violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Great N. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 149, 152 (1936). Yet this decision's
effect was more limited than might be expected. Assessments at "true" or "'intrinsic" value contin-
ued; only complete disregard of the 1929 collapse was prohibited. This "factor" could easily be
"taken into account" without necessarily having an observable effect upon the ultimate figures as-
signed as the property values. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14, 20 (D.
Minn. 1938) (citing Great N. Ry., upholding 1936 assessment valuing unmarketable building at $2.9
million). On the constitutional and statutory limitations preventing unlimited property tax rate in-
creases, and their effect upon assessments during the Depression, see infra note 176.
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proper goal for assessment, it would only suggest in the lease context that
the greater of contract or fair market rent be capitalized. 72 The fact that
even such a principle, divorced as it is from verifiable and statutorily
mandated market value criteria, may be perceived as a guide for assess-
ment73 dramatizes the absence of clear goals for the property tax.
D. Analogous Valuation Problems
A third source of guidance is found in similar valuation controversies,
especially those surrounding eminent domain proceedings and assess-
ments of property encumbered by other types of legal restrictions.
1. Condemnation Awards
Comparison of eminent domain and property tax decisions proves
again the inexactness of a "market value" standard. A number of courts
declare valuation procedures for these two purposes to be identical, while
others find them dissimilar. 74 Decisions setting condemnation awards for
the taking of property subject to a long-term lease provide'special guid-
ance for the property tax question, however, by analyzing the issue in
terms of the legal interests constituting the "property" so taken.
"Just compensation" for property encumbered by a long-term lease
and taken for public use75 requires valuation of both the lessor's and les-
see's interests in appropriated property. 76 The lessee's interest or "bonus
value" is calculated as the difference between fair rental value of the
premises and rent reserved in the lease. 77 The lessee's award thus differs
72. Both Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184 (1934), and Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Middlebury Bd. of Tax Review, 174 Conn. 380, 389 A.2d 734 (1978), recognized fair market rent,
not contract rent, as the proper basis for valuation in property tax cases, yet both permitted the asses-
sor to take above market leases into account. In Somers the desire to maintain pre-Depression values
was explicit. The Uniroyal court professed no goal of maximizing assessments, but the result sug-
gested such an approach.
73. E.g., Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184, 186 (1934) ("Was it the purpose
of the statute to jeopardize the machinery of. . . [a] municipality, during a depression, or was it
enacted to cover ordinary conditions existing over a period of years? To ask the question is to answer
it."); Central Realty Co. v. Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 158 S.E. 537, 538 (1931).
74. Compare Great N. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 139 (1936) ("The principles governing the
ascertainment of value for the purposes of taxation are the same as those that control in condemnation
cases, confiscation cases, and generally in controversies involving the ascertainment of just compen-
sation.") with Peck v. Pelcher, 55 Misc. 2d 516, 285 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (1967) (valuation for
taxation is "a totally different concept than exists in eminent domain proceedings").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar language can be found in almost all state constitutions.
Searles, Eminent Domairi:A Kaleidoscopic View, I REAL EsT. L. REv. 226, 228 (1973).
76. E.g., Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth., 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980); see also
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
77. E.g., In re Mott Haven Houses, 33 Misc. 2d 808, 227 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862 (1960), affd, 16
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from the measure of a lessee's interest for property tax purposes. If a
separate tax were imposed on the leasehold interest-as is commonly
done when the lessor is a tax-exempt entity-no deduction would be
made for the present value of the contract rent. For tax purposes, the
leasehold would be valued at the discounted fair market rent over the
lease term-what the lessee would pay a landlord, not what a prospective
tenant would pay the lessee to assume the lessee's position and rent obli-
gations. The fact that no award is due the lessee in condemnation does not
mean the leasehold has no taxable value. As the California Supreme
Court explained:
In eminent domain the full value of the interest must be paid for, but since
the taking discharges the obligation to pay future rent, the value of that obli-
gation to the lessor must be awarded to him .... It would be anomalous to
hold that a possessory interest has no value [for tax purposes] merely be-
cause the lessee has agreed to pay what it is worth.78
In other words, the court in an eminent domain proceeding may accept
the value set for the lessee's interest for tax purposes, and yet require no
payment in compensation for its loss because a rental obligation of equal
magnitude was simultaneously extinguished. To the extent the lessee en-
joyed no "bonus value" from below-market rent, no compensation is
due, and the lessor's award should be correspondingly greater than that
due the owner of a similar structure bound by an unfavorable lease.
Eminent domain decisions thus clearly value property as a summation
of interests, with little of the confusion found in property tax decisions
A.D.2d 637, 227 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1962), aff d, 13 N.Y.2d 959, 194 N.E.2d 424, 244 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1963); Horgan & Edgar, Leasehold Valuation Problems in Eminent Domain, 4 U.S.F.L. REV 1
(1969); Annot., 60 L. Ed. 2d 1107, § 7 (1980); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 286 (1949).
78. Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338 P.2d 440, 444 (1959). This case
involved valuation of a possessory interest in tax-exempt property, the possessory interest alone be-
ing subject to tax. In Blinn Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles County, 216 Cal. 474, 14 P.2d 512, (1932),
the court had held that a leasehold subject to separate assessment was to be taxed only upon its
"bonus value," allowing a deduction for rental payments. A leasehold interest acquired for fair mar-
ket value thus had no separate taxable worth. Blinn was overruled in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County
of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544, 557 (1955) ("[T]he assessor must estimate the price a
leasehold would bring on an open market .... No deduction is made for the cost of the lease to the
present lessee .... "). Accord Korzen v. American Airlines, 39 111. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 568 (1968);
see K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN. TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY ch. 18 (2d ed. 1979). The argument for
an opposing rule is made in Ricks, Possessory Interests in Publicly Owned Property: Improperly
Assessed, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 347, 350-51 (1967):
The court [in De Luz] expressed concern that it was possible under Blinn for a leasehold estate to
have zero or negative indicated value if amortization of improvement costs plus contract rent
exceeded the economic rent of the whole property .... But is this not equitable? If the lessee,
because of market changes, remains committed to pay more for property under a lease than it





which identify the lessor's interest with the value of the property as a
whole. Condemnation cases have recognized the lessee's interest as a
component of full value, even when the lessee is prevented by agreement
with the lessor from claiming reimbursement for it.79 Of course, the prop-
erty owner who vigorously directs the court's attention to the summation-
of-interests approach in an eminent domain proceeding is not likely to
have suggested it in any earlier assessment dispute. "A certain degree of
cynicism is no doubt warranted by the very general practice of land-
owners who have applied for [tax abatements] of putting down estimates
that vary widely from the claims that they make when the property is
about to be condemned." 80
Eminent domain cases involving a long-term lease favorable to the
landlord present some special difficulties that do not arise in property tax
assessment controversies. When fair market rent exceeds contract rent,
the difference may be assigned to the tenant as a leasehold bonus, with
the corresponding diminution in the value of the landlord's interest pro-
ducing a constant sum. By this logic, a landlord enjoying a lease with
above-market rental payments should be compensated for loss of the
bonus if the property is taken during the term of the lease. Yet unless the
tenant is called upon for a contribution representing the benefit received
79. E.g., In re Mott Haven Houses, 33 Misc. 2d 808, 227 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (1960), affd, 16
A.D.2d 637, 227 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1962), affid, 13 N.Y.2d 959, 194 N.E.2d 424, 244 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1963):
[T]he City would have the court disregard the value of the lessee's interest and make a total
award only for the lessor's interest despite the fact that the City is taking both interests .... The
City's contention that the owner could not obtain any more for the property in the market place if
it were encumbered by this lease totally ignores the fact that a purchaser of the fee interest would
acquire the property subject to the encumbrance of the lease. The City takes the property free
and clear of all encumbrances and thus acquires the interest of both the fee owner and the lessee
80. In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 A.D.2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786, 795
(1961), affdmem., 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1963), aff d, 16 N.Y.2d
497, 208 N.E.2d 172, 260 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1965). The court explained the effect of a property tax
determination upon a condemnation award:
As these figures cannot be reconciled, the conclusion is inescapable that one estimate or the
other, and possibly both, bear little relation to the true opinion of the owner, and his statement
that the estimate represents his opinion is false. But the constitution makes no provision for
distinguishing the compensation to be given to an honest applicant and one who lets his desires
outrun standards of common honesty. "Just" compensation does not mean compensation lim-
ited to the just. An admission of an opinion is not controlling as to the fact. The realization that
the admission is not binding has been hailed in some quarters by the assertion that there is one
value for condemnation and another for taxation. The genesis of such a contention is apparent-
it is by Sophistry out of Greed. Value is the same regardless of the nature of the proceeding.
However, the same property may have different values at different times. If a proceeding to fix
value for tax purposes is sufficiently close in time to the time of taking, the adjudication would
provide a standard common to both proceedings and binding on all concerned.
222 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96.
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by early termination of the unfavorable lease, a condemnation award
based upon the value of the undivided fee will not be sufficient for such a
payment. While below-market rents are, in effect, a transfer of a portion
of the property value from the lessor to the lessee, payments of above-
market rents represent a type of nonproperty return to the lessor. 81
Through luck or business acumen, the lessor has received income greater
than property value alone would warrant. And since, not surprisingly,
"[n]o cases have been found, and it is unlikely that any court will so
decide ... that the lessee [should] contribute or pay the negative value of
his interest upon a complete taking," 82 the only remaining alternatives
are undercompensation of the landlord or payment of more than the mar-
ket value of the undivided fee by the condemnor. While this specific
question has been confronted only rarely in reported decisions, 83 the gen-
eral acceptance of the undivided fee concept in setting total eminent do-
main awards 84 suggests that most jurisdictions would choose the former
course.
The eminent domain cases support the majority approach to the lease
question in the tax context: valuation reflecting fair market rent. Depar-
ture from the undivided fee rule in eminent domain cases in order to com-
pensate the landlord fully may be likened to an assessment based upon
contract rent. Each takes the realizable sale price of the lessor's interest
into account, but produces a result at variance with a concept of property
as a summation of all component legal interests, however divided. Each
allows the contractual arrangements between lessor and lessee to work to
the detriment of the taxing or condemning jurisdiction. This analogy was
dramatized in a decision by the California Court of Appeals 85 in which
the court refused to capitalize below-market rent for tax purposes and crit-
icized an earlier opinion86 which suggested that "just compensation" in
eminent domain required consideration of a long-term lease benefiting a
81. Property subject to a long-term lease favorable to the lessor should be assessed in the same
manner as if encumbered by an unfavorable lease-by capitalization of the fair market rent. For
discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 125-30.
82. Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 477,492 (1962).
83. See id.
84. E.g., St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S.W.2d 600, 604 (1933); Moulton v. George,
208 Tenn. 586, 348 S.W.2d 129, 130, 132 (1961). See Note, The Undivided Fee Rule in California,
20 HASTINGs L.J. 717 (1968-69); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1263 (1930), supplemented by 166 A.L.R. 1211
(1947). On the compensability of the loss of business and good will, see generally 2 J. SACKMAN.
NIcHoLs" THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.24 (rev. 3d ed. 1982).
85. Clayton v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1972).
86. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1967). This case is discussed in Horgan & Edgar, Leasehold Valuation Problems in Eminent
Domain. 4 U.S.F.L. REV. 1,26-31 (1969) (the case "has left this area of the law in a shambles");
Kanner, People v. Lynbar, Inc. Revisited, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 39 (1970-71); Note, supra note 84.
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landlord. 87 The court in the later case found this "so questionable as a
matter of condemnation doctrine" that it refused "to use it as a spring-
board for even more questionable taxation law." 8 8 Taxation of the undi-
vided fee does not preclude, of course, an explicit legislative choice of a
contrary approach in eminent domain cases. However, this could produce
the administrative complexities and problems of non-arm's-length ar-
rangements identified in assessment decisions. 89
2. Valuation Under Rent Control
Rent control limits a landlord's income as effectively as does a long-
term lease. Unlike the lease, however, rent control does not require the
landlord's consent. This distinction negates many of the arguments in fa-
vor of capitalizing fair market rent for property tax purposes. Rent control
is not "a private arrangement," 90 nor is it imposed "with the landlord's
eyes open and no doubt directed towards its own short or long-range
profit.' '91 Moreover, the governmental unit seeking to impose the tax
usually cannot claim that it "was not a party to these plans." '92 All these
considerations militate against valuing rent-controlled property on the
basis of the income it could command in an unrestricted market, and such
in fact has been the conclusion of most courts presented with this issue.93
Although owners may be pleased with this result in the property tax con-
text, they have not hesitated to take the opposite position in eminent do-
87. The Lynbar court's own discussion of the implications of its position reveals its error:
If, on the other hand, the actual rental under the existing lease is less than such fair rental value,
ordinarily the fair market value of the parcel taken will be reduced accordingly and the condem-
nor then pays less by way of just compensation. In either event the condemnor pays for what it
takes in the condition the parcel was on the date of valuation or condition.
62 Cal. Rptr. at 330. The condemnor will not pay "less by way of just compensation" in this in-
stance, for the value of the lessee's interest will balance the reduction in the lessor's share of the
award. This negates the court's attempt to draw a unifying principle equating "market value" with
realizable sale price, and thus undercuts similar efforts with regard to assessment for property tax
purposes.
88. Clayton v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 394, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690
(1972). '
89. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
90. The court in Clayton v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 393, 102 Cal. Rptr.
687, 689 (1972), characterized a long-term lease in this way.
91. Merrick Holding Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 45 N.Y.2d 538, 545, 382 N.E.2d 1341,
1344, 410 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1978) (fair market rent, not rent called for in lease, to be capitalized
for property tax purposes).
92. Id.
93. E.g., Rockaway Crest Section 1, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 38 A.D.2d 759, 329 N.Y.S.2d 620
(1972); Block v. Tax Comm'n, 33 A.D.2d 899, 306 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1970).
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main proceedings. The New York Supreme Court answered such owner
objections in its 1961 Lincoln Square94 opinion:
Various claimants have contested [the use of controlled rent as the guide to
property value] on the ground that increases in rental have been from time to
time allowed, that procedures exist for obtaining additional rentals, and that
the whole system of rent controls may be abolished. Taking these arguments
in reverse order, the last is such a remote possibility that it cannot be consid-
ered and no indication that purchases are made on that contingency has ever
been established. While procedures do exist for increases in rent, the fact
that the instant landowner has not availed himself of them is some indication
that in the particular instance they would not prove fruitful. As for prior rent
increases, they are reflected in the current rent roll. 95
One could apply the sum-of-the-interests approach to a rent control
case, arguing that a legislative decision to transfer a portion of the prop-
erty's value to the tenant does not foreclose an assessment upon the value
of the undivided fee. 96 But so harsh a result should require explicit legis-
lative approval. Absent that, the tax due from the landlord should be mea-
sured by the value of the property remaining to him.
The valuation of low-income housing constructed with the aid of gov-
ernment subsidies combines elements of legal restrictions, rent control,
and the long-term lease. 97 The interaction of these latter two strands was
well illustrated in Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland,98 a case in-
94. It re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 A.D.2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961).
affd mere., 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 190 N.E. 2d 423,240 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1963), affd, 16 N.Y.2d 497,208
N.E.2d 172, 260 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1965).
95. 222N.Y.S.2dat794.
96. This could be rationalized if the rent control legislation permitted rents to rise with tax assess-
ments. The capitalization of fair market rent would then in effect tax the tenants for the bonus value
they enjoy. Cf. Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland, 16 A.D.2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982, 992
(1962) (Breitel, J., dissenting) ("Realistically, any increase in the taxes owed by this property will be
home by the tenants in the way of increases in their rents .... "), affd mein., 12 N.Y.2d 1044. 190
N.E.2d 239, 239 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1963). Even absent such a pass-through of taxes, a legislative deci-
sion to assess fee owners upon the undivided property value would probably withstand an equal
protection challenge, on the grounds that it represented a reasonable policy analogous to imposition
of a new tax. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (Florida law granting only widows, not
widowers, an annual $500 property tax exemption did not violate the federal constitutional require-
ment of equal protection, discrimination not arbitrary if founded upon "a reasonable distinction, or
difference in state policy"), quoting Allied Stores v. Brown, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959); Amador
Valley Joint Union H.S. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 237, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,
252, 583 P.2d 1281, 1294 (1978) (no invidious discrimination in reassessing property only upon
change of ownership or new construction- "no compelling reason exists for assuming that property
lawfully may be taxed only at current values, rather than at some other value, or upon some different
basis").
97. The character of subsidized housing arrangements as a type of legal restriction upon use of
the property is considered infra at text accompanying notes 353-62.
98. 16 A.D.2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1962), affd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 1044, 190 N.E.2d 239,
239 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1963). This case is discussed further infra at text accompanying notes 353-55.
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volving property built in response to the incentives of New York's Public
Housing Law. These included low-interest loans and a twenty-year ex-
emption from property taxes upon improvements. In return, owners were
limited both in their income from the property and in the price for which
they could sell it.99 The taxpayers in Knickerbocker Village sought to
limit the assessed value of their property to the permitted sale price. The
New York Appellate Division rejected this argument with reasoning simi-
lar to that employed in many long-term lease cases:
What is to be assessed is the whole of the property... regardless of restric-
tions personal to the owner .... The restrictions upon its sale of the real
property result solely from petitioner's ownership. The restrictions were vo-
luntarily assumed and to a large extent induced by the advantage of a 20-
year exemption in respect of the improvement. 100
Yet, as a dissenting opinion pointed out:
[T]he restrictions "run" with the land if that be the test .... [T]he restric-
tions here are rigorous limitations, in the classic real property sense, on the
estate held by the owner. Moreover, they are all but never removable, even
if unlimited moneys are available to the owner for that purpose .... 101
In part, this simply dramatizes the need for-and lack of-predictabil-
ity in the property tax area. Had the developers known and planned for a
tax assessment based upon fair market rent, such a payment could have
been viewed as one more element in the bargain struck with the city. Be-
yond this, the case illustrates that the critical distinction between the rent
control and long-term lease cases lies in the taxpayer's voluntary assump-
tion of the limitations upon income. The classification of Knickerbocker
Village's restriction as "personal to the owner" is based upon this notion
of consent rather than upon a traditional property law designation, 102 a
99. The property could be sold only to the city or to another public housing corporation:
[The property could be sold only] for a price not in excess of the cost of the said property less
any amounts paid in amortization of the mortgage indebtedness and the retirement or redemption
of stock, plus so much of the limited dividends on the stock.., as shall have been unpaid, and
accrued interest on the mortgage indebtedness and income debenture certificates.
226 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
100. Id. at 987. The court had previously noted that such a limit would cause the assessment to
vary "inv'ersely to its profits .... [A]s petitioner's profits increase more can be applied to amortiza-
tion and stock redemption with a consequent lowering of the statutory maximum sales price .... "
Id. at 986.
101. Id. at 990 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
102. A long-term lease may be recorded in many jurisdictions, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183,
§ 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1968);.WASH. Rev. CODE §
65.12.470 (1981), and enforced against subsequent purchasers of the fee, e.g., Bank of New York v.
Ifirschfield, 37 N.Y.2d 501, 336 N.E.2d 710, 374 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§
291, 294 (McKinney 1968). It may thus be said to "run with the land," yet this provides little
support for permitting it to reduce the property's assessed value if it would not otherwise have that
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:713, 1983
concern that the tax base not be diminished through restrictions sought by
the owner. The wider applications of this principle of ignoring voluntarily
assumed restrictions must be approached with care. 103 But it offers imme-
diate support to the majority position on the long-term lease, 104 i.e., valu-
ation reflecting fair market rent rather than contract rent.
3. The State of the Owner's Title
Parcels with sale value diminished by an owner's inability to convey
clear title present another example of divided legal interests, with many
similarities to the long-term lease. New Jersey courts, for example, with a
strong record in support of capitalization of fair market rent, 105 have held
that deficiencies in the owner's title cannot affect valuation for tax pur-
poses. "The law requires an assessment of the value, not of the purported
owner's title, but of the land; the assessed value of the land represents the
effect. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary encumbrances is in this respect more im-
portant for valuation than is the distinction between encumbrances personal to the owner and those
which run with the land.
103. In particular. it must be recognized that the voluntary, profit-motivated actions of owners
can in certain instances reduce the jurisdiction's tax base. An owner may neglect the property and
maintain it poorly: an owner may also fail to construct improvements that would maximize its value.
So long as the tax base is linked to that market value it will be affected by such decisions. Many cases
seem to overlook this when employing a highest and best use analysis. E.g., In re Ernst, 58 Misc. 2d
504, 295 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (1968), affd mem., 33 A.D.2d 655, 306 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1969) (Up-
holding capitalization of fair market, not contract, rent: "Can we, for tax purposes, permit the owner
of taxable property to create 'instant economic obsolescence' by encumbering said property with an
inadequate lease agreement? And then must the taxing authority 'bail' him out? The Court doesn't
believe so."). A potential purchaser need not continue the current use of the property, but its condi-
tion at the time of sale will affect the bid which might have been made for it.
104. This outcome did not retain its clarity long. Six years after Knickerbocker Village, a special
term decision considered the same issue and reached the opposite conclusion without mention of the
earlier case. The New York Appellate Division affirmed without an opinion. The rationale was sim-
ply a rejection of hypothetical values:
This property is by law rigidly rent controlled and rigidly controlled in many other respects.
Therefore I do not find much help by giving consideration to capitalization of hypothetical net
income from a hypothetical building which could not legally be erected and operated under the
laws applicable to this property.
Washbridge Housing Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 60 Misc. 2d 296, 303 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (1968), affd
ire., 32 A.D.2d 899, 303 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1969). Washbridge may represent a reaction against the
city's attempt to ignore rent control as well as public housing regulation, an approach it suggested in
Knickerbocker Village as well, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85, without influencing the outcome in that
case. It may also represent a response to the continuing attraction of a realizable sale price standard,
even in a state which has clearly adopted the majority rule that property is to be valued on the basis of
fair market rent.
105. E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 71 N.J. 401, 365 A.2d 929,
931 (1976) (Conford, P.J.A.D., concurring) ("What is theoretically wrong about the Appellate Divi-
sion capitalization approach, however, is its acceptance of the actual rental income of the property
instead of postulating the fair or 'economic' rental value. The legal criterion is always the latter."):
City of New Brunswick v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702 (1963).
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value of all interests in the land." 106 A representative 1972 opinion con-
sidered property physically equivalent to lots of $90,000 value, but re-
cently sold for only $35,500, "subject to 'tidelands or riparian rights
which might be claimed by the State of New Jersey.' 1107 The court re-
fused to limit the assessment to the sale price:
Here both sides concede that the "value of all interests in the land" is
$90,000. The sale for $35,500 does not meet the stated test; it was a sale
only of the owner's title, subject to such rights as the State might have.
The difference between $90,000, the conceded value if there were not a
cloud on title, and the sales price of $35,500 undoubtedly represents the
buyer's estimate of the cost to it of eliminating, either through purchase or
litigation, the outstanding adverse claim to title. It is understandable that a
purchaser will insist on a discount from the true value of property if he buys
a doubtful title, but the fact that he does so affords no justification for apply-
ing a discount in a tax valuation case. 108
On the strength of this reasoning a Tennessee court, citing this case,
concluded that a deed restriction preventing sale of land or its lease for
more than one year should not affect its assessment, despite a statute di-
recting that "legal restrictions on use" be considered in valuation. 109
Neither the subsidized housing cases nor decisions on restricted title can
be analyzed in any but their most elementary form without consideration
of the special treatment historically afforded property subject to ease-
ments and similar limitations upon use. 110 However, the courts' willing-
ness to disregard the realizable sale price of the owner's interest here
lends definite support to such an approach in the less problematic long-
term lease area.
4. Property Subject to a Mortgage
The well-settled practice of combining the interests of mortgagor and
mortgagee in property assessment offers a number of useful parallels to
the long-term lease. It clearly demonstrates, for example, that accepted
applications of the tax bear no ready relationship to the owner's ability to
pay. As Jens Jensen observed in his 1931 treatise, Property Taxation in
the United States:
106. Stack v. City of Hoboken, 45 N.J. Super. 294, 132 A.2d 314, 318 (1957) (agreement with
grantor restricting sale rights held not to affect valuation for property tax purposes).
107. Town of Secaucus v. Damsil, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 470, 295 A.2d 8, 9, cert. denied, 62
N.J. 90, 299 A.2d 88 (1972).
108. 295A.2dat 10.
109. Hoover v. State Bd. of Equalization, 579 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
110. A discussion of cases combining these elements may be found infra at text accompanying
notes 353-62.
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The application of the test of ability to pay, in its proper form, to the
general property tax need not detain us long . . .. [T]here is obviously no
necessary, or at best only a very remote, relationship between the clear in-
come of a taxpayer, especially if he holds property heavily encumbered with
debt, and the property taxes he may be required to pay. " '
Bonbright made the same point: "What reason is there to suppose that the
value of a house worth $10,000, but subject to a mortgage of $9,000,
measures even crudely the taxpaying ability of the owner of the
equity?" 12
At one time the distinction between a mortgage which transferred title
to property and one which provided merely a lien against it was thought
conclusive of its treatment for assessment purposes. 113 However, with the
recognition that retention of legal title by an exempt entity does not confer
immunity from taxation upon property held by a nonexempt vendee 14 or
lessee, 115 the locus of legal title has lost this determinative quality. 116
Until recently, the state of Washington afforded an exception to the gen-
eral rule of assessing the mortgagee's interest together with the mortga-
gor's. The Washington court in a set of cases1 17 decided early in this cen-
tury had, through an erroneous parallel to eminent domain awards, 118
determined that rental payments were to be deducted in valuing a lease-
hold for tax purposes, 119 thus taxing only the "bonus value" of the lease.
The court then extended this principle to require deduction of mortgage
111. J. JENSEN. PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (193 1).
112. I J. BONBRIGHT. supra note 6, at 455.
113. E.g., In re Rolater, 67 Okla. 215, 170 P. 507, 508 (1918) ("Under our Constitution and
statutes property must be assessed at its fair cash value, and this without regard to the amount of
mortgage liens against the property. A mortgage in this state transfers no title to real estate, but is
merely a lien to secure the payment of debt.").
114. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569 (1946):
We think that the public policy of national development and federal tax collection justify the
limitation on state taxing power . . . . We do not, however, conclude that [the] rationale [of
previous decisions] leads to an exemption from state taxation of all lands in which the United
States holds legal title as security for the purchase price.
115. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) (leasehold interest in federal property
may be subject to local taxation).
116. E.g.. Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Cal. 2d 637, 192 P.2d 5, 10 (1948) (legislation limiting valua-
tion of property under contract of sale from veterans welfare board to value of possessory interest
overturned as violation of state constitutional requirement of assessment at full cash value).
117. In re Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927); Metropolitan Bldg. Co.
v. King County, 72 Wash. 47, 129 P. 883 (1913); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 64 Wash.
615, 117 P. 495 (1911); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 62 Wash. 409, 113 P. 1114 (1911).
See Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV 1013,
1036-37 (1974); Note, State Taxation-Privately Held Leaseholds in Publicly Owned Land, 49
WASH L. REV. 913 (1974).
118. I.e., the distinction between the value of the leasehold and the value of the leasehold bonus
is overlooked, as discussed supra at text accompanying notes 77-79.




indebtedness when assessing tax upon mortgaged property. 120 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court overruled these decisions in 1970,121 stating: "In-
debtedness does not represent a burden on the leasehold. Though it may
be a burden on the lessee, we have already concluded that the ad valorem
tax is not on the lessee's equity; it is on the value of the leasehold
tem. "' 1
22
Early attempts to tax the mortgagor only on his retained interest en-
countered administrative difficulties as well. Jensen wrote:
The privilege of dividing the tax liability between the mortgagor and mort-
gagee obtains in Arizona. It formerly obtained in California, Massachusetts,
Nevada, and Wisconsin. But it was and is of no effect since the mortgagor
invariably undertakes to pay the tax on the equity of the mortgagee as well
as his own. A law could conceivably be enacted forbidding such division,
but it would presumably merely raise the interest cost by the amount of the
tax to the borrower. 123
The greatest aid these cases offer the long-term lease question is their
demonstration that "fair market value" for tax purposes need not equal
the net sale value realizable by the owner upon a transfer of the encum-
bered interest. 124 This links the mortgage and long-term lease questions
so closely as to require compatible approaches to the two areas.
120. In Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 72 Wash. 47, 129 P. 883, 883-84 (1913), the
court held:
The leasehold is burdened by a debt exceeding the value placed upon the lease by most of the
witnesses. A purchaser of the lease would necessarily stand in the shoes of the respondent. He
would take what it has with all its burdens, no more and no less .. . .The law of common
honesty applies to the taxing power with the same force it applies to an individual .... [T]he
leasehold interest is to be measured both by its burdens and its benefits. It cannot be otherwise.
See also Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 64 Wash. 615, 117 P. 495 (1911).
In order to harmonize this result with WASH. REV. CODE § 84.04.080 (1981), which denies a de-
duction for indebtedness in valuation of real property for purposes of taxation, the court in In re
Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927), characterized these deductions as an
allowance for amortization of improvements.
121. Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wn. 2d 48, 469 P.2d 902 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
911 (1971).
122. 469 P.2d at 909.
123. J. JENsEN. supra note 111, at 119. See also Annot., 122 A.L.R. 742 (1939).
124. The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the support offered by the example of mort-
gaged property when it adopted the majority position on the long-term lease and valued property on
the basis of its fair market rent in 1963:
[P]etitioner says . . . it exercised bad judgment and made a lease which does not expire for
nearly twenty years; and because of its bad business judgment, the value of this property should
be cut in half, and Wake County should lose its taxes. Applying this reasoning to the man who
owns property, borrows money mortgaging the property as security, and invests the funds ob-
tained in securities which become worthless, he ought to be taxed only the the value of his equity
of redemption.
In re Property of Pine Raleigh Corp., 258 N.C. 398, 128 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1963).
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5. Property Subject to a Favorable Long-Term Lease
The considerations underlying capitalization of fair market rent recom-
mend that an above-market long-term lease favorable to the lessor be dis-
regarded in assessment as well. To the extent the landlord has secured a
greater return than fair market rent, the tenant is burdened with a lease of
negative market value, and the sum of these two interests should equal the
value of the undivided fee. Above-market return represents by definition
more than normal income to the property alone. A tax upon real estate
should disregard those elements of value attributable to the owner's enter-
prise or good fortune. 125
Although the favorable lease has figured infrequently in valuation deci-
sions, the better-reasoned cases have applied to it the principles govern-
ing below-market rent. For example, the court in Merrick Holding Cor-
poration v. Board of Assessors126 required that the "bonus value" of
below-market leases granted to major tenants be included in the capital-
ized income of a shopping center, then remanded to determine whether
income capitalized by the assessor included above-market rents from
smaller stores. "Of course, in arriving at the value of the entire property,
if Merrick's leases with its lesser tenants were at above market rents these
should be offset against the below market rentals received from the three
flagship tenants." 127 Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied
upon its approach to below-market rent when called upon to value prop-
erty subject to a favorable lease:
The same reasoning permits the State Board of Assessment, upon an ap-
peal such as the present, to substitute the fair rental value of the property
. . . for the actual rent payable under an existing long term lease, which
present conditions show to have been improvident from the point of view of
the tenant." 128
The appeal of realizable sale price as an assessment standard has led
several courts to allow above-market rents to enhance taxable value, 129
125. E.g., California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 67 Cal. 2d 578, 432
P.2d 700, 705, 63 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (1967) (citations omitted):
[Wlhen earnings are taken into account or the capitalization of income method is employed, the
profitableness of property to its present owner does not provide a standard by which to arrive at
its "full cash value"; rather, the net earnings to be considered or capitalized are those that would
be anticipated by a prospective purchaser. Nor may income derived in large part from enterprise
activity be ascribed to the property being appraised; instead, it is the earnings from the property
itself or from the beneficial use thereof which are to be considered.
For further discussion of the role of enterprise income, see infra text accompanying notes 179-97.
126. 45 N.Y.2d 538,382 N.E.2d 1341,410 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
127. Id. at 545,382 N.E.2d at 1344, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
128. In re Property in Forsyth County, 282 N.C. 71, 191 S.E.2d 692, 698 (1972).
129. E.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Middlebury Bd. of Tax Review, 174 Conn. 380, 389 A.2d 734, 738
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generally upon the grounds that "leases having a long-term yet to run and
reserving relatively high rents measurably appreciate present value."1 30
Once it is clear that taxable value is not uniformly equated with value to
the owner, however, this position is as untenable as its counterpart in the
context of below-market leases. To the extent the landlord benefits from
above-market rent the tenant is burdened with a leasehold of negative
value; the sum of their interests may be valued as an unencumbered fee.
E. The Long-Term Lease: Conclusions
Two aspects of the long-term lease question recommend it as the first
step in an inquiry into the legal aspects of valuation for property tax pur-
poses. Unlike most valuation disputes, the long-term lease problem pre-
sents an uneven contest between proposed solutions. When factual diffi-
culties of determining market rents are settled and contract rent is found
to be below fair market return, the summation-of-interests approach pro-
vides full justification for capitalizing the latter figure. Considerations of
horizontal equity, administrative efficiency, and assessment at highest
and best use reinforce this conclusion. The major arguments for a con-
trary result, a rejection of hypothetical values and a desire to adjust the
tax to the owner's ability to pay, have only weak application to the pre-
sent system of local property taxation, as cases dealing with mortgages
and imperfect title demonstrate. Of course, the evidentiary difficulties of
determining fair market rent frequently diminish the clarity of this iso-
lated question. The possibility, however, of a straightforward answer to
even one aspect of the problem provides a useful starting point for a more
extensive inquiry.
In addition to the virtue of answerability, the long-term lease problem
presents a second and equally important advantage: it cannot easily be
evaded when presented for appellate review. Valuation opinions usually
display an aversion to the formation of rules with general application.
Instead, such decisions frequently substitute numerical findings accompa-
nied by observations to the effect that valuation is "inherently im-
(1978); Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184 (1934); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 135 N.J. Super. 26, 342 A.2d 560 (1975), affid, 71 N.J. 401, 365
A.2d 929 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out this error in Humble Oil, but found
reversal unnecessary in light of evidence that the contract rent was not unfavorable to the tenant. 342
A.2d at 565-66.
130. Somers v. City ofMeriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174A. 184, 187 (1934).
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precise," 131 "not an exact science," 132 "a matter of opinion," 133 subject
to "a multitude of circumstances," 134 or even "an intuition of experience
which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impres-
sions." 135 In its pure form, however, the long-term lease question pre-
cludes such evasive responses. A choice between figures agreed to repre-
sent fair market and contract rent cannot be made by deferring to the
expertise of the appraiser, nor by referring to the totality of circumstances
presented by a specific case. Even a denial that the decision has larger
implications 136 cannot obscure the generality of the issue.
The majority approach to the long-term lease question also illuminates
the larger problem of defining the "property" subject to tax, primarily by
disproving a number of plausible generalizations that have clearly influ-
enced courts in various assessment disputes. The "property" to be taxed
is not always identified with the owner's interest, nor is its "value" al-
ways the sale price the owner could realize on the market. The actual
income of the owner from the property, and thus the owner's ability to
pay the tax, does not settle the valuation question, even if that income is
limited by agreements which were arm's-length and not improvident
when made. Beyond these negative assertions, the long-term lease cases
reinforce the importance of considering "property" subject to tax as
comprised of various legal interests, however divided. These considera-
tions provide a basis for examining related issues of greater complexity
which further clarify the nature of the tax.
Ii. VALUATION OF SPECIALTY PROPERTY
A. Value to the Owner and Value to the Market
Market value assessment presents a dilemma in the case of "specialty"
property, an improvement uniquely suited to its present owner. Bonbright
doubted the utility of a market value standard in this situation at all:
[T]he essence of the concept lies in its reference to the exchangeability of
the property ....
This very characteristic of market value means that the concept has but a
limited usefulness in the valuation of property. For if it were invariably ac-
131. Sam Broadhead Trust v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 975, 985 (1972).
132. Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 273 Md. 245, 329 A.2d 18, 27
(1974).
133. Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 294, 124 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1962).
134. Central Realty Co. v. Board of Equalization, 110 W. Va. 437, 158 S.E. 537, 538 (1931).
135. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,598 (1907).
136. E.g., Demoulas v. Town of Salem, 116 N.H. 775, 367 A.2d 588 (1976); Wynwood Apart-
ments, Inc. v. Board of Revision, 59 Ohio St. 2d 34, 391 N.E.2d 346 (1979).
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cepted as the basis of an appraisal, it would require a finding that many
properties, highly prized for the special purposes for which they are de-
signed, are of trivial value because only the present owner is in a position to
exploit them. 137
As Bonbright himself noted, 138 the mere fact that value to the owner
exceeds market value does not in itself favor use of either measure; the
choice depends upon the purposes of the appraisal. For property tax pur-
poses, an equation of the statutory base of "fair market value" with real-
izable sale price is consistent with the majority of assessments, which
take no account of special utility to the owner. Yet a costly but unmarket-
able building could all but escape tax in this way.
While the long-term lease cases turned upon one element of the tax
base, the definition of "property," the specialty cases turn upon the other
component, the definition of "fair market value." Is a new and unique
industrial plant, or a lavish residence of eccentric design, to be valued
well below its cost, at realizable sale price, although the owner is well
satisfied with it and would in fact rebuild it if it were to be destroyed or
condemned? Or, conversely, is a statutory "market value" standard to be
identified with cost in this instance, but with realizable sale price in al-
most every other? And if this latter course is chosen, as it has been by
most jurisdictions considering the question, how is a "specialty" to be
identified? At what point does a divergence between depreciated cost and
realizable sale price grow large enough to invoke this treatment? And
how is the owner's satisfaction with the property to be proven? For cer-
tainly an owner who would not rebuild, who values the unusual property
as little as does the market, cannot be taxed at a figure based upon cost.
The imprecise boundaries of the specialty designation attest to the diffi-
culty of these questions.
The first major case to consider this problem involved assessment of
the New York Stock Exchange building. 139 The owners argued that a
market value standard' 40 required an appraisal recognizing that it could
only be sold as a "tear-down proposition," for it could be used by no
137. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 66.
138. Bonbright stated:
[Tihe mere fact that a given property may be worth to its owner more than its market value, does
not alone compel a conclusion that the former value should be accepted and the latter value
rejected .... [M]arket value may be a fairer basis of valuation than would value to the owner,
even if the latter could be estimated with equal accuracy and convenience.
Id. at 66-67.
139. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64
(1927), affdmem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928).
140. Greater N.Y. Charter, § 889 (1925 & Supp. 1925-30) (valuation at sale price under "ordi-
nary circumstances").
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other purchaser, not even another exchange. The court rejected this. "A
complete answer to this contention, however, is that section 6 of the Tax
Law ... provides: 'All real and personal property subject to taxation shall
be assessed at the full value thereof.' "141 Depreciated reproduction cost
was held the proper basis for assessment.
The opinion contrasted "full value" and "market value." The court
stated that "real property must be assessed at its full value, whether or not
there is an ascertainable market value."1 42 But what constitutes a "mar-
ket"? A statutory market value standard can hardly be interpreted as re-
quiring a "perfect" market, 143 particularly if the alternative is an assess-
ment upon value to one party alone, the present owner. It is well settled
that an actual sale of real estate constitutes important evidence of its
value,144 even if the offer of sale has elicited only a limited number of
responses.145 If "only two people, a buyer and a seller, are necessary to
constitute a market, although a very 'imperfect' one," 146 a nominal or
even negative market value for the New York Stock Exchange as a "tear-
down proposition" appears plausible. Imputation of a requirement of
cost-based assessment requires more support than simply a reference to
"full value" if it is not to suggest that an insufficiently high market price
will be deemed not to exist.
Similar valuation problems arise in other contexts. "Throughout the
field of legal valuation, one finds the law first starting out with a false
doctrinal premise that the objective of a valuation is to ascertain 'true
value,' and then correcting this premise by adopting methods of valuation
that necessarily reach some other objective." 147 The distinction between
141. 223 N.Y.S. at 68.
142. Id.
143. Cf. Copes, Reckoning with Imperfections in the Land Market, in THE ASSESSMENT OF LAND
VALUE 55 (D. Holland ed. 1970): "The conditions for a 'perfect' market which are significant for the
purpose of this discussion are, briefly: the commodity must be homogeneous and buyers and sellers
must be present in large numbers and be well informed as to quality and price."
144. E.g., Lane Bryant, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 21 A.D.2d 669, 249 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1964), affd
mem., 19 N.Y.2d 715, 279 N.Y.S.2d 174, 225 N.E.2d 882 (1967) (arm's-length sale of property
evidence "of the highest rank" in determining taxable value); Equity Land Resources, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue. 268 Or. 410, 521 P.2d 324, 325 (1974) (reversing lower court decision which
had contended that " 'one sale doesn't make a market.' . . . [A] single sale may be some indication
of market value, but it is suspect."); State ex rel. Geipel v. City of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 726, 229
N.W.2d 585, 591 (1975) (grant of option; holding that "because a 'sale' of the property had oc-
curred, the assessor erred in relying on 'comparable sales' to establish the market price of the prop-
erty in question and the assessment must be set aside").
145. E.g.. Great Al. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236, 397 N.Y.S.2d 718, 366
N.E.2d 808 (1977) (evidence of comparable sales in wide geographical area employed in computing
market value).
146. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 42.
147. Id. at 82.
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sale price and value to the owner must be faced in insurance cases, 148
contract actions, 149 income tax determinations, 150 and numerous other
areas. 151 In each instance, the proper measure depends upon the purposes
of the valuation process. 152 The absence of any consensus as to that pur-
pose in the property tax context underlies the difficulties encountered by
the specialty cases.
B. Measuring Value to the Owner
Depreciated reproduction cost is generally the measure of the value of
specialty property to its owner when the property would be rebuilt if lost,
no substitute being available for purchase. 153 It does not measure value to
the owner, however, if the owner would not replace the property. "If the
governmental authorities discontinue the use of a lighthouse it sometimes
passes into private hands. If one in private ownership, and consequently
no longer functioning to guide vessels, should be taken in eminent do-
main its reproduction cost would hardly be considered the measure of its
value." 154 Accordingly, buildings converted to a new use rarely qualify
148. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d 487, 491 (1937), where the
court stated that the principle of indemnity prevents interpretation of the term "actual value" in
insurance statutes and policies as limited to market value of insured property in all instances:
The words "actual value" in the policies and in the statute are to be interpreted in the light of
the nature of the insurance contract as a contract of indemnity.... [The words "actual value"
do not import that recovery is limited to market value .... [M]arket value does not in all cases
afford a correct measure of indemnity. . . . In some cases there is no market value properly
speaking; and in others, if there is, it plainly would not of itself afford full indemnity.
149. E.g., Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928, 929 (1942) (Uni-
form Sales Act measure of damages for breach of contract to purchase goods; in action by dealer,
difference between contract price and market price held to mean difference between contract price
and retail market price).
150. In Turner v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954), the Tax Court was called upon
to interpret regulations requiring prizes and awards to be included in the recipient's income at "fair
market value," Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a)(2) (1955). The Internal Revenue Service argued that a set of
cruise tickets won by the taxpayer should be valued at their retail price, the taxpayer's replacement
cost. The Tax Court found value to the owner a better measure of taxable income: "The winning...
did not provide ... something which they needed in the ordinary course of their lives .... Their
value to the petitioners was not equal to their retail cost. They were not transferable and not salable
and there were other restrictions on their use." 13 T.C.M. (CCH) at 463.
151. See 2 J. BONaRIorr, supra note 6, at 694 (death duties), 837 (mortgage loans).
152. 1Id. at 509-10:
If the general property tax is interpreted as an "ability" or "faculty" tax, value to the owner is a
better standard of assessment than market value where there is a wide and measurable discrep-
ancy between the two values .... On the other hand, if this tax is designed fairly to allocate to
property owners the costs of government made necessary by the construction and operation of
their properties, unddpreciated replacement cost has a shade the better of the argument as a
proper tax base.
153. Id. at91-92.
154. In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 A.D.2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786, 803
749
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as specialties; their loss would not occasion rebuilding to their present
specifications. 155
The owner of a converted structure could, of course, place a higher
value upon it than the nominal figure assigned by the market without
valuing it so highly as to reproduce it in the event of loss. Such a situation
may in fact be common, but development of specialty valuation has taken
no account of it. Rather than attempting a subjective inquiry into actual
value to the owner in all cases, the majority of such decisions have simply
approximated this by depreciated reproduction cost. This narrows the
choice of methods, heightens the difference between specialty and non-
specialty assessments, and increases the advantage to owners of unusual
property of avoiding the specialty designation for their buildings, for de-
preciated reproduction cost will almost always exceed the sale price of a
unique or specialized structure.
Yet the majority approach has by no means eliminated all subjectivity
from the classification. Either the existence of a "market" or the unwill-
ingness of the owner to rebuild in case of loss can rebut the specialty
status, but these criteria are so ill defined as to be almost unverifiable. For
example, the 1977 A & p156 valuation of one of the world's largest food
processing plants found warehouses as distant as 1000 miles from this
property "comparable." A & P thus avoided specialty classification, a
cost-based assessment, and $2,800,000 in valuation for property tax pur-
poses, for a potential sale as a warehouse would yield a figure well below
depreciated cost. Two years later, however, Xerox Corporation was un-
able to convince the New York Appellate Division that those same prop-
erties were "comparable" to its complex of office, warehouse, and man-
ufacturing buildings, 157 and thus failed in its effort to reduce their
valuation by $80,000,000. In that same year, the Chrysler Corporation,
with $10,000,000 in assessed value at stake, won reversal of classifica-
tion of an assembly plant as a specialty, the Illinois Appeals Court finding
"support" for the existence of comparable sales in the A & P decision. 158
Nowhere in these cases were the elements of a "comparable" sale de-
tailed, nor was it explained why such a sale indicated a market for the
(1961), affdnenz.. 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30, 190 N.E.2d 423 (1963), affd, 16 N.Y.2d
497, 260 N.Y.S.2d 439, 208 N.E.2d 172 (1965).
155. E.g.. Semple School for Girls v. Boyland, 308 N.Y. 382, 126 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1955)
(school building, obsolete for its intended use as a single-family residence, not a specialty); In re
James Madison Houses, 17 A.D.2d 317, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (1962) (eminent domain award:
tenement converted to a church held not to constitute a specialty).
156. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236, 397 N.Y.S.2d 718, 366 N.E.2d 808
(1977).
157. Xerox Corp. v. Ross, 71 A.D.2d 84, 421 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1979).





A & P and Chrysler plants but not for the Xerox complex. Yet such issues
affect millions of dollars in property valuation when they produce a shift
from the normal interpretation of "market value" as realizable sale price
to interpretation as depreciated cost.
The willingness of an owner to rebuild in case of loss is even less
amenable to factual investigation than is the existence of a market. It is
not difficult for owners of unusual property to disclaim satisfaction with
their investments: "Just because you spent the money ... doesn't always
mean it is worth it." 159 Courts, on the other hand, generally assume that
the construction or purchase price of recently acquired property is a fair
measure of its valuel6 0 -a reasonable approach, if the owner has the op-
portunity to rebut it. 161 It is not available, however, when these events
took place a number of years in the past. 162
C. Depression Cases: What Is A "Market"?
The 1927 New York Stock Exchange163 decision was echoed in cases
dealing with the enormous decline in market values during the subsequent
decade. Statutes requiring payment of "fair" value in foreclosure sales of
mortgaged property' 64 lent authority to the "economic heresy" of an
159. Stephen & Stephen Properties v. State Property Tax Comm'n, 499 S.W.2d 798, 800-01
(Mo. 1973).
160. E.g., Calder Race Course v. Overstreet, 363 So. 2d 631, 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
("Indeed, the assessment may even be a little on the low side as Calder's owners would be taking a
significant investment loss were they to sell the property at the assessed valuation."); New Orleans
Cotton Exch. v. Board of Assessors, 39 La. Ann. 95, 1 So. 272, 272 (1887) ("there were no proofs
that the cost.., was particularly extravagant, none that the property had deteriorated in value, or that
the owner would sell it for an amount less than its cost"). In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Tax
Comm'n, 18 A.D.2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d 228, 231-32 (1963), affd, 14 N.Y.2d 314, 251 N.Y.S.2d
460, 200 N.E.2d 447 (1964), the court stated:
Nowhere in the record is it explained how just two years before the period under review an
experienced owner employing a reliable contractor and having the services of outstanding archi-
tects put $36,000,000 into a structure that was only worth $17,800,000. Such a startling result
requires more than speculation before it can be accepted as fact.
The Seagram case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 198-219.
161. E.g., Medical Bldg. Land Co. v. Department of Revenue, 283 Or. 69, 582 P.2d 416, 420
(1978) (court accepted taxpayer's assertion that construction cost was unnecessarily high due to nego-
tiated contract and work stoppages); Smith v. City of Covington, 205 Va. 104, 135 S.E.2d 220, 221
(1964) (taxpayer retained no general contractor and consequently paid more for construction than
necessary).
162. Conversion of a structure to a new use also provides evidence that if lost it would not be
reproduced in its existing form. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
163. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D.193, 223 N.Y.S. 64(1927),
affd mem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928). This case is discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 139-46.
164. These statutes employed a number of approaches, including refusal to confirm foreclosure
sales not meeting a minimum or "upset" price, a moratorium on foreclosures, and deduction of the
"fair value" of the mortgaged premises from a deficiency award. See generally Note, Mortgage
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"undefined, mythical concept of 'real' or 'actual' value." 165 Such mea-
sures, Bonbright pointed out, were more radical than a mere substitution
of value to the owner for market value:
[T]he fact that properties can be replaced by equally serviceable properties
at a mere fraction of their pre-depression costs has actually made these prop-
erties less valuable to their owners.... Clearly, then, a much more funda-
mental departure from the market-price concept than that suggested by
"value to the owner" must be in the minds of the adherents to the theory of
relatively stable "real values." . . . The very trouble with our economic life
today is that it has shattered real values .... 166
The New York legislature responded to the "shattered real values" and
subsequent wave of foreclosures and deficiency actions167 by requiring
that the "fair and reasonable market value" of the mortgaged property,
not necessarily the sale price, be deducted from the outstanding debt for
purposes of determining the amount of any deficiency remaining after
foreclosure of the premises by the mortgagee.168 If, however, the court
were to find that the property had no market value as of the date of the
ReliefDuring the Depression, 47 HARV. L. REV 299, 301 (1933). Moratorium legislation was upheld
against constitutional challenge under the contract clause in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934). That case found no impairment of contract in the Minnesota Mortgage Morato-
rium Law, noting especially the state of economic emergency it addressed and the temporary nature
of the remedial legislation.
165. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 420.
166. 2 id. at 847.
167. Valuation cases of that time give evidence of the effect of the Depression upon mortgagors:
Over a period of approximately three and one-half years before the relator purchased his prop-
erty on Windemere Road, the East Side Savings Bank alone sold about 840 parcels of property
which it had acquired in the City of Rochester, and the Alliance Realty Corporation from 1937
to 1941 sold on the average about 725 parcels of property a year, representing an average annual
volume of over $2,000,000. In 1939 about 135 of the 225 residences in Browncroft were owned
by banks and by other loaning institutions. There is evidence that it was the policy of the East
Side Savings Bank to liquidate the properties which it had acquired for the amount of its invest-
ment in them and that this policy depressed still further the prices of properties in Browncroft
already lowered by the economic stringency confronting many property owners. Frequently
prices on these properties were reduced three, four or even five times until they were sold, and
from 1931 through 1934, with the surplus supply of these properties, all prices fell abruptly.
People ex rel. Buck v. Rapp, 36 N.Y.S.2d 790, 794 (1942), affd mem., 266 A.D.2d 709, 41
N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1943). Another court commented:
The expert Stem in his testimony brought out the known fact that several of the Savings Banks
have been "dumping" dozens of properties on the market in the Williamsburgh section in the
last few years, for a nominal consideration, selling them to speculators from one to seventy
parcels at a time; that this type of transaction has so affected realty values that there has been no
fair market as contemplated by the so-called Deficiency Judgment Law ....
Home Title Ins. Co. v. Alrose Realty Corp., 23 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726, affd, 260 A.D. 878, 23
N.Y.S.2d 726 (1940).
168. New York Civil Practice Act, § 1083-a, 1934 N.Y. Laws 1238-39. This section is now
found in N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney 1979).
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foreclosure sale, it was directed to fix that sum as of the "nearest earlier
date as there shall have been any market value thereof .... "169
The New York Court of Appeals interpreted this section of the statute
as an outright repudiation of any market value measure:
In the depressed condition of the market for real property, the old standard
of market value has become utterly useless. The new and unusual conditions
necessarily required a new standard for determining value .... [T]he court
should receive evidence of all elements that can in reason affect the value of
the premises .... [T]he court should receive evidence of the age and con-
struction of the buildings on the premises, the rent received therefor, as-
sessed value, location, condition of repair, the sale price of property of a
similar nature in the neighborhood, conditions in the neighborhood which
affect the value of property therein, accessibility, and of all other elements
which may be fairly considered as affecting the market value of real prop-
erty in a given neighborhood. With such evidence before it, the trial court,
in the exercise of its best judgment, should determine the market value of
the premises in the existing circumstances. 170
Rejection of the "utterly useless" equation of market value with realiz-
able sale price for a new standard closely allied with "real" or intrinsic
value in effect negated the statute's substitution of market value as of the
"nearest earlier date" when that quantity existed. 171
New York courts built upon the foreclosure cases to support a similar
search for "real" values in tax assessments. 172 Conversely, the New York
Stock Exchange 73 decision was cited for consideration of reproduction
cost, value in use, and value to the owner as "elements" of market value
169. Id.
170, Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N.Y. 83, 4 N.E.2d 944, 945-46 (1936) (deficiency determination
following foreclosure).
171. Heiman v. Bishop was in fact reversing a lower court's attempt to apply the statute accord-
ing to its terms:
The court below adopted the old standard [of "market value"]. The learned referee during the
hearing and in his report repeatedly stated that there was no fair and reasonable market value of
the premises on the date of sale in June, 1935, or between that date and 1930, which he fixed as
the "nearest earlier date" when there existed a market value of the premises....
We think that the learned official referee adopted a view too narrow and strict, and contrary to
the spirit and purpose of the statute. In carrying out the directions contained in the statute, the
court should receive evidence of all elements that can in reason affect the value of the premises
together with the opinion of experts upon the subject.
4 N.E.2d at 945.
172. E.g., Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 19 A.D.2d 56, 240 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1963); People ex
rel. Buck v. Rapp, 36 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1942), affdmem., 26 A.D.2d 709, 41 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1943).
173. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64
(1927), affd mem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928). This case is discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 139-46.
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in foreclosure actions. 174 Decisions in both areas affirmed that "fair mar-
ket value" (for property tax purposes) or "fair and reasonable market
value" (in the foreclosure setting) must mean something other than the
amount indicated by the raw data of the marketplace, the realizable sale
price.175 Yet if "fairness" comprehends more than the procedure of the
sale-for example, a reasonable length of offering time and advertise-
rrient-it threatens to replace the objective judgment of the market with a
grant of almost unbounded discretion to the trier of fact. 176 An awareness
174. E.g., Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Hofheimer, 170 Misc. 691, 10 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1939).
affdmem., 261 A.D. 946, 27 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1941).
175. Bonbright found no instances in which a statutory reference to "fair" market value deter-
mined the outcome of a valuation controversy:
It is quite true that the courts have sometimes rejected "the verdict of the market place" on
the ground that the prices fixed thereon do not reflect "fair market values." Rarely, however,
have the judges drawn the sharp distinction between "market value" and "fair market value"
that this rejection would seem to imply. Instead, they have more frequently used the two terms
as exact synonyms, holding that even the unqualified phrase "market value" must be interpreted
to mean "fair market value." . . . [E]ven if the statute refers merely to "market value," they
have held that the attribute of "fairness" must be imported into the term. Consequently, no
reported opinion coming to our attention has stated that the "fair market value" of a given
property, at a specified time, is more or less than its "actual market value." Here, as elsewhere
in the law, one finds no such attempt as scientists make to distinguish between actuality and
desiredness or normality.
I J. BONBRtGHT, supra note 6, at 56.
176. This problem is evident in property tax cases of this period from many states. For example.
in Minnesota v. Federal Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Minn. 1938), the court stated:
The fact that there is no demand for downtown property, or that the supply far exceeds the
demand, may, if a literal application of the statute is applied, justify such fluctuations in assess-
ment figures from year to year that will precipitate the fiscal affairs of the city into utter confu-
sion....
... [Blecause the building may have no market value by reason of no demand, it should not
escape its just share of the tax burden.
See also Washington County Nat'l Bank v. Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515, 518
(1940) (probably the "best located building in the town"; valuation set $15,000 above sale price
because sale price "was probably less than it was worth, for there is no general demand for bank
buildings"); Central Realty Co. v. Board of Equalization & Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 158 S.E. 537,
538 (1931) ("Was it the purpose of the statute to jeopardize the machinery of state, county, district,
and municipality, during a depression, or was it enacted to cover ordinary conditions over a period of
years? To ask the question is to answer it."). As these cases illustrate, a pragmatic issue was posed
by statutory and constitutional limitations upon local rates of property taxation: were the tax base to
fall as far as had realizable sale prices, tax rates could not rise enough to preserve essential municipal
revenue. See generally M. BERNARD. CONSTITUTtONS, TAXATION. AND LAND POLICY (1979); Howards,
Property-Tax Rate Limits: A View of Local Government, in PROPERTY TAXATION U.S.A. 165 (R.
Lindholm ed. 1967). Bonbright commented:
The contention of taxpayers that their property should not be assessed in excess of the low mar-
ket prices prevailing during the business depression is unacceptable for practical reasons. It
could be sustained, if at all, only on condition that the present statutory and consitutional limits
on governmental debts and on the rates of taxation be repealed. Unless these limits are removed,
assessors and courts will be forced, willy-nilly, to pretend that real estate is now worth more
than it really is worth.
I J. BONBRtGHT, supra note 6, at 510 (footnotes omitted). Such arguments apply, of course, only
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of this danger, in fact, may be sensed in the reluctance of New York
courts to invoke the foreclosure provision 177 after the crisis of the 1930's
had passed.178 Only the specialty area makes general use of nonmarket
valuation today. This leaves the specialty designation an all the more dra-
matic exception to normal valuation methods.
D. Extension to Income-Producing Property
Commercial property for which the sale price depends upon the success
of business associated with it poses a similar valuation problem. Realiz-
able sale price is a problematic basis of taxation, not in this case because
it is unacceptably low, but because it reflects managerial skill and enter-
prise worth rather than real property value alone. A capitalization of earn-
ings may "furnish a good rule of thumb upon which to base a business
transaction," 179 but it would "include the use of real and personal prop-
weakly or not at all to present-day questions of specialty valuation, except in those cases where one
large industrial or commercial property forms a major part of a jurisdiction's tax base.
For a defense of judicial discretion in deficiency judgment cases, see Comment, Mortgage Relief
During the Depression, 47 HARV. L. REv. 299, 306-07 (1933):
[J]udicial consideration of the conflicting interests in the individual case seems more desirable
than blanket legislation. ... While there are many deserving landowners in danger of losing
their property through debts made unbearable by an unexpected deflation of the dollar, there are
others who do not merit extraordinary relief: the speculator whose investment in the land has
been negligible, the solvent opportunist who wilfully refuses to meet his obligations, the judg-
ment-proof debtor who with impunity milks the property.
(Footnotes omitted.) See also Carey, Mortgage Foreclosures in Cook County, 19 A.B.A. J. 275, 277
(1933) (court's decision showed "a thorough grasp of the true function of a court of equity").
177. The New York statute remains in effect today, see supra note 169, unlike most similar
legislative responses to the problem of foreclosures in the 1930's. See Comment, "Depression Juris-
prudence"-Remaining Effects in Statutory Law, 47 MICH. L. REv. 254, 256 (1948).
178. When a service station owner lost his property by foreclosure in the 1974 gasoline shortage
and attempted to invoke this approach, the New York Appellate Division ruled against the owner by
distinguishing that situation from the "exigent circumstances in the economy" that produced the
legislation of the 1930's:
[E]ven though the value of the gas station property may have been depressed at the time of the
foreclosure sale, it should not affect the mortgagee's right to a deficiency judgment. It is only
when the mortgaged premises are shown to have no fair and reasonable market value at the time
of the sale, taking into consideration all elements which may fairly affect value, that resort may
be had to the nearest earlier date when there was a market value ....
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Tulloch, 55 A.D.2d 773, 389 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495-96 (1976). This does little
to clarify the tests by which existence of a fair and reasonable market value may be ascertained, and
the unpredictability of this approach was only dramatized by the court's decision that the fair and
reasonable market value on the date of sale was in excess of the price obtained for it. Was "market
value" being computed or superseded? As in the specialty cases, there is a discontinuity in the par-
ties' positions: if a market value is accepted as fair and reasonable, it is to the debtor's advantage that
it be set as high as possible, and thus offset a corresponding portion of the debt. But an unacceptably
low market value may be more advantageous, for it will then be augmented by consideration of value
in use and value to the owner.
179. People ex rel. Hotel Astor v. Sexton, 159 Misc. 280, 287 N.Y.S. 746, 752 (1935), affd
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erty and corporate franchises, and such a rule for the assessment of real
estate alone is misleading and wholly unreliable." 180 Such considerations
led New York courts to include within the specialty designation commer-
cial property producing nonrental income. The first such cases involved
the valuation of hotels: 181
Concededly, the sales prices of the hotel enterprise, as well as the hotel
income, reflected not only the value of the real estate-the only proper sub-
ject of the real property tax-but the worth of such additional elements as
management, good will, hotel furniture and furnishings, inventory of food
and beverages and the usual hotel services .... In these circumstances, the
valuation of a transient hotel property is in essence the valuation of a "spe-
cialty," a term including real estate, which, unlike an apartment house or
office building, produces income only in combination with a business con-
ducted upon it. 182
While cost-based valuation of commercial property' 83 parallels spe-
cialty cases following the New York Stock Exchange decision, their com-
bination in one category entails some confusion, for in other respects they
have little in common. Commercial property, such as a hotel, cannot be
said to be without a market, nor of value only to its owner. Application of
the specialty designation to income-producing property reduces its assess-
ment by deeming profits from its operation irrelevant to real estate valua-
tion184 in contrast to the effect of such classification upon unique and
unmarketable structures. It is not surprising that New York decisions
have referred less and less frequently to the specialty status of income-
mem., 256 A.D. 912, 10 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1939) (hotel income held reflective of business value rather
than real estate value).
180. People ex rel. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Clapp, 152 N.Y. 490, 46 N.E. 842, 843 (1897)
(railroad property valuation for local tax purposes held limited to reproduction cost; court found it
"impossible to apportion the rentals or earnings, and credit the just proportion to real estate, to per-
sonal property, and to franchises").
181. E.g., People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 83 N.E.2d 839
(1949); People ex rel. Hotel Astor v. Sexton, 159 Misc. 280, 287 N.Y.S. 746 (1935), affd mem.,
256 A.D. 912, 10 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1939); People ex rel. Hotel St. George Corp. v. Lilly, 45 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1943), rev'd mem., 268 A.D. 830, 49 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1944), affd, 293 N.Y. 898, 60 N.E.2d
30 (1944) (per curiam).
182. People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 83 N.E.2d 839, 840
(1949).
183. Income data was considered only for purposes of determining the "suitability" of the struc-
ture-i.e., whether it would be reproduced if destroyed. Id. This inquiry is common to all types of
specialty valuation. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
184. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 181. In People ex rel. Metro. Jockey Club v. Mills, 190
Misc. 277, 72 N.Y.S.2d 757, 762 (1947), aff'dmem., 273 A.D. 971, 79 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1948), the
court employed similar reasoning in valuation of a race track: "[lit is the racing and the betting which




producing property 8 5 even while supporting a distinction between busi-
ness income and property income 8 6 for valuation purposes.
A market value assessment should reflect a prospective bid for property
alone, exclusive of any going concern upon the site. Yet a purchaser
would surely consider its profitability when making an offer. "[W]e
know that in ordinary circumstances investors will pay for income-pro-
ducing property a price measured in large part by the amount and cer-
tainty of the income which can be obtained from such property." 1'87 The
income to be measured is that which a purchaser could expect, not neces-
sarily that enjoyed by the present owner. 188 But this distinction does not
justify a disregard of income data altogether.
Some cases suggest that only rental income may be considered in prop-
erty tax valuation; that hotels and race tracks, for example, not being
rented by tenants, cannot be valued by the income approach. 189 Yet many
commercial properties are held by landlords and rented to those who actu-
ally conduct business upon them, 190 and frequently the rent is measured
185. E.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kieman, 42 N.Y.2d 236, 397 N.Y.S.2d 718, 366
N.E.2d 808 (1977); Semple School for Girls v. Boyland, 308 N.Y. 382, 126 N.E.2d 294 (1955);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Misc. 2d 910, 422 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1979).
Both A & P and Semple cited the Hotel Paramount case for the older definition of specialty property
as unique and unmarketable, ignoring the business income definition which Hotel Paramount itself
introduced. This second definition has occasionally been employed in later cases, however, e.g.,
Westbury Drive-In v. Board of Assessors, 70 Misc. 2d 1077, 335 N.Y.S.2d 361, 366 (1972), aff d
mem., 45 A.D.2d 821, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1974), and has never been formally disapproved. A
dissenting opinion to a 1979 appellate division decision sharply criticized its application of the
"unique structure" specialty definition (which the department store in question was found not to
meet), pointing out that the income-producing property branch of the specialty category had been
ignored. This dissent went on to criticize the unpredictable application of this designation:
I submit that an owner-operated department store in White Plains is as much a specialty as the
Macy's department store in Queens County and the A & S department store in Nassau County
and that the rules of assessing these structures should not differ from county to county, nor
should the principles to be applied in judicially reviewing them be as unsettled and unclear as
they appear to be to me.
.. [T]here now exist two totally contradictory rulings in this Department with respect to the
designation and valuation of owner-operated department stores whose sole income is that pro-
duced by the business conducted thereon.
White Plains Properties Corp. v. Tax Assessor, 71 A.D.2d 677, 419 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891, 895 (1979)
(Suozzi, J., dissenting), affidmem., 50 N.Y.2d 839, 430 N.Y.S.2d 35, 407 N.E.2d 1332 (1980).
186. E.g., Placid-Marcy Co. v. Town of North Elba, 29 A.D.2d 818,287 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1968);
Putnam Theatrical Co. v. Gingold, 16 A.D.2d 413, 228 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1962).
187. -People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 38 N.E.2d 465, 467
(1941).
188. E.g., California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 67 Cal. 2d 578, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 5, 9,432 P.2d 700, 705 (1967).
189. E.g., People ex'rel. Metro. Jockey Club v. Mills, 190 Misc. 277, 72 N.Y.S.2d 757, 762
(1947), affdmem., 273 A.D. 971, 79 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1948).
190. Lessees responsible for property tax payments may in fact be treated as owners in legal
proceedings contesting the assessment. Federated Dep't Stores v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn.
757
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:713, 1983
by receipts of the tenant-proprietor. 191 Given this situation, it is a small
step to allow an owner-proprietor to introduce evidence of profitability in
a review of the tax, reasoning that this figure would be relevant to its
rental value were it leased for commercial purposes. 192 This greatly
weakens the rationale for ignoring nonrental income.
Courts and assessors continue to distinguish the rent upon property,
actual or imputed, from enterprise income, but a satisfactory means of
separating the two remains elusive. 193 An owner's business efforts will
affect the value of his property, 194 and the property's characteris-
77, 291 A.2d 715 (1971); In re Property of Pine Raleigh Corp., 258 N.C. 398, 128 S.E.2d 855
(1963); Trinity Place Co. v. Finance Adm'r, 38 N.Y.2d 144, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16, 341 N.E.2d 536
(1975); cf. Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth., 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980) (lessee treated
as owner for purposes of inverse condemnation statute).
191. E.g., Hilton Inns v. Board of Assessors, 39 Misc. 2d 792, 242 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1963). Gaso-
line sales are frequently of primary importance in determining rental charges for service stations. St.
Louis Hous. Auth. v. Bainter, 297 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. 1957) (testimony that major factor "in
determining the fair market value of a service station or its reasonable rental value was 'the volume of
business or gallonage' "); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 71 N.J. 401,
365 A.2d 929 (1976) (per curiam).
192. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation & Assessment, 26 A.D.2d 759,
272 N.Y.S.2d 257, 260 (1966):
Assuming that the custom throughout the nation is generally to base long term leases for national
chain variety stores on annual gross sales figures, it seems reasonable to permit an owner-occu-
pied national chain variety store to offer in evidence its annual gross sales figures and suggest a
property valuation for real property tax assessment purposes by applying a capitalization per-
centage rate to such figures.
193. Cases holding that gross income may be used as a starting point in calculating the return
upon real property generally offer no details as to how such a determination should proceed. E.g.,
California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 67 Cal. 2d 578, 63 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9,432
P.2d 700, 705 (1967); Hilton Inns v. Board of Assessors, 39 Misc. 2d 792, 242 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435
(1963). A dramatic example of the type of circular reasoning encouraged by the absence of any clear
definition of business income can be found in ITT World Communications v. County of Santa Clara,
101 Cal. App. 3d 246, 257, 162 Cal. Rptr. 186, 192-93 (1980):
Appellant essentially argues that a valuation of property in excess of RCNLD [reproduction
cost new less depreciation] necessarily includes income attributable to enterprise value. This
position, however, is founded upon the erroneous premise that a valuation in excess of RCNLD
will always exceed the value of the tangible property. If the value of tangible property may in
some cases properly exceed RCNLD, then a valuation in excess of RCNLD does not necessarily
include income attributable to enterprise value.
This attempts to employ factual data to solve a definitional problem. The court posits cases in which
property value does not exceed RCNLD, and builds upon this assumption to find a method of deter-
mining value. This may be compared to cases holding that leases upon taxable property may be
ignored for assessment purposes only when they do not reflect "true value." See supra note 18. In
each case, a comparison with "value" is prescribed as a step in calculating that "value."
194. See, e.g., Schleiff v. County of Freeborn, 231 Minn. 389, 43 N.W.2d 265, 270 (1950),
where the court upheld valuation of $67,200 for property purchased two years earlier for $35,000,
accepting testimony that
the latter figure might be the fair market value of the property in 1944, at a time when it was
vacant, but that since the building had been substantially occupied after that date and was so
occupied at the time of the assessment, its market value had been enhanced since its purchase by
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tics will influence the profitability of the business carried out upon it. 195 A
market value standard suggests that profits should be taken into account
insofar as they bear upon the return reasonably to be expected by a pro-
spective buyer, however much this projection may fluctuate from year to
year. 196 While this would not eliminate difficult evidentiary problems
when structures have not recently been sold, 197 it disposes of the need for
special exceptions to general valuation principles in the case of income-
producing property. In the absence of compelling justification, the dan-
gers of arbitrary treatment and distorted valuations are reason enough to
avoid creation of new classifications.
E. Extension to "Prestige" Structures
The boundaries of specialty classification were extended again, al-
though in an ambiguous fashion, by the New York Appellate Division's
1963 decision concerning the Seagram Building. 198 At issue was the
proper assessment of "one of New York's, and the country's, great
works of modem architecture, the Seagram Building, 375 Park Avenue,
at 53rd Street by Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson, as handsomely
proportioned and serene a tower as the 20th century has conceived." 199
taxpayer, [and] that ... taxpayer had been able to turn the building into new uses with increased
income ....
195. E.g., People ex rel. Hotel St. George v. Lilly, 45 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603-04 (1943), rev'd
mem., 268 A.D. 830, 49 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1944), affid, 293 N.Y. 898, 60 N.E.2d 30 (1944) (per
curiam) (location near subway entrance increased gross sales and therefore rental value of stores).
196. A recent decision by the Washington State Board of Tax Appeals illustrates the general
reluctance of valuation tribunals to recognize transitory fluctuations in "real value." The board re-
jected evidence of value based upon a recent sale of the property because a "buyers' market" then
prevailed. As a dissenting member pointed out, "[tihe fact that a 'buyers market' existed at the time
of the sale is a reflection of the true market and does not change the willing buyer-willing seller or
arm's-length nature of the transaction." Rainier Brewing Co. v. Hoppe, Nos. 78-62 to 78-70 (Wash.
B.T.A. Jan. 25, 1980) (Brand, vice chairman, dissenting).
Use of reproduction cost as a stable measure of "value" when income and market data reflect
turbulent economic circumstances raises a question as to the effect of the economy upon building
prices. In In re Real Property for Mun. Purposes, 192 Misc. 280, 80 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1948), the city
objected to the use of inflated post-war construction costs in an eminent domain proceeding valuing a
settlement house agreed to be a specialty. The city argued that its expert used 1941 prices because
labor and material prices had greatly increased since then, and that values should be determined as of
a time when conditions were normal. The court rejected this argument, not on the grounds that abnor-
mal values could be real ones, but because no "abnormal condition" had been shown to exist. 80
N.Y.S.2d at 342.
197. A major danger is assignment to the hypothetical party of all the characteristics of the pre-
sent owner, "resorting to a tour deforce by which to bridge the gap between the realization value of a
property and its value to the owner." I J. BONBRIGrr, supra note 6, at 60.
198. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 18 A.D.2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d 228
(1963), affid, 14 N.Y.2d 314,251 N.Y.S.2d 460,200 N.E.2d 447 (1964).
199. Goldberger, Three Ways to Get a Sense of Extraordinary New York, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1980, at C9, col. 6.
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The building, completed shortly before the assessment at a cost of
$36,000,000, was valued by the city at $21,000,000. However, the own-
ers contended that a capitalization of rental income would yield a value of
less than $18,000,000.
The appellate division relied upon the presumed validity of assess-
ments in rejecting this "startling result": 200
It would seem to follow beyond the hope of successful contradiction that the
traditional method of ascertaining value by capitalization is not applicable in
this situation. Nowhere in the record is it explained how just two years be-
fore the period under review an experienced owner employing a reliable
contractor and having the services of outstanding architects put
$36,000,000 into a structure that was only worth $17,800,000.201
The court went further, however, and suggested two possible approaches
to such "prestige" structures: 202 use of depreciated reproduction cost, by
analogy to buildings of unique design, 20 3 and capitalization of income,
with that figure adjusted to include the value of public association of the
owner's name with an architecturally outstanding structure. 2°4 A concur-
ring opinion elaborated upon this latter suggestion:
200. Seagram, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
201. Id.at231-32.
202. The court made clear that such suggestions were only dicta:
The conclusion, therefore, is that petitioner proceeded upon an untenable theory and failed to
show error in the assessments which calls for affirmance of the confirmation by the referee. It
would, however, be unfair to leave the impression that a building of this sort presents an insolu-
ble problem .... [I]t will not be idle to indicate the lines along which presentation might be
made.
Id. at 232.
Earlier in its opinion the court listed the "distinctive features" characterizing buildings of this
type: they are generally known by the owner's name, rather than by street address; they are con-
structed of unusual materials; their architecture is "noteworthy"; and they are set back from the
street:
[Tihe space involved [is] employed in distinctly decorative effects. The net effect is that this
building, and the limited number that resemble it, gives up a substantial fraction of the land that
might be built upon, with a consequent diminution of the rentable space, and its construction
involves a cost materially in excess of utilitarian standards.
Id. at 230.
203. While denying that this building constituted a "specialty," the opinion nonetheless found a
parallel justifying use of the cost approach: "While here the special features do not restrict the use,
they do affect the value and the absence of proof of that effect could well lead to a valuation on
replacement value as a last resort." Id. at 232.
204. The court stated:
The public does not know or care about the actual ownership of the fee. The same effect could
be produced if the building were identified in the public mind by the name of a tenant. In calcu-
lating the income of the building the additional increment that a tenant who could afford and




Given a new building, prudently constructed for commercial purposes, the
answer must be that the rental value assigned to the owner-tenant is too low,
and, perhaps too, that the building as a whole bearing the name of its owner
includes a real property value not reflected in commercial rental income.205
Four justices of the New York Court of Appeals voted to affirm the
judgment of the Appellate Division, denying without explanation the tax-
payer's contention that this would tax prestige and advertising value,
rather than real property alone. 20 6 Three justices dissented. Their opinion
criticized the result as a tax upon value to the owner in violation of market
value assessment: "The good will follows Seagram and cannot be re-
garded as real property value inherent in the building itself.' '207
No well-defined rules for assessment of "prestige" structures have de-
veloped; perhaps in reaction to criticism of the Seagram case, courts have
been reluctant to invoke it,208 and the "limited specialty" category has
remained nebulous. 20 9 Yet the problem posed by Seagram-a divergence
205. Id. at235 (Breitel, J.P., concurring).
206. 14N.Y.2dat317,251N.Y.S.2dat462,200N.E.2dat448.
207. Id. at 321, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 465,200 N.E.2d at 450 (Burke, J., dissenting).
208. See, for example, G.R.F., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 41 N.Y.2d 512, 393 N.Y.S.2d 965,
362 NE.2d 597 (1977), where the court adopted elements of the Seagram approach but denied it was
equating the two cases. Id. at 513-14, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 967, 362 N.E.2d at 598-99. For critical
reaction to the Seagram decision, see, e.g., Murphy & Rook, State and Local Taxation, 15 SYRA-
cUsE L. REv. 223, 225 (1964); Note, Taxation-Assessment-Valuation of Prestige Office Building
Based Partially on Cost of Construction Upheld, 33 FOPDHAM L. Rev. 121 (1964); A BlowforArchi-
tecture, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1964, at 22, col. 2:
When it serves society badly, there is something wrong with the law. A clear illustration is in
the New York State Court of Appeals decision upholding a lower court judgment that Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons is to be penalized in the form of higher taxes for building an extravagantly
handsome structure that has become one of the city's chief ornaments. For New York this deci-
sion is a catastrophe.
209. Even before the New York Court of Appeals reached a decision in Seagram, the appellate
division faced a similar situation in a valuation dispute over the Pepsi-Cola headquarters on Park
Avenue. The appellate division simply stated:
[Tihis building is not ... in the same category as the Seagram Building, that is, a newly erected
structure built especially for prestige and advertising value as well as for the headquarters use of
its owner....
... The building being neither a "specialty" nor a "prestige type structure," the cost of
construction thereof is accepted only as a maximum value.
Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 19 A.D.2d 56, 240 N.Y.S.2d 770, 774-75 (1963). The lack of any
more objective and detailed explanation of the distinction between the two buildings was criticized by
the dissenting opinion to the court of appeals decision in Seagram:
The narrow and highly technical character of the rule applied by the Appellate.Division may
be highlighted by comparison with [Pepsi-Cola Co.] ... Since both [buildings] are new, held
for business rental, and used as headquarters for the owner, the only difference is the presumed
benefit accruing to the Seagram Company from having its name associated with an architectur-
ally superior and well-known building.
14 N.Y.2d at 320, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 464, 200 N.E.2d at 449 (Burke, J., dissenting). Commentators
have agreed with the dissent on this point: "It would seem, then, if there is any distinction between
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between cost and income data not explicable as the result of mistaken
planning-remains unsolved, and mirrors the specialty dilemma.
The strongest argument favoring the Seagram result was articulated by
the appellate division: "The public does not know or care about the actual
ownership of the fee. The same effect could be produced if the building
were identified in the public mind by the name of a tenant. '1210 "Pres-
tige" buildings have proven their profitability upon these terms;21' a
prime tenant may pay sufficient rent to justify the cost of construction.
Any distinction between such a building and an owner-occupied but oth-
erwise similar structure would undermine horizontal equity between
buildings of equivalent market value.
Yet, as the dissent in the court of appeals pointed out, " '[v]alue'
under section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law ... is market value given
willing sellers and buyers .... In our view, this approach to value neces-
sarily excludes any element that is unique to the present owner of a build-
ing." 212 Would not the identification of Seagram's corporate activities
with a building of outstanding architectural quality, so important to Seag-
ram itself, be of little or even negative value to a potential purchaser?213
This argument was used by the Equitable Life Insurance Company in a
1979 Iowa case: "Equitable argues that no other insurance company
the [Seagram] case and the Pepsi-Cola case, it lies in the architectural evaluation made by the tax
assessor, resulting in the addition of a highly unpredictable consideration to an already complex situa-
tion." Note, supra note 208, at 124; accord, Murphy & Rook, supra note 208, at 225. For an archi-
tecture critic's view of the Pepsi-Cola Building, see P. GOLDBERGER. THE CrrY OBSERVED: NEW
YORK 154, 155 (1978) ("[The building is] an elegant box of glass and aluminum floating on piers...
Like the Seagram Building, it is a jewel of metal and glass that works best when it can be played off
against older, masonry buildings .... ").
210. 18A.D.2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d228, 233 (1963), affd, 14 N.Y.2d 314, 251N.Y.S.2d 460,
200 N.E.2d 447 (1964).
211. Real estate developer Gerald Hines, for example, has retained architects Philip Johnson
(who worked with Mies van der Rohe on the Seagram building) and John Burgee on numerous proj-
ects, including Houston's Pennzoil Place. FORTUNE magazine credited him with introducing invest-
ment builders to the "use of high-quality design," and went on to add:
A Seagrams could afford to put up a costly Mies van der Rohe design in New York City. An
investment builder could not, or thought he couldn't.
Hines has altered that perception .... He did so because he thought well-designed buildings
would make more money for him and his partners. They have.
Stuart, Texan Gerald Hines is Tall in the Skyline, FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 101, 103.
212. 14 N.Y.2d 314, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463, 200 N.E.2d 447, 450 (1964) (Burke, J., dissent-
ing)- cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Flint, 415 Mich. 702, 329 N.W.2d 755, 757 (1983)
(" [W]e reject the notion that it is proper to include, in determining value, expenditures made, as the
Tax Tribunal found, to enhance plaintiff's image and business without regard to whether they add to
the selling price of the building.").
213. Note that the value attached to the reputation and beauty of the structure itself is presumably
reflected in the rent paid by ordinary tenants whose names are not associated with the building. A
value of name association, over and above the value of an address in such a building, must be sought




would want to occupy a building so closely identified with Equitable and
therefore the ... [valuation] experts actually considered the special value
or use value of the property to Equitable .... "214 Seagram does not
address this problem.
A second and more serious problem in Seagram concerns potential in-
clusion of nonproperty values in the tax base. If association of its name
with an acclaimed landmark increased Seagram's sales but could not be
expected to do the same for a prospective purchaser, should this effect
enhance value for property tax purposes? A concurring opinion in the ap-
pellate division acknowledged this concern in a footnote: "[W]hether the
increased value attaches to the real estate or to business good will may
well, in some cases, present problems difficult of solution.' '215 But the
court of appeals dismissed such concerns: "This does not mean that ad-
vertising or prestige or publicity value is erroneously taxed as realty
value. ' ' 216 Yet rejection of a strict market value standard may permit
value to the owner to subsume all such categories. A 1928 valuation case
concerning a magnificent but unprofitable hotel illustrated these difficul-
ties. The presiding justice first proposed that whatever the property "adds
to the comfort or well-being of its owner or possessor, that fact should, as
far as the limitation of human understanding will permit, be assigned its
true proportion of value,''217 but then reduced the assessment on the
grounds that the owners "should not be penalized for their public spirit by
having to pay taxes on the full structural value of a money losing ho-
tel." ' 218 In other words, the judge's sense of fairness, and little else, de-
termined the amount of the tax. A similar lack of objective criteria for
"value" in Seagram led the ensuing debate to focus upon instrumental
goals, such as encouragement of architectural excellence, 219 as if the tax
base were so ill defined as to permit unlegislated incentives reflecting ju-
dicial attitudes towards design. The most unsettling aspect of Seagram is
its suggestion that this may be accurate.
214. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 281 N.W.2d 821, 824-25 (Iowa 1979). As-
sessment of value to the owner is specifically prohibited by IowA CODE ANN. § 441.21(1) (West
Supp. 1983).
215. 18 A.D.2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d 228, 236 n.1 (1963) (Breitel, J.P., concurring), aff'd, 14
N.Y.2d 314, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460, 200 N.E.2d 447 (1964).
216. 14 N.Y.2d 314,318,251 N.Y.S.2d 460,463,200 N.E.2d 447,448 (1964).
217. People ex rel. Colgate Inn v. Assessors of Hamilton, 132 Misc. 506, 230 N.Y.S. 134, 136
(1928).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., A Blow for Architecture, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1964, at 22, col. 2 (quoted supra
note 208). See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
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F. The Question of Highest and Best Use
Ambiguities surrounding the criterion of "highest and best use" have
complicated valuation of specialty property. Under normal circumstances
a valuation at highest and best use permits an assessment to encompass
value for all potential uses rather than current use alone. Property valua-
tion at highest and best use requires appraisal of each parcel "as though it
were being put to its most profitable use, given probable legal, physical
and financial constraints." 220 It simply implements a market value stan-
dard, identifying highest and best use by reference to prices bid for the
property in light of all its possible legal uses.
In the case of specialty property, however, highest and best use has
been occasionally employed as a bridge between use value and market
value-a means of taxing value to the owner without confronting the im-
plications of this step. 221 This may be in part a reaction to taxpayer ma-
nipulation of "functional obsolescence." 222 A claim of obsolescence 223
provides an owner with a ready argument for reducing the assessment of
almost any structure below its reproduction cost less physical deprecia-
220. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, IMPROVING REAL PROPERTY ASSESS-
MENT 425 (1978). A statute requiring assessment at current use, or consideration of current use in
assessment, is an alternative to the highest and best use standard, and generally results in a reduced
assessment. E.g., Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313
(1979).
221. See, for example, McCannel v. County of Hennepin, 301 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1980).
where the court held that airport facilities owned by Northwest Airlines were to be valued on a cost
basis as specialty property, with no consideration taken of the expense to a potential buyer of convert-
ing the property to a different use:
Northwest argues that the trial court's method of valuing its property as unique property vi-
olates the general rule that property should be valued at its market value rather than its intrinsic
value. Although the concepts of intrinsic value and unique property are closely parallel in cases
such as this, the trial court did value the property by determining its reproduction cost, an ac-
cepted method of estimating market value. To state it differently, the trial court determined the
value of the property according to its highest and best use as an airport facility without regard to
who might own it. The fact that its intrinsic value to Northwest Airlines might be equal to its
value to a hypothetical buyer as an airport facility does not render the trial court's method of
valuation invalid.
222. This term is defined by the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS. supra note
220, at 424, as "loss in value of a property resulting from such factors as overcapacity, inadequacy,
poor layout in the face of changes in style or in the art ......
223. E.g., Onondaga County Water Dist. v. Board of Assessors, 39 N.Y.2d 601, 604, 385
N.Y.S.2d 13, 15, 350 N.E.2d 390, 391 (1976) (rejecting taxpayer's attempt to deduct 50% of con-
struction cost of new pipeline as functional obsolescence: "Where . . . as in this case, the excess
capacity for production was planned and constructed in reasonable anticipation of future needs, that
is, with deferred utility, there is no functional depreciation."); B.F. Keith Columbus Co. v. Board of
Revision, 148 Ohio St. 253, 74 N.E.2d 359, 361 (1947) (allowance for functional depreciation held
proper for vaudeville theatre converted to motion picture use: "Functional depreciation occurs where
property, although still in good physical condition, has become obsolete or useless due to changing
business conditions and thus to all intents and purposes valueless to the owner.").
Property Tax
tion.224 The difficulty of testing this reduction against market data may
have encouraged courts to rely upon the current and intended use as the
standard for valuation.
The same skepticism greets claims that a unique building would enter a
prospective purchaser's calculation of value as a negative sum, the cost of
demolition and removal-the "tear-down proposition" suggested and re-
jected in the New York Stock Exchange case.2 25 Where the building in
question is sound and of use to its owner, the idea of a negative assess-
ment appears an affront to common sense, 226 yet it is not inconsistent
with a market value standard.
A particularly interesting example of this problem arose in a 1978 New
Jersey decision, Hackensack Water Co. v. Borough of Old Tappan.227
The water company had bought 940 acres of "natural basin property"
twenty years earlier, excavated it and constructed a dam and reservoir.
The division of tax appeals, accepting a stipulation that the highest and
best use of the underwater property was residential, reduced its assess-
ment by four-fifths. The borough appealed. The court detailed the steps
required to turn the reservoir into a subdivision: dismantling the dam,
draining the reservoir (without flooding the neighboring land), transport-
ing millions of cubic yards of landfill, and rechanneling the dammed
river. The cost of these preparations was estimated to exceed the market
price of the land as residential property. 228
The court rejected the notion of a highest and best use yielding a lower
224. See, e.g., Stephen & Stephen Properties v. State Tax Comm'n, 499 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo.
1973) (argument that two-year-old tennis club, although successful, should be valued at 50% of cost
to reflect functional obsolescence; testimony that this depreciation "was there the day they laid the
last brick, it was there while this was in the planning stage"). The Stephen & Stephen court consid-
ered whether a prospective purchaser could expect to obtain a special use permit to operate a tennis
club, such as the present owners enjoyed. The court held that, despite testimony to the contrary, "the
permit limits the field of possible buyers because there is no guarantee the special use permit would
pass to subsequent buyers." Id. at 803. An interesting contrast is found in Pocono Downs, Inc. v.
Board for Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 11 Pa. Commw. 81, 312 A.2d 452 (1973). That decision
rejected the taxpayer's argument that a higher capitalization rate should be applied to its income
because it required a racing license which could be revoked by the state racing commission. "The
court below properly observed that there was little prospect of the Commonwealth's reversing its
allowance of horse racing and that the license in fact afforded security against competition." 312
A.2d at 454. On the difficulty of verifying claims of functional obsolescence without reference to
income data, see infra note 246.
225. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64
(1927), affldmem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
139-46.
226. See, e.g., Delaware Racing Ass'n v. McMahon, 320 A.2d 758, 760 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 340 A.2d 837 (Del. 1975) (rejecting highest and best use which
"contemplated the destruction of valuable improvements").
227. 77 N.J. 208, 390 A.2d 122 (1978).
228. 390 A.2d at 125.
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value than current use: "Underlying the settled rule that remote uses are
irrelevant . . . is the more basic principle that property valuation should
have some relationship to reality, and the reality of the matter is that the
land is useful as a reservoir." 229 It then valued the land, as specialty prop-
erty, at the original cost to the water company.
This outcome, while an understandable expression of impatience with
an almost absurd extension of highest and best use analysis, did not at-
tempt to define the limits of that approach. 230 An unstated operational rule
may be drawn from the court's reaction: highest and best use of land will
not justify a lower total assessment of land and improvements than alter-
nate uses would yield. This corollary, necessary only when the cost of
returning land to its undeveloped state cancels any improvement in its
ultimate value, accords with the inherent meaning of "highest and best
use." But the court in Hackensack Water Co. did not elaborate upon this
implication. It justified current-use valuation on the grounds that "prop-
erty should be valued in the actual condition in which the owner holds
it,"231 a maxim which cannot support appraisals lower than market
229. Id.
230. "We do not intend here to disturb the principle that valuation of land for economically
feasible uses other than its actual use is appropriate." Id. at 126 n.3. In the case of unmarketable
property, does this suggest that value to the owner must replace the nominal market price of a tear-
down proposition, the latter proving less economically feasible than actual use? Without a separate
justification for deviation from a market standard, the "economically feasible" criterion simply indi-
cates that the higher of value to the owner and value to the market will prevail. This is clearly not
appropriate in the case of marketable property of great value to the owner and modest value to the
market-as becomes plain when such property is offered for sale. See, e.g., Skyline Swannanoa, Inc.
v. Nelson County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 437, 440 (1947) (Mansion of imported marble, con-
structed in 1922 at cost in excess of $1 million, sold in 1944 for $60,000: "The main dwelling was
designed for use as a private residence. There seems to be no market for the property for such use.
Attempts have been made to convert the building to commercial use, but its architectural design has
proved too much of a barrier .... ). Nichols recounts a similar example from an unreported Massa-
chusetts case:
The principal officer and owner of a "chain" of restaurants maintained a dairy farm from which
the milk sold in the restaurants was derived, and as incident thereto built a cow-barn finished in
mahogany, with marble slabs separating the stalls. Music was played while the cows were being
milked, and the slogan "milk from contented cattle" had great advertising value. Later the
owner met financial reverses from outside investments, and the property came into the hands of
a "dirt farmer" operating an ordinary commercial milk route. A court decision was required to
convince the assessors that the cow barn was worth little more than one built of ordinary materi-
als.
Nichols, Two Problems in Tax Valuation, 24 B.U.L. REV. 1,9-10 (1944). One would expect that the
possibility of selling the marble and mahogany fixtures was raised by the assessor, if they would
command a price in excess of the depreciated cost of an ordinary barn.
231. Hackensack Water Co., 390 A.2d at 125. This maxim has been cited by a number of courts
rejecting allowances for functional obsolescence. E.g., Delaware Racing Ass'n v. McMahon, 320
A.2d 748, 761-62 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 340 A.2d 837 (Del. 1975) ("A
property owner is and should be assessed on the basis of what improvements have been erected, not
on what could have been erected, despite the fact that the latter might be more economical or finan-
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values for alternate uses. It made no mention of the problem of unmarket-
able property,232 and failed even to suggest an alternate basis of assess-
ment, such as value to the owner.2 33 The historical cost of the reservoir
land almost certainly represented neither its present value to the water
company, its value to a hypothetical purchaser seeking another use, nor
its value to another public utility standing in the place of the present
owner. Reliance upon cost-based assessment in such a situation simply
demonstrates the need for general reconsideration of specialty valuation if
it is to be more than a last resort for intractable disputes.
G. Summary: The Cost Approach and Its Alternatives
1. Horizontal Equity
The widespread use of cost-based assessments in specialty valuation is
problematic because it sanctions radically different assessment pro-
cedures for property within and without that class. Use of reproduction
cost rather than realizable sale price can result in an enormous increase in
taxes upon a specialty,234 yet reproduction cost would not be used as the
sole guide to valuation of nonspecialty buildings. 235 Nonspecialty prop-
cially rewarding."); Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 19 A.D.2d 56, 240 N.Y.S.2d 770, 774 (1963)
("The owner is to be assessed on the basis of the building that he erected, and as it existed on the
taxable status date, and not on what he could have erected."). Clearly a property owner cannot be
assessed upon the value of an imaginary structure. Yet it is equally clear that alternate uses which
affect market value, either in a positive or negative fashion, should affect assessments as well. How
little assistance this maxim offers may be seen by comparing it to the statement, found with equal
frequency, that an assessment will not be limited by the use to which the taxpayer puts the property.
E.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d 714, 720 (1971)
("A taxpayer who chooses to use his land in a manner which is not consistent with its highest and
best use should not be rewarded with a lower assessment, the effect of which is to increase the tax
burden on others.").
232. Perhaps because the parties agreed that the highest and best use of the property was for
residential development, 390 A.2d at 125, the opinion did not deal with the question of marketability
in fact. It noted that the water company could not sell its property without permission of the New
Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners, id. at 124, but did not indicate whether such approval
was likely or whether such sales had taken place in the past.
233. "I would not, to the obvious detriment of the remaining taxpayers of the Borough of Old
Tappan, ascribe as the true value of the reservoir land its remote original cost which has no relevance
whatsoever to current market value." Id. at 127 (Handler, J., dissenting).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
235. E.g., People ex rel. Manhattan Square Beresford, Inc. v. Sexton, 284 N.Y. 145, 29 N.E.2d
654, 654 (1940) ("In assessing an improvement upon real estate for tax purposes the maximum value
which ordinarily may be placed upon it is reconstruction cost less depreciation."). Contra, Bornstein
v. State Tax Comm'n, 227 Md. 331, 176 A.2d 859, 862 (1962) ("We think the contention that
reproduction cost is an overall ceiling cannot be supported .... We find no merit in the contention
that use of a capitalization factor converts an ad valorem property tax into one upon income."). See
generally Gifford, Should Replacement Cost Impose a Ceiling on Real Property Tax Assessments?,
26 J. TAx'N 314 (1967). Pennsylvania does not allow use of reproduction cost in determinations of
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erty may provide its owner with benefits not reflected in sale prices, yet
these benefits do not affect its property taxes. Substitution of value to the
owner for sale price risks taxation of prestige, sentiment, or business
values rather than real estate values alone. 236
These problems are greatly exacerbated by the absence of any clear
definition of a "specialty." The impossibility of replacement in the mar-
ket is sometimes accepted as a criterion, 237 and sometimes rejected. 238 A
link between income and business enterprise has sometimes been em-
ployed as a test, 239 and more often ignored. 240 The absence of purchasers
contemplating use for its intended purpose is the best known require-
ment, 241 yet how far the search for potential buyers may extend is not
clear. 242 The resulting uncertainty makes the powerful effect upon tax
liability all the more offensive to horizontal equity. 243
market value, In re Pennsylvania's N. Lights Shoppers City, Inc., 419 Pa. 31, 213 A.2d 268, 269
(1965), but that rule has been interpreted as permitting use of cost data to set a ceiling on assessed
value. Pocono Downs, Inc. v. Board for Assessment & Revision of Taxes, II Pa. Commw. 81, 312
A.2d 452, 453-54 (1973).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
237. E.g., In re James Madison Houses, 17 A.D.2d 317, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (1962). For
example, the court stated in In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 A.D.2d 153, 222
N.Y.S.2d 786, 802-03 (1961), aff d mem., 12 N.Y.2d 1086, 240 N.Y.S.2d 30, 190 N.E.2d 423
(1963), affd, 16 N.Y.2d 497,260 N.Y.S.2d 439, 208 N.E.2d 172 (1965):
It must be beyond dispute that in a town or city that has only one theater, if the theater is con-
demned the only recourse open to the owner, if he desires to operate a theater, is to build another
one .... So, to compensate such an owner the cost of building another theater, less deprecia-
tion, is the only appropriate method.
238. See, for example, County of Suffolk v. C.J. Van Bourgondien, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 507, 512,
419 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55,392 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (1979), where the court stated:
The county contends that claimants' greenhouses are not unique because they can be pur-
chased on the open market. However the requirement of uniqueness goes to the function of the
building, not to the availability of its components. Claimants' greenhouses were specially built
for the growth of plants and flowers, and the evidence establishes, would have had to be re-
moved or destroyed rather than be readily converted in place to other uses. Clearly, they are
unique structures.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 179-97.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
241. E.g., Delaware Racing Ass'n v. McMahon, 340 A.2d 837, 842 (Del. 1975); Chrysler
Corp. v. State Property Tax Appeal Bd., 69 I11. App. 3d 207, 387 N.E.2d 351, 355 (1979); Great
AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 236, 397 N.Y.S.2d 718, 366 N.E.2d 808 (1977).
242. See supra note 145.
243. See, e.g., People ex rel. N.Y. Athletic Club v. Chambers, 272 A.D. 895, 71 N.Y.S.2d
298, 300 (1947) (Callahan, J., dissenting), affd mem., 297 N.Y. 986, 80 N.E.2d 364 (1948):
It is a matter of common knowledge that the cost of reproduction of buildings at present is so
far above market value as to have little relation thereto, and if all properties having some degree
of special use are to be valued at the ceiling of values resting upon the basis of the mounting
reproduction costs less depreciation, thousands of such structures in this City will be taxed pres-
ently on a basis much higher than the remaining bulk of the taxable improvements.
The trial court had ruled that a 20-story clubhouse could not be valued as a specialty, citing such
testimony as this examination of the taxpayer's expert: "Q. Is the New York Athletic Club building
similar in any way to the Stock Exchange building? A. In no way whatsoever." People ex rel. N.Y.
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2. Imperfect Markets
The valuation of property may proceed upon an examination of actual
sale prices of comparable parcels, a calculation of depreciated reproduc-
tion cost, or a capitalization of expected income. Courts reviewing prop-
erty tax assessments have felt free to shift from one method of valuation
to another, or to prescribe an assessment falling within the range yielded
by various methods but conforming to no specific formula. 244 This re-
flects a belief that, properly applied, all three methods should produce the
same result, 245 and that "real" value lies within the area they delimit,
elusive only because simplifications necessary to make the calculations
workable exclude the refinements that would permit them to converge.
Yet in the case of specialty property these assumptions collapse. In the
specialty context, the choice of a method of valuation often becomes the
choice of a tax base.
Whenever the market is so limited as to produce substantial variations
in the realizable sale prices of identical parcels, "market value" is a
questionable measure for the tax. Should the use to which a building is
put change its assessment? If, for example, a town with two theatres is
able to support only one, should the operating theatre be assessed as a
specialty, at its depreciated reproduction cost, while the second is as-
sessed upon its realizable sale price?246 This would produce radically dif-
Athletic Club v. Mills, 187 Misc. 31, 61 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (1946), modified sub nom. People ex rel.
N.Y. Athletic Club v. Chambers, 272 A.D. 895, 71 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1947), aff d mem., 297 N.Y.
986, 80 N.E.2d 364 (1948).
244. E.g., Medical Bldg. Land Co. v. Department of Revenue, 283 Or. 69, 582 P.2d 416
(1978): "Now we embark on the somewhat mystical process appraisers refer to as 'correlation.'
From the three [cost, market, and income approaches, yielding results which differed by $1.5 million]
estimates above we must come up with a single figure for the true cash value of the subject property."
582 P.2d at 420 (footnote omitted). The court then chose to rely on income data alone, despite the
fact that the office building in question was newly constructed and only partially occupied, its "earn-
ings history" consisting of rent accrued after the assessment date.
245. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Bd., 69 111. App. 3d 207, 387 N.E.2d
351,355 (1979) (in valuing automobile assembly plant, "[i]n theory, use of either of the two relevant
approaches [i.e., income and cost] should lead to the same total value"); Gifford, supra note 235, at
314 ("Errors of one sort or another in the valuation processes undoubtedly account for most differ-
ences between capitalized-income value and [cost] value.").
246. E.g., B.F. Keith Columbus Co. v. Board of Revision, 148 Ohio St. 253, 74 N.E.2d 359
(1947) (unreasonable to allow no deduction for functional depreciation when theatre intended for live
performances but used only for motion pictures contained unnecessary storage space, dressing
rooms, and stage area). One commentator expressed concern that Keith would allow a lower assess-
ment for such a theatre even if it were as profitable as similar buildings still used for live perfor-
mances. Note, Functional Obsolescence as a Factor in Valuation, 17 U. CtN. L. REv. 165, 172
(1948). This problem, ho wever, is shared by all attempts to measure functional depreciation without
reference to income data. See, e.g., Bend Millwork Co. v. Department of Revenue, 285 Or. 577, 592
P.2d 986 (1979); Publishers Paper Co. v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 737, 530 P.2d 88 (1974);
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Department of Revenue, 258 Or. 116, 477 P.2d 888 (1970). This difficulty
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:713, 1983
ferent levies upon identical buildings. 247 If, on the other hand, availabil-
ity of the unused theatre as a substitute limits the operating theatre's
assessment to the price at which the abandoned one is offered, demolition
of the abandoned building will have the surprising effect of raising the
other's valuation from a sacrifice price to depreciated reproduction cost,
for it will now qualify as a specialty. Should the owner of the first theatre
buy the second as a tear-down proposition but keep it in place to assure a
market value assessment of the building in the future? These are all prob-
lems of imperfect markets; none of them would arise if an auction
matched numerous buyers and sellers of similar property.
3. Realizable Sale Price as a Tax Base
Would a literal interpretation of "market value" improve specialty as-
sessments? At one time Wisconsin adopted this approach. Considering a
situation similar to the Seagram case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
wrote in 1922:
The statute does not contemplate that the owner shall be both seller and
buyer. No safe test could be arrived at upon such a basis. It would only
consist in the judgment of the assessor unchecked by external actual facts as
to sales or market value .... [I]t must be borne in mind that the state asks a
tax only upon the business value of the property of its citizens .... In this
case we have a fine, substantial, artistic building gracing half a block in the
can be solved by refusing a deduction for functional depreciation to taxpayers who will not supply the
assessor with income data, in the absence of an active market for the particular type of building under
consideration. The more intractable problem lies in the unequal assessment of identical buildings put
to different uses when the market has already absorbed the number which can compete at the most
profitable use.
247. An extraordinary example of this approach is found in Village of Burnsville v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 295 Minn. 504, 202 N.W.2d 653 (1972). The assessor valued certain Minnesota
River bottomland, previously classified as wasteland and assessed at less than $1 million, at more
than $7 million after its acquisition by the Northern States Power Company. Four million dollars of
this assessment represented a "use increment," the value to the utility of substituting a connected
lake for the cooling towers it would otherwise have had to construct. The Minnesota Supreme Court
approved the tax court's reasoning in reducing the total assessment to less than $1.5 million: "If we
were to add a 'use increment' to the value of this property then we would have to add a similar 'use
increment' to all property in the State of Minnesota, which could be used for cooling purposes." 202
N.W.2d at 656-57 (quoting unreported Minnesota tax court decision). A witness testified "to the
obvious fact that actual or potential 'Black Dog Lakes' [the lake used by the power company] exist in
the bottomlands 'all the way up and down the river.' "Id. at 657 n.6. On one level this result poses
no difficulty for the valuation of specialty property according to its depreciated cost. The availability
of substitutes will limit value to the owner to market value, preventing the market price of bottomland
from rising to the cost of cooling towers. But the notion of a "use increment" is relevant to the more
usual specialty situation, such as the one- or two-theatre town, ifBurnsville suggests that as a general
proposition use by the owner should not affect the valuation of property.
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city of Milwaukee built to meet the peculiar needs of its owner, and not well
adapted for other uses. The state says, Tax it at its sale value. 248
Why is this unsatisfactory? Primarily because, in the usual case of non-
specialty property, market value indicates something of the resources ex-
pended by the owner as well as those the owner would realize were the
property offered for sale. For the owner of a costly structure to escape
taxation because no other party shares such extravagant tastes poses a
problem of horizontal equity different from, but no less troubling than,
that presented by current specialty cases-and undoubtedly one less polit-
ically acceptable to most jurisdictions. "The literal adoption of a market-
value rule would seem to do gross injustice by hitting only those taxpay-
ers whose property happens to take marketable form. "249
It is difficult, however, to support elaborate exceptions to general valu-
ation methods on grounds of political realism in the absence of legislative
action. Almost no statutes address the specialty problem. 250 Attempts to
find an answer in existing legislation generally serve only to justify a
248. State ex rel. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weiher, 177 Wis. 445, 188 N.W. 598,599
(1922). Like Seagram, this case involved valuation of an opulent office building constructed as head-
quarters for its owner. As in Seagram, the taxing jurisdiction proceeded upon the assumption that a
business would not invest in property unless it were worth the cost: "an owner is not supposed to
build to lose." Id. A dissenting opinion, in turn, presaged Seagram by contending that such "monu-
mental" structures embodied value not reflected in capitalized earnings, and that the recent construc-
tion of a number of such corporate headquarters signaled the development of a market for such build-
ings, and that the "conservative" directors of an insurance company could not be supposed to have
squandered corporate funds upon a building worth only a fraction of its cost. Id. at 601 (Crownhart,
J., dissenting). On the question of a strict market value standard, Weiher suggests that few points of
substance have been added to the debate since 1922. Nor has Wisconsin maintained this unambigu-
ous adherence to such a standard-its courts perhaps have realized, in Bonbright's words, that "only
the Wisconsin courts have had the courage to interpret market value in this literal sense, and in their
case discretion would have been the better part of valor." I J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 509. In
subsequent years the court came to permit consideration of "all elements" affecting market value,
including income data. See State ex rel. N. Shore Dev. Co. v. Axtell, 216 Wis. 153, 256 N.W. 622,
623 (1934); see also State ex rel. IBM Corp. v. Board of Review, 231 Wis. 303, 285 N.W. 784
(1939) (valuation of personal property).
249. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 458. Bonbright also recognized the pragmatic nature of
many such decisions:
Why this vagueness in the concept of value? For one thing, even the most conscientious tax
collector will tend to dodge debatable points, to give the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt. To
hew close to the line of theory may give satisfaction to economists, but it will assuredly cause a
stampede of irate citizens on grievance day. "Interesting questions" usually die stillborn.
Id. at 479. Of course, the pragmatic approach to specialty valuation does not appease the owner, but
rather the other taxpayers in the jurisdiction.
250. OR. REv. STAT. § 308.205 (1981) directs that the "true cash value" of property without a
market value shall be set for tax purposes at "the amount of money that would justly compensate the
owner for the loss of the property." The Oregon tax court has invoked this section in approving the
New York Stock Exchange approach to specialty valuation: "A specialized building with an ongoing
use, which is the highest and best use, should be valued at that use." Benevolent Protective Order of
Elks v. Department of Revenue, 6 Or. T.R. 489, 492 (1976).
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pragmatic result. The New York Stock Exchange decision found "a com-
plete answer" in the statutory requirement that all property "be assessed
at the full value thereof." ' 251 The Illinois court rejected specialty valua-
tion for the Chrysler plant because the law prescribed uniformity of as-
sessment at "fair cash value." ' 252 Phrases such as "fair market value"
and "willing buyer-willing seller" 2 53 have been used to describe a hy-
pothetical sale at a price equal to value to the owner more often than they
have been taken to mean realizable sale price. 254 In such a situation, a
refusal to follow any one of the mingled and confused notions of "value"
to its logical conclusion may be justified as the "interpretation of lan-
guage by its traditional use.' '255
251. People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64, 68
(1927), affd men., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514(1928), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
139-46.
252. Chrysler Corp. v. State Property Tax Appeal Bd., 69 Ill. App. 3d 207, 387 N.E.2d 351,
355 (1979):
Illinois law requires that all real property "shall be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at
the price it would bring at a fair, voluntary sale."..... This is theoretically an objective standard
of valuation; the value of particular property is set by the forces of the marketplace at a given
place and time.
... [E]ven where special purpose property is involved, the use of reproduction cost is only
one proper factor in the valuation process ....
The court also found "strong support" for its rejection of specialty valuation in the state's constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity, ILL CoNsT. art. IX, § 4(a), although it did not agree with Chrysler's
contention that this provision prohibited cost-based valuation. 387 N.E. at 356.
253. In Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1934), Judge Learned Hand criticized
Treasury regulations providing that property lacked a fair market value only in "rare and extraordi-
nary cases":
Perhaps there need not be a "market" to establish a "market value," but there must be some
assurance that the value is what a "market" would establish; and a "market" itself presupposes
enough competition between buyers and sellers to prevent the exigencies of an individual from
being exploited .... Willing" adds nothing, for, if the trade goes through at all, both must be
willing, and the degree of their reluctance is not a serviceable measure.
Judge Hand concluded that the 1921 formulation, "readily realizable market value," which was
replaced three years later by "fair market value," was a more expansive term, "for one may at times
'readily realize' on goods which have no true market, 'fair' or 'unfair.' " Id. Yet specialty cases
from New York Stock Exchange on have attempted to find a statutory "market value" for property
with a negligible or nonexistent realizable sale value. Stiles v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 951, 952-53
(5th Cir. 1934), took that approach to the 1924 change in wording of the federal statute: "It is not
necessary that market value be ascertained by quotations on an exchange or that the property be
readily salable in open market."
254. E.g.. Turnley v. City of Elizabeth, 76 N.J.L. 42, 44 (1908):
We are not disposed, however, to give much force to the argument that because there are very
few actual buyers for so costly a residence the valuation to be placed upon it under the statutory
criterion [i.e., the price at a fair and bona fide sale] should be correspondingly depreciated. The
criterion established by the statute is a hypothetical sale, hence the buyers therein referred to are
hypothetical buyers, not actual and existing purchasers.
255. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (federal estate tax not a direct tax
requiring apportionment); cf. Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448, 450 (1908), where
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H. Specialty Valuation: Conclusions
Given the current structure of the real property tax, the problem of spe-
cialty valuation permits no single and general solution. The ad hoc ap-
proach found in many decisions, with ill-defined categories and contrad-
ictory assessment methods, requires improvement. Yet outright abolition
of the distinction would produce unacceptably low assessments upon
costly property of value to its owner. The initial steps must be incremen-
tal. Given that the specialty classification is judicially created, what can
courts do to minimize its disruptive effect upon the predictability and ob-
jectivity of the tax?
As a first measure, the range of properties included in this class could
be greatly narrowed. Recognizing that it represents a departure from gen-
eral valuation methods, which equate "market value" with realizable
sale price, courts could reserve specialty classification for cases in which
normal valuation approaches fail. For example, property linked to enter-
prise income need not be given a specialty designation if the income rea-
sonably anticipated by a normal buyer may be estimated. 25 6 Similarly, the
specialty classification need not be invoked in the valuation of "prestige"
structures if the prestige inherent in association with the building name
may be offered to a prime tenant for an enhanced rent. 25 7 A structure
which could be replaced by purchase, rather than by rebuilding, need not
be considered a specialty, no matter how specialized its use; the availabil-
ity of a substitute will prevent value to the owner from exceeding the sale
price. 258 As much as possible, the specialty classification should be re-
served for exceptional cases in which sale price affords a plainly objec-
tionable tax base.
The subjectivity involved in judging a measure objectionable, of
course, demonstrates at once the difficulty of confining such an excep-
tion. Numerous types of property may be of greater value or of different
use to their owners than to the market; this cannot in itself justify an in-
crease in their assessments. Defining the "market" necessary to support a
finding of "market value" presents a related problem. No real property
enjoys a perfect market from an economist's point of view, but nonethe-
the Court found that the fourteenth amendment does not require a reduction in assessment of land to
reflect the mortgage debt:
[T]he mode of taxation is of long standing, and, upon questions of constitutional law, the long-
settled habits of the community play a part .... It is a sufficient answer to say that you cannot
carry a constitution out with mathematical nicety to logical extremes. If you could, we never
should have heard of the police power. And this is still more true of taxation, which in most
communities is a long way off from a logical and coherent theory.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 179-97.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 198-219.
258. Cf. supra note 238 (specialty designation for marketable property).
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less most parcels require no deviation from realizable sale price in calcu-
lation of assessed value. An attempt to restrict the specialty designation to
exceptional cases requires recognition that value to the owner is not the
general measure of assessment and that an extremely low sale price may
be a valid indicator of a market value. This in itself would go far toward
restricting specialty treatment to unusual situations. Decisions frankly cir-
cumventing normal identification of sale price with market value would
doubtless be more difficult to obtain than are those directing specialty
classification at present.
This recognition that specialty valuation constitutes an exception to
usual valuation methods could benefit a large number of cases not cur-
rently considered a part of the specialty category-those involving
owner-imposed restrictions upon use or marketability. These and similar
encumbrances have reduced assessments in a number of cases apparently
guided by the mistaken belief that realizable sale price is the standard for
all valuations. The narrow logic of such decisions signals the need for a
new perspective upon the problem. If it is admitted that some small but
irreducible number of cases require the exception to market value assess-
ment now provided by the specialty approach, a starting point may be
found for a new method of dealing with other unmarketable property, for
which a nominal assessment may also be found unacceptable. If the spe-
cialty cases aid this extremely troublesome area, the subject of the next
segment of this study, perhaps the price they have exacted in terms of the
logic and predictability of assessments, attributable to "the absence of
any valid philosophy for the general property tax," 259 will be in some
part redeemed.
IV. VALUATION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS
AND SIMILAR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
A. The Problem of Easements That Reduce Market Value
The long-term lease and specialty problems provide a useful back-
ground for consideration of the complex array of privately imposed re-
strictions that have been held at various times to affect the valuation of
property for tax purposes. The most difficult questions in this area con-
cern limitations accepted voluntarily by the owner, lowering the realiz-
able sale price of the land but also conferring other benefits not subject to
real property taxation. Should private, voluntary arrangements of this sort
reduce the tax base of the jurisdiction in which the land is located? The
long-term lease and specialty cases demonstrate that neither the effect of
legal encumbrances nor realizable sale prices determine property tax val-
259. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 508.
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uation in all instances. However, the majority of cases dealing with the
valuation of property subject to legal restrictions do in fact allow these
encumbrances to reduce the taxable value of the burdened property.
This pattern was first set by a number of New York easement cases
decided early in this century. The logic of these cases hinged upon what
might be termed the "additive" quality of appurtenant easements.260
Reasoning that the benefit of the restriction inured to other real property,
courts concluded that recognition of the burden of the easement in assess-
ment of the servient estate would cause no revenue loss to the taxing juris-
diction, and in fact was required if double taxation of the benefit were to
be avoided. 261 This appealing symmetry, however, relies upon a number
of incorrect assumptions, primarily the conservation of total property
value and the fact of assessment of the benefit to the dominant estate.
Even more problematic are the broader applications of this reasoning in
later cases that, omitting even the assumed equation of benefit and bur-
den, merely equate taxable value with realizable sale price. The lease and
specialty cases disprove any suggestion that "fair market value" is univ-
ersally defined as the realizable sale price of the owner's interest. The
remaining sections of this article will discuss the development of the ma-
jority approach, which permits legal restrictions to reduce the value of the
burdened property, and will examine alternative methods of dealing with
these situations.
1. Development of the Majority Position
The first influential case dealing with the effect of an easement upon
260. An easement is a property right; its holder may limit the uses to which the owner of property
may put land or buildings. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.5 (A. Casner ed. 1952). An affirmative
easement affords its holder a privilege of positive action, such as use of a private road, upon the
burdened property. A negative easement, by contrast, limits the property's uses without conveying a
right of entry to the holder of the easement. A common example of a negative easement is a limit
upon the height of a building, imposed to protect a neighboring structure's view and access to sun-
light.
An easement in gross benefits its holder personally, running to him as an individual rather than as
the owner of a particular estate. An easement appurtenant accompanies the possession of the bene-
fited, or dominant, estate, enhancing in some way the physical use or enjoyment of it. It passes with
possession of the dominant estate. Id. at §§ 8.71, 8.75. Thus, what is termed here the "additive"
concept of appurtenant easements posits that a benefit and corresponding increase in value to some
dominant estate accompanies every decrease in value suffered by a burdened, or servient, estate.
For discussion and criticism of the approach of the early New York cases, see Menikoff, The
Taxation ofRestricted-Use Property: A Theoretical Framework, 27 BuF'ALO L. REv. 419 (1978).
261. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 269.
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valuation for tax purposes, People ex rel. Poor v. O'Donnel,262 stemmed
from disputed assessments upon Gramercy Park in New York City from
1903 to 1905. Gramercy Park is a private park held in trust for the benefit
of residents of the surrounding lots and maintained by their private assess-
ments:
It is more like a London square than a New York park, and it was laid out at
the foot of Lexington Avenue between 20th and 21st Streets in 1831 by
Samuel Ruggles, a developer, who sold off 66 building lots around the
park. The park remains in private hands, and owners of the surrounding
properties are the only possessors of the keys to its iron gates ... 263
However, today the keys are no longer made of gold, as they were in the
past. 264
Protesting the park's valuation (at $500,000 for 1903 and 1904, and
$750,000 for 1905), the trustees claimed in Poor that easements restrict-
ing its use, found in the deeds to the adjoining lots and to the park itself,
deprived it of all market value: "These easements are such that the land
cannot be used for any other purposes than those mentioned in the deeds,
and their existence makes it necessary to devote the land exclusively to
park purposes . "..."265 The New York Appellate Division agreed and
held the assessments erroneous, finding that in its encumbered state the
park could find no buyer "for any price whatever.' '266 Crucial to its rea-
soning, however, was its conviction that a contrary result would produce
double taxation:
Since the park was established, it has been the practice of the tax commis-
sioners to include in their assessment of the dominant tenements the full
value of the park privileges or easements. The result is that the assessed
value of the lots surrounding the park, exclusive of their improvements, is
several hundred dollars per foot, in excess of the assessed value of lots of
the same size and character in the same section of the city; this excess repre-
senting the value of the park rights, privileges, and easements appurtenant
to the lots surrounding the property of the relators. This excess amounts to
more than what would be the full value of the land embraced within the
limits of the park if the same could be sold free and unencumbered. 26
7
262. 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36, affd mem. sub nom. People ex ret. Poor v. Wells, 200 N.Y.
519, 93 N.E. 1129 (1910).
263. Goldberger, Three Ways to Get a Sense of Extraordinary New York, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1980, at C9, col. 1.
264. Johnston, For a Bastion of Tradition, Change Brings an 'Invasion,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1980, at B1, col. 1.
265. 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36, 37-38, affd mem. sub nom. People ex rel. Poor v. Wells,
200 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E. 1129 (1910).




The court then described an easement's effect upon property values in
language adopted by later cases2 68 as a general principle, which might be
termed an "additive" theory of value:
[W]hen an easement is carved out of one property for the benefit of another,
the market value of the servient estate is thereby lessened, and that of the
dominant increased practically by just the value of the easement. The re-
spective tenements should thereafter be assessed accordingly, the determi-
nate question of the assessable value of each of the properties affected being
its market value, or the amount for which it would sell under ordinary cir-
cumstances .... The city has, therefore, taken unto itself the advantage of
the second of the propositions heretofore laid down, namely, that the domi-
nant estate should be increased by the value of the easement. It cannot, in
fairness and justice, do this, and, at the same time, refuse to accede to the
justice of the first of the propositions, namely, that the market value of the
servient estate is lessened by the value of the amount of the easement. 269
A number of these propositions have become central to the assessment
of servient estates at their realizable sale prices, rather than at unencum-
bered market value. Chief among these is the notion that "carving" an
easement from the servient estate diminishes its value "practically by
just" the increase in value to the dominant estate. Yet the generalization
is erroneous. No such uniform relationship in fact exists, as may be dem-
onstrated by any number of counterexamples. Bonbright required only
one sentence:
An easement of passage over A's forest land to the road may greatly en-
hance the value of B's hotel property without correspondingly depreciating
A's land; while on the other hand an easement of light over C's lot may
merely make D's backyard slightly pleasanter while preventing C from
building an apartment house. 270
Such considerations, however, have not prevented the majority of courts,
following Poor, from concluding without evidence that any increase in
the value of the dominant estate must be accompanied by a corresponding
decrease in the assessment of the servient estate. 271
Poor has also influenced later cases by its evident, although not ex-
plicit, definition of the property tax base, equatilng it with the realizable
sale price of the owner's interest. The New York court thus adopted with-
out explanation or discussion one answer to a question which the lease
and specialty cases show to be highly problematic. The lease cases dem-
268. See infra text accompanying note 294.
269. 124 N.Y.S. at 38-39.
270. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 497.
271. See infra note 329.
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onstrate that rights the owner has relinquished will in some situations be
figured as part of the "property" subject to tax, and the specialty cases
make clear that realizable sale price is not in every instance equivalent to
"market value."
The most influential contribution of Poor to the development of the
additive approach, however, lay in the court's accusation that the city was
inconsistent in valuing the park at a substantial sum while simultaneously
assessing the neighboring lots upon a value enhanced by their park privi-
leges. This too assumes a number of questionable points. If all property
were assessed without regard to encumbrances or divided legal interests,
there would be no need to consider the transfer of value from one lot to
another by reason of such arrangements. Yet even under this approach an
enhanced value to lots surrounding Gramercy Park could enter their as-
sessment, due not to their owners' exclusive rights to the park, but simply
to the amenity of nearby open space in the middle of a city. Surely such
an assessment would not constitute double taxation, even if the aggregate
of such additions exceeded the value of the park itself.272 The charge of
double taxation reflects a confusion between legal interests in land and the
effect a given use has upon neighboring properties' values. The additive
approach, which posits a conservation of market values after imposition
of an easement, equates property rights, which may be divided and con-
served in mathematically precise ways, with property values, which con-
form to no such patterns. A conveyance of rights in the servient estate
may or may not affect its market value for purposes of taxation, depend-
ing upon the definition of property employed as the basis for the tax, but
the problem cannot be avoided by equating the conveyance of rights with
a transfer of taxable values.
Within two years, four additional cases strengthened and extended the
reasoning in Poor. A 1911 case2 73 held that a statute conferring upon the
purchaser at a tax sale "absolute title free from all incumbrances" had no
effect upon an easement granted before assessment of the unpaid tax
against the servient estate. 274 Instead, the court determined, the statute
272. The court in Poor found this comparison particularly persuasive:
The city, in other words, having added to the market value of the surrounding lots a sum as the
estimated value of the easements in the park, which exceeds or equals the value of the park
itself, it cannot assess over again against either the trustees who hold the fee, nor by necessary
consequence against the owners of the land benefited by the easement, the value of the park
property itself which it has, in effect, already assessed and collected.
139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36, 39, affd mem. sub nom. People ex rel. Poor v. Wells, 200 N.Y. 519,
93 N.E. 1129 (1910).
273. Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co., 73 Misc. 61, 130 N.Y.S. 740 (1911), affd mem., 149 A.D.
936, 134 N.Y.S. 1126 (1912), affdmem., 210 N.Y. 561, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914).
274. This decision dealt only with the statute governing tax sales in Oneida County. 130 N.Y.S.
at 747. Its resolution, however, was adopted by the legislature for all county tax sales in N.Y. TAX
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merely cleared the title of liens placed upon it.275 This narrowing of the
property rights conveyed at a tax sale had an immediate impact upon val-
uation controversies in assessment appeals, for almost all courts have as-
sumed that identical "property" must be at issue in the two instances. 276
A second 1911 case returned to the assessment' question. 277 The tax-
payer owned land burdened, through a subdivision map filed with the
county register by the grantor, by easements of access appurtenant to two
neighboring lots. The owner alleged that the remaining "naked fee ... is
for all practical purposes valueless, inasmuch as the owner of said prem-
ises can do nothing with the same and it has to be kept open for the benefit
of the said abutting owners.' '278 After the map was filed, New York City
annexed this section of Westchester County and changed its system of
roads. As a result, the street contemplated by the grantor was never con-
structed, and there was no evidence that the dominant estates had in-
creased in value as a result of this "dormant" easement. Thus, if the
taxpayer's allegations were accepted, 279 the rationale for the additive ap-
proach to easements would be contradicted, for the dominant estates en-
joyed no enhanced value corresponding to the servient property's loss of
marketability. Yet the court chose to follow Poor and its rationale:
The element of double taxation does not appear in the matter at bar ....
But the fact is that a piece of real estate which had been deprived of all its
valuable attributes, so far as the owner was concerned, was treated by the
tax commissioners as if still possessing them....
If, then, the parcel of real estate has no real value for which compensation
LAW § 154, the successor to which, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 1020 (McKinney 1981), sets tax
titles subject to "all easements or rights of way which were in existence at the time of the levy of the
tax, the non-payment of which resulted in the tax sale."See 1971 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 67. For other
examples of statutes preserving easements after a tax sale of the encumbered property, see CAL. REV.
& TAx CODE § 3520(4) (West 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 45 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978);
WASH. REv. CODE § 84.64.460 (1981). See generally Kratovil, Tax Titles: Extinguishment of Ease-
ments, Building Restrictions, and Covenants, 19 Hous. LAW REv. 55 (1981).
275. 73 Misc. 61, 130 N.Y.S. 740, 747 (1911), affd mem., 149 A.D. 936, 134 N.Y.S. 1126
(1912), affdmem., 210 N.Y. 561, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914).
276. E.g., Jackson v. Smith, 153 A.D. 724, 138 N.Y.S. 654, 656 (1912), affdmem., 213 N.Y.
630, 107 N.E. 1079 (1914); Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306 (1929); Hayes v. Gibbs,
110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946). See generally Kratovil, supra note 274.
277. People ex rel. Topping v. Purdy, 143 A.D. 389, 128 N.Y.S. 569, affd mem., 202 N.Y.
550, 95 N.E. 1137 (1911).
278. 128N.Y.S. at571.
279. The court did not deal in its opinion with the possibility that the change in circumstances
following annexation would affect the enforceability of the easement and so raise the value of the
servient estate. See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1952); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1949).
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must be paid, if taken in condemnation proceedings, how can it have a value
for purposes of taxation? Its valuable qualities have been attached to the
adjoining properties which, by the acquisition of easements appurtenant
thereto, have been increased in value and should be assessed accordingly..
It follows, therefore, that, although the question of double taxation is not
here involved, this case comes directly within the reasoning of People ex
rel. Poor v. Wells.28 0
This resolution raises as many questions as it answers. The property
may have been of no value "so far as the owner was concerned," but the
long-term lease cases demonstrate that value to the owner does not always
determine the property tax assessment-nor does compensation due the
owner in eminent domain proceedings. Just as the lessee enjoying below-
market rent holds a compensable property right for eminent domain pur-
poses,281 so too the owner of the dominant estate may have a claim to
compensation in the event condemnation destroys the easement. 282 And if
that easement is of no market value, as seems likely in this case, in what
sense may it be said that the "valuable qualities" of the servient estate
have "been attached to the adjoining properties"? If, on the other hand,
the easement is of value and its loss would require compensation to the
owner, why should not that award be added to the sum which would be
due the owner of the servient estate to reach the total value subject to tax?
Yet another important New York Appellate Division opinion on this
topic followed one year later. Owners of a dominant estate holding ease-
ments of air, light, and access over an adjoining lot objected to foreclo-
sure of tax liens upon the servient property insofar as the process threat-
ened to extinguish their easements. 283 Following the earlier cases, the
court assumed that the value of the easement had been included in the
assessment of the dominant estate, and subtracted from the assessment of
280. 143 A.D. 389, 128 N.Y.S. 569,572-73, affdmem., 202 N.Y. 550,95 N.E. 1137 (1911).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 74-89.
282. E.g., United States v. Certain Land in Augusta, Maine, 220 F. Supp. 696, 700 (D. Me.
1963), where the court stated:
The authorities are divided on the question of whether the extinguishment of an equitable
servitude is a taking of private property for which federal and state constitutional provisions
require that compensation be paid when the land to which it is attached is taken for public use.
The state decisions are in hopeless and irreconcilable conflict, although the majority view favors
compensation. The federal rule has not yet been authoritatively settled.
(Citations omitted.) See, e.g., In re Parkway in Nassau County, 256 A.D. 1094, 11 N.Y.S.2d 581
(1939); Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913, 914 (1916) ("These
restrictive covenants create a property right and make direct and compensational the damages which
otherwise would be consequential and noncompensational."); see generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d
961 (1968); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1137 (1965).





the servient estate. 284 The court had no difficulty judging the easement to
survive the tax sale, stating that "the lien is upon the property assessed
and no more .... The property assessed and the property conveyed upon
the tax sale must be the same.' '285
While this consolidated rather than extended the logic of the earlier
cases, its description of the additive concept of easements proved particu-
larly influential:
An easement is a servitude upon, and differs from an interest in, or lien
upon, the land. It is not a part of, but is so much carved out of the estate in,
the land, and is as much a thing apart from that estate as a parcel of the land
itself conveyed from it.286
The definitions of "lien" and "interest" were critical here, for the
statute governing tax sales directed that title pass free of "all liens upon,
claims against, interest in or right or title" to the subject property.287
Many courts have followed these cases by denying the applicability of
similar statutes to easements, 288 yet this result is open to question. An
easement, like a lien or a mortgage, is a legal interest in the subject prop-
erty, 289 one whose variety of forms 290 cautions against generalizations as
to its nature. 291 Is a mortgage or a lease less an element "carved out" of
the property, less "a thing apart from that estate," than an easement? If
284. 138 N.Y.S. at 656. ("The appellants in this case paid the taxes assessed upon their prop-
erty, and presumptively the value of the easements was included in that assessment.").
285. Id. This differed slightly from the position of the court in Blenis, discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 273-76. While Blenis would limit the title purchased at a tax sale to "the title
that the owner of the property had free from liens by the way of incumbrances placed thereon," 130
N.Y.S. at 747, Jackson recognized that the tax title constituted a .'new and independent grant," 138
N.Y.S. at 656, but limited it to the property assessed. Id. The controversy in Blenis took place almost
20 years after the sale for taxes, in the form of an action for abatement of a nuisance (i.e., a building
blocking access to the servient estate). Because Jackson presented an objection to foreclosure pro-
ceedings themselves, the court was given an opportunity to consider in detail the status of the ease-
ment, rather than simply deferring to the precedent of Blenis.
286. 138 N.Y.S. at 656.
287. Id. at 655, citing § 1039 of the Greater New York Charter, 1901 N.Y. Laws, ch. 466, as
amended by 1908 N.Y. Laws, ch. 490.
288. E.g., Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395,40 N.E.2d 664 (1942).
289. "An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another . . ' RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
290. Easements may take a number of forms, including leases, contracts, restrictive covenants,
and rights of way. "When a conveyance creates the right to use certain land but the conveyance is not
sufficiently precise to create a possessory interest, the interest created, if one is created, is necessarily
an easement." 2 AMERICAN LAwOF PROPERTY § 8.21 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
291. Jackson distinguished an easement from "an interest in, or lien upon, the land," 138
N.Y.S. at 656, quoted supra at text accompanying note 286. Yet an easement is "an interest in land
in the possession of another," RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944), and even the New York
Court of Appeals, relying upon Jackson, held that the purchaser at a tax sale need not accept property
burdened by easements when "said liens were in no way referred to by the terms of sale," Tax Lien
Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751,752 (1914).
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these interests are to be distinguished, it must be because an appurtenant
easement attaches to another parcel of property, unlike a mortgage or
lease. Yet the significance of this distinction received little attention at the
time these cases set the pattern for the assessment of encumbered prop-
erty. "Why the easement should have received exceptional treatment we
are unable to say," 292 wrote Bonbright. Nor have courts following the
New York approach supplied the rationale he found lacking. 293
These four cases, taken together, provide an internally consistent set of
rules for assessments and tax sales of property encumbered by appurten-
ant easements. Their influence was such that by 1914 the New York
Court of Appeals could begin an opinion on the foreclosure question by
simply quoting Poor to the effect that an easement "carved out" of one
property lessened its market value, and increased that of the dominant
estate, "practically by just the value of the easement." ,294 Numerous later
disputes were resolved by reference to this pattern, without re-examina-
tion of its premises or reasoning.
2. Application to Restrictive Covenants
Other jurisdictions have relied upon the New York cases both in similar
settings, such as the sale for taxes of property burdened with an easement
of access, 295 and in cases involving other forms of restrictive coven-
ants. 296 Although restrictive covenants may be termed easements, 297 they
often depart from the pattern supporting the New York scheme. A restric-
tion upon new construction, for example, may raise the market price of
292. 1 J. BONBRIGHT. supra note 6, at 497.
293. A number of decisions have, in fact, excised this comment when quoting this passage from
BONBRIGHT. E.g., Gowen v. Swain, 90 N.H. 383, 10 A.2d 249, 252 (1939); Borough of Englewood
Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super. 514, 174 A.2d 631, 637 (1961).
294. Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751,752 (1914).
295. E.g., District of Columbia v. Capital Mortgage & Title Co., 84 F.Supp. 788, 790 (D.D.C.
1949) ("[W]hat the District of Columbia loses by way of taxes on the servient tenement, should have
been fully recouped by taxes on the dominant estate .... The District of Columbia, therefore, loses
nothing. "). The court stated in Ehren Realty Co. v. Magna Charta Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 120 N.J. Eq.
136, 184 A. 203, 203-04 (1936):
The parcel ... situate in the middle of the block is without any substantial value unless included
with it is the right of way. . . .It cannot have been the intention of the legislature that the
assessor should fix the value of such lands independent of the means of reaching them, for the
assessed value would be trifling, and much income thereby lost to the taxing district .... The
tax sale is based on the assessment. Nothing passes thereby except what has been assessed.
296. See generally Nichols, Real Property Taxation of Divided Interests in Land, 11 KAN L.
REV 309, 320 n.94 (1963) ("Restrictive covenants are treated analogously to easements.").
297. E.g., Schwab v. Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus Co., 245 A.D. 174, 281 N.Y.S. 30 (1935)
(easements may be created by restrictive covenants); Town of Harrison v. Campagna, 193 Misc. 239,
81 N.Y.S.2d 257, affd mem., 274 A.D. 898, 83 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1948) (as easements, restrictive
covenants survive tax sale).
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all lots in a residential subdivision-such an effect in all probability being
the purpose of its imposition-without diminishing the value of any one
"servient" estate. And certainly if the effect of the restriction is to dimin-
ish sale prices, the logic of assuming value to be "carved out" of one lot
and added to another disappears altogether. Yet most such cases have
assumed that a transfer of value takes place, basing their reasoning on the
New York example.
A 1929 Oregon case, Crawford v. Senosky, 298 affirmed the grant of an
injunction against construction of a gas station in an area restricted by
deed from commercial activity until 1932-a measure "necessary to the
successful development of this addition into a high-class residential dis-
trict. ' 299 The defendant, however, had purchased the property at a tax
sale, and the court noted that Oregon law provided title thus obtained
"shall be superior to any lien, claim or charge whatever against such
lands, except the lien of tax certificate . . . and the taxes for the current
year.' '300 Yet the court felt that affirmance of the injunction required only
a citation to the early New York cases:301 "But the foreclosure of a tax
lien does not cut off easements that have been carved out of one property
for the benefit of another.' '302 The attraction of the additive approach was
such that the court employed it in a different context from that in which it
developed, with no discussion of these differences, and in opposition to
the literal terms of the statute dealing with tax titles. 303
The New Mexico Supreme Court took a similar approach to a restric-
tion upon the sale of alcohol. In Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Pren-
dergast,30 4 the defendant had purchased land -sold for unpaid taxes. A
prior deed prohibited the sale of alcohol upon the lot. This restriction had
been placed upon all lots in the area by the company originally owning all
land in the town. Again, the court found this an exception to the general
grant of new and paramount title at tax sales, citing the New York pre-
cedent:
It may be said that generally, all easements or rights which are subject to
separate valuation for assessment purposes, and which have been carved out
of the servient estate, since they are, theoretically at least, taxed as a part of
the dominant estate, remain inviolate upon sale of the servient estate. This
298. 128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306 (1929).
299. 274 P. at 306.
300. Id. at 307 (citing Or. Laws § 4371).
301. Citing Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914), discussed supra at text
accompanying note 294; Jackson v. Smith, 153 A.D. 724, 138 N.Y.S. 654 (1912), affdmem., 213
N.Y. 630, 107 N.E. 1079 (1914), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 283-93.
302. 274 P. at 307.
303. The New York cases were similarly in opposition to a literal reading of statutory language
dealing with tax titles. See supra text accompanying notes 273-75.
304. 43N.M.245,91 P.2d428 (1939).
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we hold, is the majority rule even though the state, as purchaser under tax
sale, and thereafter vendor to individuals, does in fact, give by its deed a
'new and paramount" title. 305
The court's assumption that the benefit of the easement was taxed to the
dominant estate made it clear that no separate valuation of the easement
alone had taken place. To assume "theoretically at least" that such an
assessment had taken place seems highly unrealistic, as no statute or prior
decision required it, and accounting for all legal encumbrances would be
a difficult task for an assessor. In answer to these objections, the court
reverted to language reminiscent of the New York Stock Exchange30 6
opinion:
Counsel for appellee urges consideration of the fact that our statute, un-
like that of some states, makes no provision for the assessment of such, or
other, easements. It is answer enough to that contention to point to the re-
quirement that all (emphasis ours) property shall be assessed according to
the value thereof .... Theoretically, it is a simple thing to do. 307
The question of tax sales has interesting implications for the valuation
process. Can valuation of a benefited parcel at an enhanced figure reflect-
ing that benefit be justified if a tax sale of the burdened parcel would
extinguish the easement or servitude? Many courts have assumed that the
grant of a truly "new and paramount" title at a tax sale would produce
double taxation, 308 and destroy property rights upon which taxes had been
paid. 309 Yet by the New York hypothesis, the benefit assumed to be taxed
to each estate in its dominant capacity should be equivalent to the burden
suffered by each estate in its servient role. If this is so, extinguishing both
the benefit and the burden should destroy no value, and disregard of the
encumbrance in assessment should not produce double taxation. The
court did not accept these consequences of the New York approach, 3 0
but neither did it re-examine the initial assumptions. If each home but one
305. 91P.2d at 430.
306. "A complete answer to this contention, however, is that section 6 of the Tax Law . . .
provides: 'All real and personal property subject to taxation shall be assessed at the full value thereof
, . .' " People ex rel. N.Y. Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64, 68
(1927), aff d mem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
139-46.
307. Alamagordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428, 434 (1939).
308. 91P.2d at 431.
309. Id.
310. "There is the further allegation that such scheme and plan was intended to and did in fact,
enhance the value of the lots so sold .... " Id. at 429. The court accepted this allegation, id. at 432,
in overruling a dismissal of the development company's complaint, and thus laid the ground for a
final argument against disregard of the restriction for assessment purposes: such a course would
"foolishly reduce" tax collections. Id.
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in the subdivision paid taxes upon a value reflecting the proscription upon
liquor sales, and the restriction remained in effect until foreclosure of the
tax lien upon the delinquent owner's lot, each assessment was based upon
a correct valuation as of the assessment date.
In part, these cases reflect a confusion between property rights and
property values. Payment of taxes upon a value reflecting a particular
condition establishes no right to enforce or maintain it. A home located
next to a private park or a well-maintained structure may command a pre-
mium price for that reason, but payment of taxes reflecting that value
confers no right to block construction in the park or enforce stringent
maintenance standards for the neighboring building. The fact that a bene-
fited parcel has been assessed at a higher level because of the restriction
does not automatically confer upon its owner a right to preserve that re-
striction after a tax sale of the servient estate. Nor would the possibility of
such extinguishment necessarily impose an unreasonable burden upon
parties affected by the restrictions. Like mortgagees, these subdivision
owners may take private steps to ensure continuation of their agreements.
Taxes upon the property, for example, might be paid by a homeowners'
association, financed by fees from its members.
The court's approach in Alamogordo requires an initial presumption,
never stated explicitly, that the value of the subdivision lots reflected
more than the neighborhood's condition on the assessment date. The
court must have viewed the sale prices as a reflection of the potential buy-
ers' belief that the restriction upon sales of alcohol would remain enforce-
able in the future. In this case, the court's fear of double taxation, al-
though still not conclusive, would be strengthened. Taxpayers might have
relied upon future application of the New York rule, which would safe-
guard the restriction even in the event some homeowners were delinquent
in their property tax payments. But this hypothetical justification requires
some indication that the New York rule would be applied in New Mexico.
How could homeowner reliance upon that approach be justified when a
future decision of the state's supreme court was required to adopt it?
Surely the purchaser at the tax sale had some justification as well for rely-
ing upon the statutory language promising a "new and paramount" title.
Consideration of the purchaser's position raises yet another distinction
between the Gramercy Park situation and a case such as this involving
mutual restrictive covenants. The former case provided taxpayers with an
argument for consistency in assessments: the enhanced valuation of land
carrying rights to the park was said to require a diminished assessment of
the park itself,31' each parcel commanding one price in light of the ease-
311. See supra text accompanying notes 267-69.
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ment and another in its absence. But the Alamogordo opinion assumed
that the restriction raised the value of all lots subject to it,312 while the
purchaser at the tax sale demonstrated a belief that the most profitable use
of the lot contravened the restriction-probably, although not necessar-
ily, because other parcels continued to be bound. Only on the purchaser's
land could alcohol be sold. Together, these assumptions depict three
levels of value: one for each parcel if none are encumbered, a second and
higher level if all are encumbered, and a third and still higher level for
one parcel if it alone is not encumbered. What does this scheme imply for
the New York rule?
Assessment of all parcels at the second level is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the position that any parcels sold for unpaid taxes will be free
of the restriction. Perhaps the announcement of such a policy would re-
duce or eliminate the difference between the first and second levels. To
assess all parcels at the second level once such a tax sale has taken place
would be incorrect: the then-current sale price, whether at the first level or
somewhat above that, if the effect of one unencumbered parcel is not the
same as the effect of no encumbrances at all, must govern. But consistent
assessment of all parcels at a sale price reflecting the benefit of the en-
cumbrance is justifiable even if a tax sale conveys new title free of the
restriction.
This array of market values makes it clear that the Alamogordo ap-
proach basically addresses a private need for concerted action. Any given
homeowner may be better off ignoring the restriction. Uniform enforce-
ment may raise all values in the aggregate, and principles of property law
may permit such restrictions to run with the land, binding all in the chain
of title from the original grantor. 313 But what has this to do with tax as-
sessment or tax titles? A private scheme for raising property values may
make use of existing legal mechanisms, but this does not resolve a case
questioning their existence, such as Alamogordo. Not every land use re-
striction raising real estate values is either available 314 or acceptable315 to
312. See supra note 310.
313. See generally RESTATEMENTOF PROPERTY §§ 487(e), 530 (1944).
314. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975) (invalidating zoning restrictions the effect of which was to prohibit construction of
low-income housing by, e.g., permitting only single-family detached residences and setting mini-
mum lot area at 20,000 square feet), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
315. This is demonstrated not only by the absence of such restrictions in many communities, but
by the enactment of measures such as rent control and limitations upon condominium conversion
which reduce market values of rental housing units below their unregulated levels. See J. Heilbrun,
Summary of the Proceedings, Conference on Rent Control: Its Effect on Housing Availability and
Assessed Values 10 (Oct. 25-26, 1977) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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any given jurisdiction-even if it would increase property tax reve-
nues.
316
An opposite result in Alamogordo, in fact, could actually have im-
proved the municipality's financial position, given public awareness of
the state of the law. A homeowners' association with mandatory fees,
such as that maintaining Gramercy Park, could guarantee payment of
taxes upon the property of its members. The effect of such an arrange-
ment upon market values might well reflect as much confidence in the
future of the restrictions as would be promoted by Alamogordo. In that
case, assessments properly based on sale prices should reach the second
level, that which obtains when all parcels are encumbered. Thus tax reve-
nues should be as high as they would be under Alamogordo. The munici-
pality should in fact gain by the amount of taxes due upon delinquent
property of the type which led to that decision in the first place.
A later case in agreement with Alamogordo,317 which considered sub-
division deeds prohibiting commercial structures and homes costing less
than $2500,318 ridiculed the notion that a tax sale should confer a truly
"new and paramount" title:
To follow such a theory would create a great insecurity of titles by placing
unreasonable burdens upon landowners by putting them in the precarious
position of seeing that every one of their 1,058 neighbors are properly as-
sessed and their taxes paid, in order to protect their property from the loss of
the restrictive covenant. 319
Yet homeowners' associations with membership rights appurtenant to
subdivision lots may cover thousands of units, managing park land, mari-
nas, golf courses, and roads, and assessing members for dues to cover
these expenses. 320 Surely such an organization could ascertain that no
member's property is delinquent in tax payments. This possibility is in
any event no more fanciful than the assumption, accepted in these
cases, 321 that assessment of all property affected by easements had taken
316. But cf. supra note 310.
317. Hayesv. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d781 (1946).
318. 169 P.2d at 782. The covenants also prohibited homes located less than 20 feet from the lot
boundary. Plaintiffs asserted that these restrictions were "necessary to the successful development of
this subdivision into a high-class residential district." Id.; cf. supra text accompanying note 299.
319. Id. at 788.
320. See, e.g., Sudden Valley Community Ass'n v. Turner, Nos. 78-18 to 78-37 (Wash. B.T.A.
Feb. 8, 1980) (association for owners of 4500 subdivision lots; membership appurtenant to land; 20
property tax appeals relating to association property, including golf courses, a country club, adminis-
tration buildings, picnic areas, marinas, beaches, parks, private roads, and nature trails).
321. Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428,430 (1939) ("It
may be said that generally, all easements or rights which are subject to separate valuation for assess-
ment purposes, and which have been carved out of the servient estate, since they are, theoretically at
least, taxed as a part of the dominant estate, remain inviolate upon sale of the servient estate.");
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those restrictions into account. 322 In effect, these cases reject the imposi-
tion of administrative burdens upon homeowners seeking to maximize
their property values but exhibit no similar hesitation toward administra-
tive burdens upon the tax officials charged with assessing that property.
Even more troubling is the unwillingness of these cases to re-examine the
assumptions behind the early New York easement decisions-assump-
tions open to some question even within the context that gave rise to them
initially, and far more problematic when applied to other settings.
3. Mills, Golf Courses, and Low-Income Housing
The belief that easements produce a transfer and conservation of value
has influenced decisions in a variety of factual situations. An intriguing
set of opinions early in this century dealt with taxation of mill rights and
flowage easements, the right of mill owners to flood adjoining lands when
damming a stream to produce a steady fall of water.323 Although a few
early mill cases were cited in the first New York easement decisions, 324
Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306, 308 (1929); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d
781, 786 (1946) ("In determining this value ['full cash value' for assessment purposes] no deduction
is made for mortgages, liens, rights of dower, and similar interests. But an easement is not a lien, it is
rather a servitude imposed upon the land sometimes said to be 'carved out' of the servient estate.")
Note that Hayes here assumes the validity of Jackson's distinction between a mortgage and a lien. See
supra text accompanying notes 286-92.
322. A concurring justice in Hayes had perhaps a more realistic view: "It is practically impossi-
ble for a county assessor to know of all easements, building restrictions and the like which exist in his
county. Indeed in this very case the assessor testified that he acted in ignorance of the building restric-
tions here involved." 169 P.2d at 789 (Wolfe, J., concurring). See Kratovil, supra note 274, at 57
("Tax assessors rarely have the time or the inclination to concern themselves with easements and
building restrictions. ").
323. This situation gave rise to a number of different property tax questions: the effect of a sale
of "flowage rights" from the owner of the flooded land to the owner of a dam or mill, e.g., In re
Petition of Auditor General, 260 Mich. 578, 245 N.W. 522 (1932); or of the conveyance to the owner
of a mill or plant of the right to utilize power generated at a separate dam, e.g., Crocker-McElwain
Co. v. Assessors of Holyoke, 296 Mass. 338, 5 N.E.2d 558 (1936); Essex Co. v. City of Lawrence,
214 Mass. 79, 100 N.E. 1016 (1913); or of conveyance of the right to draw water from a pond or lake
to power a mill by its fall, e.g., Quinebaug Reservoir Co. v. Town of Union, 73 Conn. 294, 47 A.
328 (1900). Other variations arose when municipal boundaries divided the dam and the mill, e.g.,
City of Bangor v. City of Brewer, 142 Me. 6, 45 A.2d 434 (1946); Union Water-Power Co. v. City
of Auburn, 90 Me. 60, 37 A. 331 (1897); Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Blackstone, 200
Mass. 82, 85 N.E. 880 (1908); Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg Co. v. Town of Gilford,
64 N.H. 337, 10 A. 849 (1887); or the pond and the dam or mill, e.g., Beaverton Township v. Lord,
235 Mich. 261, 209 N.W. 122 (1926); Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Concord, 66 N.H. 562, 34 A. 241
(1891); People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Durey, 126 Misc. 188, 213 N.Y.S. 623
(1925), rev'd, 221 A.D. 294, 223 N.Y.S. 215 (1927); In Re Hall, 116 A.D. 729, 102 N.Y.S. 5, affd
mem., 189 N.Y. 552, 82 N.E. 1127 (1907), between different taxing jurisdictions. Each of these
cases dealt with the "value" of taxable property when the owner no longer held the legal right to
utilize land in certain ways-a question linking the mill and easement cases.
324. E.g., Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Blackstone, 200 Mass. 82, 85 N.E. 880
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and later mill decisions took account of the developing easement law,325
for the most part their specialized factual setting inhibited any larger in-
fluence upon valuation cases in other contexts. Interestingly, New Hamp-
shire courts were able to analyze the problem correctly as one of aggre-
gating all interests in the assessed land, 326 while New York decisions
exhibited some confusion in this area327 -an exact reversal of their posi-
tions with regard to the long-term lease.328
Beyond these little-noticed cases, however, the additive approach of
the New York courts toward assessment of servient property gained wide-
spread acceptance. 329 Its subsequent employment in a wide array of situa-
(1908); In re Hall, 116 A.D. 729, 102 N.Y.S. 5, affd mem., 189 N.Y. 552, 82 N.E. 1127 (1907)
(cited in Jackson v. Smith, 153 A.D. 724, 138 N.Y.S. 654 (1912), affdmem., 213 N.Y. 630, 107
N.E. 1079 (1914), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 283-93; and in Tax Lien Co. v.
Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914), discussed supra at text accompanying note 294).
325. E.g., In re Petition of Auditor General, 260 Mich. 578, 245 N.W. 522 (1932); People ex
rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Durey, 126 Misc. 188, 213 N.Y.S. 623 (1925) (citing
Jackson v. Smith, 153 A.D. 724, 138 N.Y.S. 654 (1912); and Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9,
106 N.E. 751 (1914)), rev'd, 221 A.D. 294, 223 N.Y.S. 215 (1927).
326. E.g., Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Concord, 66 N.H. 562,34 A. 241,242 (1891):
If A., owning a farm in Bow and an adjoining farm in Dunbarton, sells to B. the Dunbarton
farm, and a perpetual right to carry to it... water flowing from a spring on the Bow farm, the
easement thus created in Bow land, and ... annexed to Dunbarton land, is in Bow, and is
taxable in Bow to its owner.... After the conveyance of the interest in the Bow farm from A. to
B., giving B. a right to carry the water to the Dunbarton farm, and after he exercises that right,
there is as much water-producing real estate in Bow as there was before.
See also Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Town of Gilford, 64 N.H. 327, 10 A.
849, 850-51 (1887), quoted infra at text accompanying note 383.
327. E.g., People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Durey, 126 Misc. 188, 213
N.Y.S. 623 (1925), rev'd, 221 A.D. 294,223 N.Y.S. 215 (1927).
328. See, e.g., Demoulas v. Town of Salem, 116 N.H. 775, 367 A.2d 588, 593 (1976) (actual
income to be disregarded when it "does not reflect the true value of the property"); Merrick Holding
Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 45 N.Y.2d 538, 410 N.Y.S.2d 565, 382 N.E.2d 1341 (1978) (fair
market rent, not contract rent, to be used in calculating assessed valuation). Michigan courts followed
the New Hampshire approach in taxing flowage rights to the flooded land, In re Petition of Auditor
General, 260 Mich. 578, 245 N.W. 522 (1932); Beaverton Township v. Lord, 235 Mich. 261, 209
N.W. 122 (1926); Glidden v. Beaverton Power Co., 223 Mich. 383, 193 N.W. 862 (1923), and now
are the main opponents of New York's approach to the long-term lease. See C.A.F. Inv. Co. v.
Township of Saginaw, 410 Mich. 428, 302 N.W.2d 164 (1981). Both areas require that courts recog-
nize that taxable "property" may encompass rights conveyed by the owner to other parties-whether
through leases, flowage easements, or rights of way.
329. Courts accepting what is here termed the "additive" approach-the New York assumption
that the value of the encumbrance is transferred from the servient estate to the dominant, which
reduces in practice to assessment at realizable sale price-generally have done so in the context of a
tax sale, holding easements to survive foreclosure of a tax lien upon the assumption that their value
was previously assessed to the dominant estate. E.g., District of Columbia v. Capital Mortgage &
Title Co., 84 F. Supp. 788, 790 (D.D.C. 1949); Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W.2d 22,
24 (1954) ("weight of authority" behind New York rule); Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Prender-
gast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d-428, 430 (1939) ("It may be said that generally, all easements or rights
which ... are, theoretically at least, taxed as part of the dominant estate, remain inviolate upon sale
of the servient estate. This, we hold, is the majority rule .... ); Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395,
40 N.E.2d 664, 665 (1942) ("[g]reat weight of authority" behind New York rule); Crawford v.
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tions illustrated certain implications not considered by the early cases. It
was applied to mineral interests, 330 covenants not to compete, 331 rights in
air space, 332 driveways, 333 public parks, 334 irrigation ditches, 335 and oil
pipelines336-to say nothing of the rights of way337 and restrictive coven-
Senosky, 128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306, 307 (1929); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, 786
(1946) ("better considered cases" support New York rule); cf. Arizona R.C.I.A. Lands, Inc. v.
Ainsworth, 21 Ariz. App. 38, 515 P.2d 335, 337 (1973) (by enacting statute preserving easements
after tax sale, "the Arizona legislature has simply aligned this jurisdiction with the prevailing view
on the matter"); Nichols, supra note 296, at 320 (taxation of easements "normally becomes an issue
only when the question is raised of survival after a tax foreclosure sale"). In a few states, however,
the New York approach has been adopted in the assessment context itself. E.g., Tualatin Dev. Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323, 473 P.2d 660, 663 (1970) ("The courts of other states have
been confronted with similar situations and have held that when the use of land is so restricted that its
ownership is of no benefit or value, the assessment for tax purposes should be nothing or merely
nominal.") The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY in 1944 articulated the rationale for the additive ap-
proach:
In the case of ... an [appurtenant] easement the dominant tenement has its value for sale pur-
poses increased by the existence of the easement. Upon a sale of the land constituting this tene-
ment, whether the sale is for tax purposes or not, the purchaser gets the benefit of the easement.
Accordingly the value of the land for sale purposes and hence for tax purposes is increased
because of the existence of the easement.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509(2) comment d (1944). Note the emphasis upon realizable sale price
("value for sale purposes") and upon an assumed survival of the easement after tax sale. The RE-
STATEMENT pointed out that, subject to constitutional restrictions, "the legislature is at liberty to
determine the effect of a tax sale." Id. at § 509 comment b. The position of the RESTATEMENT added
to the influence of the majority view. E.g., Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W.2d 22, 24
(1954).
330. E.g., State ex rel. Svoboda v. Weiler, 205 Neb. 799, 290 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1980) (min-
eral interests subject to separate assessment survive tax sale); cf. Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 67
N.E. 244, 246 (1903) (excavation rights extinguished by sale for taxes, upon assumption that they
were included in assessment of the fee).
331. E.g., Messett v. Cowell, 194 Wash. 646, 79 P.2d 337, 342 (1938) (tax sale extinguished
covenant not to extract lime upon property).
332. Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162, 168-69 (1972), dis-
cussed infra at note 381.
333. Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395, 40 N.E.2d 664, 665 (1942) (easement to use driveway
survives tax sale, upon assumption that it was taken into account in assessment); cf. Rice v. Reich, 51
Wis. 2d 205, 186 N.W.2d 269, 271-72 (1971) (lease of driveway created easement).
334. Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super. 514, 174 A.2d 631, 638
(1961).
335. Upper Harmony Ditch Co. v. Carwin, 189 Colo. 190, 539 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1975) (ease-
ment for ditch across land not affected by sale of land for unpaid taxes, upon assumption that the
easement was not included in assessment of the property in default). Contra Harmon v. Gould, I Wn.
2d I, 94 P.2d 749, 754 (1939) (easement for ditch across land extinguished by its sale for taxes, the
tax lien being superior to all other interests).
336. Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351, 355 (1924) (right of way for pe-
troleum pipelines not extinguished by sale for taxes).
337. E.g., Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn.
257, 63 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (1954); Gowen v. Swain, 90 N.H. 383, 10 A.2d 249, 253 (1939); Ehren
Realty Co. v. Magna Charta Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 120 N.J. Eq. 136, 184 A. 203, 204 (1936); Tamb-
lin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 136, 168 P. 982, 985 (1917).
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ants338 that first gave rise to this approach. Two of the most provocative
settings have only recently begun to attract attention: the assessment of
common areas in residential developments, and the assessment of feder-
ally subsidized housing subject to rent limitations.
New York courts did not hesitate to extend the additive approach to
open areas within housing developments, holding that the homeowners'
rights had destroyed the taxable value of common parkland, "or, it may
be, stating it better, it has shifted the taxable value from the park lands to
the other lands in the development.. . . "1339 In 1970 the Oregon Supreme
Court adopted a similar position when it assigned a zero tax value to a
nine-hole golf course which county assessors had appraised at more than
$160,000.340 The course was included in a "planned adult residential
community" to meet the county planning commission's open space re-
quirements, but it had not shown a profit in three years of operation. 341
The court felt the New York cases provided the best solution, stating that
"when the use of land is so restricted that its ownership is of no benefit or
value, the assessment for tax purposes should be nothing or merely nomi-
nal. "342
This result risks inconsistency with the long-term lease cases. Should
the realizable sale price of encumbered property set its taxable value? A
1973 Maryland case dealing with beachfront property quoted testimony
by a developer concerning deed restrictions prohibiting construction:
It is not the beach itself that has value, it is the lots that lie behind the beach
that have the value .... But the beach itself has no fair market value. I can
tell you from my own experience in developing waterfront property that the
happiest day of your life is-for the developer-is the day that he can give
that to the community. 343
338. E.g., Nedderman v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N.W. 36, 39 (1936); Alamo-
gordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428, 431 (1939); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110
Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, 788 (1946).
339. Crane-Berkley Corp. v. Lavis, 238 A.D. 124,263 N.Y.S. 556,560 (1933).
340. Tualatin Dev. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323,473 P.2d 660 (1970).
341. 473 P.2d at 661. The earnings history of the golf course was quite short, it having opened in
1966 and the tax years in controversy being 1967 and 1968. Id. at 660-61. The Oregon court permit-
ted an even shorter earnings history to influence an assessment in Medical Bldg. Land Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 283 Or. 69, 582 P.2d 416 (1978), where the building in question had been open
less than one year at the time of assessment.
342. 473 P.2d at 663 (citing People ex rel. Poor v. O'Donnel, 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36,
affd mem. sub nom. People ex rel. Poor v. Wells, 200 N.Y. 518, 93 N.E. 1129 (1910), discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 262-80).
343. Supervisor of Assessments v. Bay Ridge Properties, Inc., 270 Md. 216,310 A.2d 773,777
(1973). There the assessors sought to diminish rather than deny the additive effect of the easement,
arguing that, as 380 of the 1110 subdivision lots had not yet been sold, 380/1110 of the original value
must remain in the beach itself. The court rejected this notion that easements appurtenant to the
unsold lots "remained in a state of suspended animation":
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By this reasoning, any property which has become a net burden to its
owner should receive a zero value assessment. 344 Yet an owner losing
money because of an unfavorable lease or mortgage 345 is not entitled to a
zero valuation of his property on that account.
The most dramatic case in this series was a 1976 decision by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, Twin Lakes Golf and Country Club v. King
County,3 4 6 which reduced the assessed value of an eighteen-hole golf
course from $660,000 to zero. The golf course was designed to meet the
county's "common open space" requirement for planned unit develop-
ments. The zoning agreement, recorded plat maps, and deed covenants to
lot purchasers restricted it to use as a golf course. 347 The golf course had
lost money in each of its six years of operation. 348 In the briefest of all
these decisions, the Washington court referred to the New York, Oregon,
and Maryland cases discussed above, 349 to the statutory directive that
property be assessed at its "true and fair value in money,'"350 and to the
willing buyer-willing seller standard. It then concluded that "[w]hen the
use of land is so restricted that its ownership is of no benefit or value, the
assessment for tax purposes should be nothing.' '351
It seems to us that by implication easements were intended to attach to the unsold lots as soon as
the plats [showing the general plan of development] were recorded and the first lot was sold,
because from that time on, there was no longer a unilateral option available to the developer to
grant or withhold the easements.
310 A.2d at 776.
344. In Tualatin, the court found support for a zero value assessment in the city's refusal to
accept the golf course as a donation from the developer. 473 P.2d at 664. Yet why should the city
undertake to maintain a private development's golf course? Many parcels of real estate, restricted or
not, may have market value without being suitable for municipal ownership. Such a situation arose
when the Beverly Hills home of Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., was sold for over five
million dollars. The city, local universities, and charitable organizations all declined the home as a
gift prior to its sale because its operating costs were estimated at $300,000 to $400,000 annually.
Lindsey, For Sale: Home wlVieiv of Movies' Golden Years, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1980, at A16, col.
5 ("It couldn't be given away, so the legendary home of Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks Sr.
was put on the market today for $10 million."); Pickfair Sold to Jerry Buss, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20.
1980, at 24, col. 4.
345. Depreciated real estate subject to nonrecourse liabilities in excess of its fair market value
provides an especially provocative example of property that has become a net burden to its owner.
See generally Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983); Podolin, How to Handle the Burned
Out Tax Shelter, 37 N.Y.U. FED TAX INST. ch. 16 (1979).
346. 87 Wn. 2d 1,548 P.2d 538 (1976).
347. Id. at 3,548 P.2d at 539.
348. Id. at 4, 548 P.2d at 540.
349. Supervisor of Assessments v. Bay Ridge Properties, Inc., 270 Md. 216, 310 A.2d 773
(1973): Crane-Berkley Corp. v. Lavis, 238 A.D. 124, 263 N.Y.S. 556 (1933); Tualatin Dev. Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323, 473 P.2d 660 (1970).
350. WASH REV. CODE § 84.40.030 (1981).
351. Twin Lakes, 87 Wn. 2d at 4, 548 P.2d at 540. Like Twin Lakes, cases adopting this ap-
proach have generally not considered the effect of provisions allowing members of the titleholding
association to revoke restrictions upon use of the common areas in the future. E.g., Waterville
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The startling conclusion that an eighteen-hole golf course has no value
for tax purposes makes Twin Lakes somewhat more dramatic than most
easement decisions, but the distinction is quantitative only. It merely ex-
tends the method of reasoning found in those cases. 352
The assessment of government subsidized rental housing affords an-
other setting for the valuation of restricted property. Restrictions upon the
rents charged for these units may be viewed in a number of ways: as the
equivalent of an unfavorable long-term lease, as the quid pro quo for the
subsidies and income tax advantages enjoyed by the owners, or as an en-
cumbrance restricting the use and benefit of the property as effectively as
easements and covenants.
One of the first cases in the area was Knickerbocker Village, the 1962
New York Appellate Division decision discussed above with regard to the
long-term lease. 353 The court there rejected the taxpayer's contention that
statutory restrictions upon the income and future sale of the project
brought it within the precedent of the easement cases. Instead, it found
these restrictions "personal to the owner," comparable to mortgage in-
debtedness. The court observed that the "restrictions upon its sale of real
property result solely from petitioner's ownership. The restrictions were
Estates Ass'n v. Town of Campton, 122 N.H. 506, 446 A.2d 1167 (1982) (homeowners' rights in
common property, although revocable by two-thirds vote of members, held to deprive it of all but
nominal taxable value).
352. In Tualatin, for example, the court cited with approval the reasoning of Borough of Engle-
wood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super. 514, 174 A.2d 631 (1961), which required that deed
restrictions limiting property to use as a public park affect its assessment. The Tualatin court criti-
cized the result in that case, however, which assessed the property upon 10% of its unencumbered
value: "Assigning a money value to such a speculative possibility [i.e., a sale of 'bare legal title' in
its encumbered state] seems to us unnecessary; the figure could only be arrived at arbitrarily." 473
P.2d at 664. Thus the zero value result represented not a divergence from the reasoning of earlier
cases but merely a less compromising application of their logic. A witness in a New Jersey case
following Allison, dealing with valuation of a subdivision's common beach area, illustrated the logi-
cal inconsistencies inherent in any such attempted compromise. He testified that under a willing
buyer-willing seller standard the beach "has no value":
But I must say that it does, it has to have some value .... I don't think it could be sold. Well, it
probably could be sold in the market, but it certainly couldn't be sold for very much money,
because there are too many strings attached to the property ....
It can't be used for much other than it is being used now; and on that basis, I would say it
has zero value. But I am trying to be practical about this thing. It must have some value for
taxation purposes.
In re Appeal of Neptune Township, 86 N.J. Super. 492, 207 A.2d 330, 332-33 (1965). Tualatin's
rejection of the assumption that all property must have "some value for taxation purposes" opened
the way for taxpayers to claim a zero rather than nominal assessment in Twin Lakes and later cases,
e.g., Four Hills Country Club v. Bemalillo County Property Tax Protest Bd., 94 N.M. 709, 616 P.2d
422 (1979); Brooks Resources Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 286 Or. 499, 595 P.2d 1358 (1979).
353. Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland, 16 A.D.2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982, aff d mem.,




voluntarily assumed and to a large extent induced by the advantage of a
20-year exemption in respect of the improvement.' 354 Yet the possibility
of lifting those restrictions was certainly as remote as that of freeing any
servient estate from an easement. As a dissenting opinion pointed out,
"[t]hese are restrictions on the property and not on the owner-and the
restrictions 'run' with the land if that be the test." 355
The voluntary, tax-motivated imposition of restrictions was crucial to
the Michigan Tax Tribunal's refusal to value low-income housing fi-
nanced by the National Housing Act 356 by a capitalization of actual rents
received:
[W]e are mindful that in many so-called "tax sheltered" real estate ventures
the entrepreneurs enter into them with the full expectation that there will be
little or no cash income for many years.
[A]re such properties not to bear their fair share of the property tax
burden because their cash income flow is tailored to suit the income tax
convenience of the owner? A dollar saved on income tax liability is just as
bankable as one shown on the bottom line of a profit and loss statement. 357
The tax tribunal did not press the analogy to the long-term lease, a
restraint understandable in view of the position of the Michigan Supreme
Court on that issue. 358 That parallel seemed dispositive, however, to the
dissenting justices in a New Hampshire case considering assessment of
subsidized housing:
Public utilities are subject to regulation as monopolistic enterprises .... On
the other hand, the rental of privately owned housing stands upon a different
footing. The plaintiff's project is subject to regulation because the plaintiff
agreed that it should be . . .in order to finance its project upon favorable
terms and to obtain other economic advantages. 359
354. 226N.Y.S.2d at 987.
355. Id. at 990 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
356. See generally U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER SUBSIDY
AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES (1977); Halliday, Low Income Housing Shelters: Are Municipal
Bonds a Better lnvestment from a Tax Viewpoint?, 6 J. REAL ESTATE TAX'N 143 (1979); Halperin &
Tucker, Low income Housing (FHA 236) Programs: One of Few Tax Shelter Opportunities Left, 36
J. TAXVN 2 (1972); Washburn, The Role of Tax Syndications in Housing: A Policy Perspective, 5
URB. L. & POL'Y I (1982); Comment, Tax Reform and Real Estate Tar Shelters: Consequences for
Low-Income Housing, 48 U. CIN L. REV. 99 (1979).
357. Kentwood Apts. v. City of Kentwood, 2 MICH- TAX REP (CCH) 200-678 at 10,263
(Mich. Tax Tribunal 1977).
358. See supra note 13. Four years later, the Michigan Court of Appeals followed that state's
approach to the long-term lease question in valuing subsidized housing. Congresshills Apts. v.
Township of Ypsilanti, 102 Mich. App. 668, 302 N.W.2d 274 (1981).
359. Royal Gardens Co. v. City of Concord, 114 N.H. 668, 328 A.2d 123, 125 (1974) (Duncan,
J., and Kenison, C.J., dissenting). The majority had held that it could not "distinguish for valuation
purposes a state and federally regulated utility from a federally regulated housing project which limits
the income to be received by the owner." Id.
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This view did not sway the majority, whose equation of public housing
with public utilities dictated that regulated return affect valuation in each
case.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a similar view in
1979, holding that regulated income, not fair market rents, must be used
in capitalizing the income of a subsidized housing project. 360 Together,
the Massachusetts and New Hampshire opinions persuaded the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court to disavow its earlier suggestion that the example of
the long-term lease cases should produce a valuation of limited-income
housing based upon full market rent:361 "We have reexamined our posi-
tion in light of two decisions since . . . We now adopt a stance that
rejects that implication. ,362 Beyond an exhaustive description of those
cases, however, the court gave no rationale for its change of heart.
These cases bear witness to the strong judicial inclination to base as-
sessments upon the realizable sale price of an owner's interest, even with-
out the support of theories positing transfer of value or conservation of the
municipal tax base. They offer a test of other arguments favoring this
measure with regard to encumbered property generally. To what extent
should nonrent return, even- in the form of income tax deductions, be con-
sidered income from taxable property? Should governmental approval or
enforcement of restrictions upon property affect their influence upon as-
sessments? What relevance has the concept of highest and best use in the
valuation of encumbered property?
B. Implications for a Definition of Taxable "Property"
1. "Fair Market Value"; "Willing Buyer-Willing Seller'--of What?
The encumbered property and long-term lease cases share a definitional
problem: what "property" is being taxed? But while the lease decisions
360. Community Dev. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 377 Mass. 351, 385 N.E.2d 1376 (1979).
361. In Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.I. 696, 325 A.2d 543 (1974), the court had criticized use of
regulated income as a measure of property value:
The investors are restricted to a maximum 6% return. However ... investors in such develop-
ments can obtain a federally guaranteed mortgage at a rate of 3% .... There is no personal
liability on the investor's part in event of a foreclosure by the Federal Government . . . . The
depreciation benefits were described as "excellent" and the 6% return as the frosting on the
cake.
In seeking to establish fair market value, one looks for the fair rental value rather than the
actual income received. In using the income approach, the significant element to be established
is the realty's capacity for earning income rather than income actually derived from its opera-
tion. At this point there is no credible evidence that [the taxpayer's] rental was fair rental in-
come.
325 A.2d at 546, 548 (citation omitted).
362. Kargman v. Jacobs, 411 A.2d 1326, 1330 (R.I. 1980).
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offer a fairly narrow set of alternatives, the easement cases provide nu-
merous variations. Is an encumbered golf course to be viewed as a physi-
cally separate entity for sale to a willing buyer, if one could be found, or
as a part of the residential development? 363 Should the plaza fronting an
office building share its assessment? 364 Are the dams and canals a part of
the mill, 365 the "flagship" store a part of the shopping center, 366 the
walkway a part of the hospital complex? 367 Any structure, however valu-
able, could be viewed as a collection of separate components, each indi-
vidually of little worth to the market.
Would not even these components, however, command a market price
if the purchaser could in turn demand payment for their use by the owner
of the larger structure? If the walkway, plaza, dam, or "flagship" store
serves a useful function for the related, admittedly valuable entity, a sepa-
rate assessment should be accompanied by presumption of an arm's-
length relationship between the owners. An encumbrance upon one parcel
implies a bargained-for compensation, not necessarily a loss in value to
its owner-nor to a later purchaser succeeding to the right to collect it.
These considerations run counter to the additive approach. They sug-
gest that, far from transferring an invariant monetary value from the ser-
vient to the dominant estate, an encumbrance may enhance the total value
of the two parcels, with fair compensation imputed to the servient land.
The owner of the encumbered parcel, or an earlier owner in the chain of
title, consented to the restriction, and it is not to be assumed that this was
done gratuitously. The present owner may not share in this benefit, and
may have purchased the encumbered lot at a lower price as a result. How-
ever, realizable sale price cannot be assumed to be a proper limit upon
taxable value here any more than in the long-term lease situation. The
problem requires a multifaceted definition of "property": a determination
of its physical extent, potential uses, and the rights accompanying owner-
ship.
The Oregon tax court recently demonstrated that even precedent em-
ploying the additive approach 368 need not guide a tribunal recognizing the
parallel between the easement and lease. It denied an unprofitable golf
course in a planned unit development a zero value for tax purposes, and
363. See supra text accompanying notes 346-52.
364. E.g., Trinity Place Co. v. Finance Adm'r, 46 A.D.2d 373, 362 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1974),
aff d, 38 N.Y.2d 144, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16, 341 N.E.2d 536 (1975).
365. See supra notes 323-26.
366. E.g., G.R.F., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 41 N.Y.2d 512, 393 N.Y.S.2d 965, 362 N.E.2d
597 (1977), discussed infra at note 419.
367. Portland Adventist Hosp. v. Department of Revenue, 8 Or. T.R. 342, 359 (1980).
368. Tualatin Dev. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323,473 P.2d 660 (1970), discussed




distinguished an Oregon Supreme Court decision granting zero taxable
value to another golf course369 on the grounds that the subdivision in
question was still under construction. However, the tax court then went
further, attacking the logic of the majority approach altogether:
The intent or objective of the developers in these [golf course] cases is
that by voluntarily accepting governmental and contractual restrictions upon
a portion of the planned unit development, the owners of the surrounding
homesites are assured that attractive open space will always be there. This
has the effect of making the surrounding homesites more valuable in the
marketplace. The developers, as taxpayers, also contend, however, that this
renders the restricted property valueless in the marketplace. The theory is
that it transfers the value that previously existed in the dedicated open space
to the surrounding properties which are assessed and taxed at an "increased
value."
The fallacy of this theory is the assumption that there is only so much
value to be allocated among the parcels. Market value may increase in one
area without detracting or taking away from another ....
Although the property may be additionally restricted in its use by virtue
of contractual arrangements, obligations or representations to the unit own-
ers in the development, such restrictions are not considered for purposes of
determining the property's assessed value. Since the benefit of the restric-
tions reside in individuals rather than the public, the benefit of the restric-
tions as well as the "remaining" uses are totaled for purposes of determin-
ing the property's assessed value. [Citing a decision of the Oregon Supreme
Court adopting the majority view of the long-term lease question.J370
The Illinois appellate court similarly rejected the additive approach in a
1980 appeal from a zero value assessment of a lake held by a homeown-
ers' association under a restricted use deed.371 The property tax appeal
board had taken the familiar position that "the value of the amenities as-
sociated with the lake were reflected in the assessments of the adjoining
residential lots .... [T]he lake property had no value independent of the
lots and properties which contained the restrictive covenants and. . . it
therefore had no assessable value.' '372 The appellate court had little diffi-
culty demonstrating the error of this reasoning:
In determining what is the fair cash value of real property for tax purposes
369. Id.
370. Willamette Factors, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 8 Or. T.R. 400, 404-06 (1980). The
long-term lease case cited was Swan Lake Moulding Co. v. Department of Revenue, 257 Or. 622,
478 P.2d 393 (1970).




the guiding standard is directed towards determining that price at which
ready, willing and able sellers and buyers would agree. This standard pre-
supposes that the property is available for sale on the market and that there
are buyers interested in purchasing it; it does not, however, permit an as-
sessing body to give consideration to legal restrictions on the use of the
property or infirmities in the title of the taxpayer....
It is apparent that property adjoining or in close proximity to a body of
water, a park, golf course or other scenic view may well have an increased
value because of its location. However, there is no assessment principle in
Illinois which provides that the assessed value of the scenic property may
itself be correspondingly reduced because of its effect on surrounding prop-
erty.
We conclude that insofar as the valuation of the Association's lake prop-
erty was based upon the amenity theory of assessment, whereby its value
was transferred to the adjoining properties, it was erroneous. 373
Clearly, rejection of the theory that an encumbrance enhances the value
of the benefited parcel and diminishes the value of the burdened parcel
equally deprives the additive approach of its primary support and requires
a new analysis of the easement question. It is possible to identify a num-
ber of aspects of this task common to the long-term lease and specialty
problems already discussed.
2. Imputation of Payment
A refusal to assume that an encumbrance reduces the value of the ser-
vient estate, that its imposition carries no corresponding benefit, may be
justified by both the capitalization of market rent in the long-term lease
cases and the equation of highest and best use with value to the owner in
the specialty cases. Both demonstrate that realizable sale price does not
always govern property tax assessments. Would not a highest and best
use of the servient estate require fair market rental for the rights trans-
ferred to the dominant estate? The mill cases early in this century proved
the feasibility of this method, 374 ruling that the "value of land by reason
373. Id. at 176 (citations and footnotes omitted).
374. For example, in Central Maine Power Co. v. Inhabitants of Turner, 128 Me. 486, 148 A.
799, 801 (1930), the court held that the land's potential for water power development increased its
assessment even when it was flooded by its owner. The court stated:
[Liand upon which a mill privilege exists is taxable at its worth as land enhanced by the value of
its capacity for water power development .... If the privilege is undeveloped or, developed, is
not utilized, the capacity of the land for power development ... is nevertheless an element of
value to be considered in its tax valuation.
See also Penobscot Chemical Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of Bradley, 99 Me. 263, 59 A. 83, 87 (1904)
("It is not, where is the water power created by the appellant's dam used? but, how much is its
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of its adaptability to a certain purpose is not lost when actually devoted to
the purpose for which it is adaptable." ,375
If the "property" subject to tax is equated with the "property" the
taxpayer may offer for sale, any owner may obtain a zero value assess-
ment. He need only enter long-term contracts burdening the land, benefit-
ing himself personally by a lump sum payment, and affording no advan-
tage to a prospective purchaser. Some of these elements were presented to
the Oregon tax court when a developer sought a zero value assessment for
a subdivision's water systems, on the strength of the golf course cases,
arguing that "it would willingly give them away if assured its contractual
responsibilities would be properly carried out." ' 376 Is this qualitatively
different from a zero value assessment for the encumbered golf course
that could not be given away, 377 or the encumbered beach that was
granted a zero value assessment after testimony that "the happiest
property . . .worth?"). In Union Water-Power Co. v. City of Auburn, 90 Me. 60, 37 A. 331,
334-35 (1887), Judge Emery stated in dissent:
I do not see the necessity, and I doubt the expediency, of undertaking to determine whether
what is called "the water power" is wholly appurtenant to the dam, or wholly appurtenant to the
mill, or partly appurtenant to each ....
.. [I]t is simply a parcel of land over which a stream of water flows and falls, and is to be
taxed in the town in which it is situated. So far as the land is more valuable by reason of the
stream and fall upon it, so far are these to be considered in the valuation of the land, and no
further. This consequent increase in value is a question in commercial economics, and requires
for its determination the consideration of possible revenues to be drawn from the land, and the
possible price to be obtained for it.
... [U]nder our law such utilization can be made only by leave of the owner of the land under
and abutting the falls ....
* " * This monopoly, this revenue or chance of revenue from it, should be included in an
estimate of the value of the land.
This dissenting opinion in Union Water-Power came to command more respect than the majority's
view, e.g., Slatersville Finishing Co. v. Greene, 40 R.I. 410, 101 A. 226, 230 (1917) (holding that
land flooded by its owner was nonetheless to be valued in light of its potential for producing power;
"The principles thus enunciated [in the dissent to Union Water-Power] have been followed in the
later Maine cases."); Whiting-Plover Paper Co. v. Town of Linwood, 198 Wis. 590, 225 N.W. 177,
179 (1929) (more recent cases "pay no great tribute to the soundness of the doctrine" of the majority
opinion in Union Water-Power); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 829 (1937); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 143 (1930).
Massachusetts courts, by contrast, utilized the additive approach in such situations. E.g., Essex Co.
v. City of Lawrence, 214 Mass. 79, 100 N.E. 1016 (1913) (dam from which water power was con-
veyed to plants and mills in the vicinity held to have thus lost taxable value-although owners of the
dam received 260 ounces of silver annually for each mill power conveyed).
375. Whiting-Plover Paper Co. v. Town of Linwood, 198 Wis. 590, 225 N.W. 177, 178 (1929).
376. Brooks Resources Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 6 Or. T.R. 217, 224 (1975) (subdivi-
sion water systems possess independent value, but that value must be assessed for tax purposes as
part of the residential lots), rev'd, 276 Or. 1177, 558 P.2d 312 (1976) (separate assessment of water
systems proper where subdivision not organized under Oregon unit ownership law).
377. Tualatin Dev. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323,473 P.2d 660 (1970), discussed
supra at text accompanying note 340.
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day of your life is-for the developer-is the day that he can give that to
the community" ?378
Once the additive approach is rejected, is a distinction between an ap-
purtenant easement (e.g., the encumbrance upon a golf course or beach
benefiting residential property) and an easement in gross (e.g., a timber
lease, 379 hunting license, 380 or rental arrangement 381 benefiting its holder
personally) valid? Should not both enhance the value of the servient
estate? Surely the capacity of the servient land to benefit either persons or
property contributes to the commercial value of its component legal inter-
ests-a value that is not diminished by conveyance of those rights. "It
would be anomalous to hold that a possessory interest has no value
merely because the [purchaser] has agreed to pay what it is worth." ' 382
Or, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court held in an 1887 mill case:
The entire value of a parcel of land may consist in its capacity to render
other lands valuable; as if in a desert a single acre were found whereon
artesian wells could be sunk, producing sufficient water to irrigate and make
fertile the whole desert. The acre would be of great value, because by means
of it lands otherwise worthless could be made valuable. It could not be
justly appraised without considering its effect upon them. But the increased
value of the irrigated lands would not be the measure, or form any part, of
its value. 383
A summation-of-interests approach to valuation of encumbered prop-
erty draws considerable support from decisions holding that the value of
378. Supervisor of Assessments v. Bay Ridge Properties, Inc., 270 Md. 216, 310 A.2d 773, 777
(1973), discussed supra at text accompanying note 343.
379. German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 52 So. 292 (1910).
380. Woodburn v. Skagit County, 120 Wash. 58, 206 P. 834 (1922).
381. Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972), provides a good
example of the difficulties encountered when the majority approach is applied to a situation in which
the owner of the servient estate (burdened here with a negative easement ensuring a neighboring
office building's light and view) receives continuing payments from the owner of the benefited prop-
erty. Should the easement reduce the value of the servient estate? To the contrary, the Maryland court
held that an increase in its assessment was warranted by the lease of air space, and consequent income
to the owner. However, the court was unable to reconcile this result with its support for the New York
easement cases, merely suggesting that "[u]nder certain facts, the value of the servient estate may not
be diminished at all, and may even be increased." 296 A.2d at 169. It cited for this proposition
Slatersville Finishing Co. v. Greene, 40 R.I. 410, 101 A. 226 (1917), a mill case which may be read
as contradicting the logic of the New York easement cases. See supra note 374.
382. Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338 P.2d 440, 444 (1959) (refusing to
deduct present value of rental payments in calculating lessee's interest in exempt property for tax
purposes), discussed supra at note 78.





clear title, not the deficient or unmarketable title that the current owner
may hold, is the basis of the tax:384
The law requires an assessment of the value, not of the purported owner's
title, but of the land; the assessed value of the land represents the value of all
interests .... [T]he fact that the title of the alleged owner is dubious is not a
proper basis for reducing the land's value for tax purposes. 385
The difference between realizable sale price of the owner's interest and
the assessed value of the property in such a case is measured by the cost
of obtaining clear title. 386 Parallel reasoning in the easement cases would
value all interests in the property for tax purposes, assuming them avail-
able to yield fair return at current market levels for a prospective pur-
chaser.
3. Property Rights and Market Values
The golf course cases provide a clear illustration of the confusion be-
tween property rights and property value that pervades the consideration
of encumbrances in property tax decisions. Does a conveyance of rights
in the common areas to owners of subdivision lots signify a shifting of
value? This was the view of the taxpayers who prevailed in Twin
Lakes:387 "The economic phenomenon that has occurred here is that of a
dominant estate absorbing the value of the servient estate. . . .It should
surely shock the conscience if the servient estate were again to be taxed
. ". ,,388 Yet the effect of the golf course upon the value of the lots is not
determined by ownership rights alone. Lots bordering the course will
command a higher price than similar but more distant parcels enjoying
equivalent rights. 389 Land next to a private park will enjoy a higher mar-
384. E.g., Town of Secaucus v. Damsil, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 470, 295 A.2d 8 (1972); Stack v.
City of Hoboken, 45 N.J. Super. 294, 132 A.2d 314 (1957); Hoover v. State Bd. of Equalization,
579 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
385. Stack v. City of Hoboken, 45 N.J. Super 294, 132 A.2d 314, 318 (1957). See supra text
accompanying notes 105-10.
386. One court has stated:
The difference between $90,000, the conceded value if there were not a cloud on title, and the
sales price of $35,500 undoubtedly represents the buyer's estimate of the cost to it of eliminat-
ing, either through purchase or litigation, the outstanding adverse claim to title .... [This fact]
affords no justification for applying a discount in a tax valuation case.
Town of Secaucus v. Damsil, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 470, 295 A.2d 8, 10 (1972), discussed supra at
text accompanying note 108.
387. Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King County, 87 Wn. 2d 1, 548 P.2d 538 (1976),
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 346-52.
388. Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Twin Lakes.
389. Tualatin Dev. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323, 473 P.2d 660, 661 (1970),
discussed supra at text accompanying note 340 (lots bordering public golf course sold for $2500 to
$4000 more than others in the development, although all had equal rights to use the golf course).
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ket value than land less favorably situated, even if this additional value is
accompanied by no grant of rights in the park land at all.
Conversely, a grant of property rights may produce no increase in the
market value of the dominant estate. 390 In the best possible case, such a
grant might raise the value of each parcel-the dominant enjoying, for
example, certain access to air and light, the servient receiving an assured
income in exchange.
The transfer of property rights at issue in these cases is no more an
impediment to valuation of all interests in the land than is execution of a
long-term lease. The titleholding association and lot owners might be
considered collectively as owners of the full fee,391 the willing sellers in a
hypothetical exchange. Less hypothetically, the specialty cases might
support assessment at the value of this possibly unmarketable property to
its owners, surely a significant sum. 392
A demonstration of these logical flaws does not, however, address the
fears of double taxation that have influenced many courts. Assessment of
the servient estate at its unencumbered value would be inconsistent with
an assessment of the dominant estate at a realizable sale price reflecting
its easement rights. 393 But consistency may be achieved directly, without
hypothesizing a transfer of value. If imputation of payment from the
390. See supra text accompanying note 270.
391. This was the approach taken in a 1935 eminent domain case, In re Public Beach, 269 N.Y.
64, 199 N.E. 5 (1935), which dealt with beach property that, before being taken by the city as a park,
had been held by the Neponsit Property Owners' Association. Because the association had only legal
title subject to easement rights in all homeowner-members, the New York Appellate Division had
limited its award to the truly nominal sum of six cents. The New York Court of Appeals took a
different view, requiring that the value of the members' rights be included in the award to the associa-
tion:
[Slince all owners of dominant tenements enjoyed, irrevocably, membership rights, accorded by
the appellant, coextensive with their easements upon the land taken, the easements, for practical
purposes, had become merged in the membership rights.... When such an organization was
formed, the property owners were expected to, and have looked to that organization as the me-
dium through which enjoyment of their common right might be preserved equally for all. In such
circumstances, the ownership of the fee and the ight of beneficial ownership are not completely
severed. For all practical purposes, both have become vested in the membership corporation...
199 N.E. at 9; cf. Mikos v. King's Gate Club, Inc., 426 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(members of nonprofit corporation deemed owners of property to which association held title, for
purposes of determining taxability of mobile homes).
392. The value of common areas to the homeowners and titleholder was illustrated dramatically
in Sudden Valley Community Ass'n v. Turner, Nos. 78-18 through 78-37 (Wash. B.T.A. Feb. 8,
1980), discussed supra at note 320. The association sought a zero value assessment for its golf course
and marina "in accordance with the Twin Lakes doctrine." Sudden Valley, slip op. at 2. The board
denied this request, in part because the association had purchased the property in question from the
developer, in settlement of litigation, for $1.8 million one year before the disputed assessment. See
id. at9.




owner of the dominant estate were feasible, a precise reduction in assess-
ment could be made. At the other extreme, assessment of each estate
without regard to the easement would provide a workable approximation
of the unencumbered (and unbenefited) value in many cases, far less pre-
cise but well within the enormous range of error that is the norm in all real
property assessment. 394 A third alternative, where practical, would be va-
luation of the dominant and servient estates as one unit-a solution illus-
trating again the need for a definition of the "property" to be taxed before
the location of "value" is ascertained.
4. Defining the Physical Unit
The most intractable difficulties in valuation of encumbered property
arise from the need to assign independent values to integral components
of a larger unit. 395 Were the dominant and servient estates under single
ownership, they could be valued as one, and the presence of an easement
would not disturb the equivalence of unencumbered value, value at high-
est and best use, and realizable sale price. If instead the units must be
valued as if they were self-contained, that symmetry is lost. Calculating
the value of a servient estate according to its highest and best use requires
that the value of the encumbrance be calculated as if the owner of the
dominant estate had made payment for the benefit received. Whether this
is done by ignoring the encumbrance or by imputing payment, the result-
ing value of the servient estate will differ from its realizable sale price.
A few cases have attempted instead to divide the total highest and best
use value of the entire unit among its component parcels. In Homer v.
Dadeland Shopping Center,396 the Florida Supreme Court valued parking
394. While this article deals primarily with assessment difficulties rooted in the absence of a
clearly defined tax base, numerous quantitative studies have demonstrated the problems of assigning
accurate valuations even when that base is equated with realizable sale price. Most such studies com-
pare assessed values with sale prices of parcels that have been sold over a given period. If all assess-
ments were made at a uniform percentage of market value, homeowners would pay a rate of tax
different from the nominal figure, but the rate would be the same for each. Therefore inequities
among taxpayers are measured by the "coefficient of dispersion'--the deviation of individual as-
sessment/sale ratios from the central or average ratio, variously defined, for a particular group. See
generally INTERNATIONAL Ass'N OF AssEssINo OFFIcERs, supra note 220, § 1.2. Census figures indi-
cated that such composite coefficients of dispersion in 1976 ranged from 13.8% in Connecticut to
41.1% in Pennsylvania and Montana. ACIR, supra note 1, at 141. A recent study of real property
assessments in New York City found coefficients of dispersion below 20% for only three of 37 types
of housing properties. N.Y.U. Grad. School of Public Admin., Real Property Tax Policy for New
York City 1-16 (1980). Assessment/sale ratios for housing were found to vary from 22.3% for single-
family units to 68.3% for newer elevator buildings. Id. at 1- 14.
395. Cf. 2 J. BONBRIrr. supra note 6, chs. 19, 20 (use of "unit rule" in allocating value of
corporate enterprise among taxing jurisdictions).
396. 229 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1970).
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areas restricted to that use by easement 397 at the same number of dollars
per square foot as the land upon which stores were located:
The shopping center was designed and operated as an economic whole ....
... [T]he land used for the parking area is an integral part of the shopping
center and just as important to its development as the land upon which the
buildings are erected. The tax assessor was justified in placing the same
value on the land used for the parking area as the land upon which the im-
provements were erected. 398
The Connecticut Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion in
valuing similar lots:
The three parcels of land are zoned for commercial-general business and are
in the principal commercial area of Stamford. The highest and best use of
these three parcels of land would be for commercial buildings. Their actual
use is for parking lots restricted to customers of the department store ...
[T]he finding by the referee that the highest and best use for each of the
parking lots would be for commercial buildings has not been attacked by the
plaintiff. A taxpayer who chooses to use his land in a manner which is not
consistent with its highest and best use should not be rewarded with a lower
assessment, the effect of which is to increase the tax burden on others. 399
Yet the Connecticut court ruled that the adjacent department store was to
be valued by a capitalization of fair market rent, a figure reflecting the
availability of free parking in the immediate area. 400 This produces incon-
sistent assessments, similar to those resulting from assuming conflicting
uses for land and for improvements upon it.401
397. Id. at 836 ("Although the provision in a lease granting the tenant exclusive rights to con-
duct a particular type of business may be considered a restrictive covenant, the requirement of a
'parking area' in other instruments relating to the shopping center created an easement.").
398. Id. at 836-37.
399. Federated Dep't Stores v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d 715, 719-20
(1971).
400. The taxpayer had in this case relied not upon the easement cases but upon a claim of "func-
tional depreciation" caused by the servitudes. "No case, however, has been cited by the plaintiff
wherein the functional depreciation factor has been applied in a factual situation similar to that of the
present case." 291 A.2d at 720. Since both the parking areas and the department store were subject to
a sale-leaseback from the taxpayer to the General Electric Pension Trust, an accurate measure of the
rental value of the entire set of parcels could serve to calculate its market value as an integrated
parcel. Use of the lease value for the store and the unencumbered commercial value for the parking
areas, however, would almost certainly overstate the total assessment.
401. E.g., Sabin v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 422, 528 P.2d 69, 72-73 (1974) (existing
improvements inconsistent with the use of the land contemplated in its tax valuation could increase its
assessment only if a prospective purchaser would value them for, e.g., the cash flow they offered
before the land was converted to the higher use); Portland Golf Club v. State Tax Comm'n, 255 Or.
284, 465 P.2d 883 (1970) (rejecting attempt to value golf course land at its use for residential pur-
poses while valuing improvements as part of a golf course).
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Could the Homer approach be applied to subdivision common areas? A
1976 Florida decision402 suggested that possibility, directing separate as-
sessment of tennis courts, swimming pool, sidewalks, parking lots, and
the playground of a residential development, "with an adjustment being
made in the value of each residential unit. This leaves to the [titleholding
corporation] the responsibility of collecting the taxes through the assess-
ment authority of its declaration .... [T]he total valuation of the entire
project must be just valuation .... *"403 It is not clear what precise steps
the court contemplated that the assessor take to "adjust" the valuation of
the residential lots. 404 Despite this ambiguity, the decision makes an im-
portant contribution by recognizing the need to consider together servient
and dominant estates, the homeowners and the titleholding corporation,
in assessment.
How should the total value of such a unit be apportioned among these
parts? The artificiality of this division ensures that any method chosen
will itself be to some extent arbitrary. "One of the most important but
most frequently disregarded truths about value," Bonbright wrote, "is
that only by a somewhat rare coincidence does the sum of the values of
the different parts of an organic whole equal the value of the whole" ':405
If the parts are valued as separated from the whole, the sum of their values
is likely to be far less than the value of the whole. On the other hand, if the
parts are valued as parts of the whole, their sum total of values may greatly
exceed the value of the whole.
The same situation applies, to a greater or less degree, with different
types of property. What is the value of the left-hand member of a pair of $4
gloves? Practically nothing if the part is valued separately from the whole;.
approximately $4 if the part is valued as a part of the larger whole. Obvi-
ously, neither of these figures-zero or $4 per glove-can be multiplied by
two as an expression of the value of a pair of gloves. On the other hand, if
we start with the $4 value of the entire pair and prorate that figure between
the two gloves by dividing by two, we get a value per glove that is utterly
meaningless. 406
402. Department of Revenue v. Morganwoods Greentree, Inc., 341 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1976).
403. Id. at 759.
404. It is unclear, for example, how the court reconciled its view that the assessor should follow
the example of Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, 229 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1970), which "while
noting that the lot was impressed with restrictive covenants, upheld their disregard," 341 So. 2d at
759, with its directive that the assessor "consider the effect of the easements" in valuing the common
areas. Id. One explanation might be that the court wished a uniform land value to be assigned to the
residential lots and common areas, following Homer, and recognized that the resulting value for the
common areas would differ from their assessment as independent, unencumbered parcels. However,
the opinion contains insufficient discussion to confirm this interpretation.
405. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 76.
406. Id.
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While any allocation may be subject to dispute, a unified assessment at
least provides a nonarbitrary figure to be allocated-no small benefit from
the point of view of the taxing jurisdiction. 407 Whether this method or
another is applied in individual instances is less important than recogni-
tion that any such effort must first determine the composition of the
"property" to be assessed.
C. A Summation-of-Interests Approach to the Easement Cases:
Conclusions
Three major advantages have encouraged the widespread adoption of
the additive approach to valuation of encumbered property. It recognizes
that the distinctive feature of an appurtenant easement-the transfer of
benefit to other real property-permits its effects, unlike those of a mort-
gage, lease, or easement in gross, to be contained within the property tax
system. It sanctions assessment at realizable sale price, avoiding the hy-
pothetical or contrary-to-fact assumptions unpopular with courts and tax-
payers alike. Finally, it has the appeal of a scientific conservation law,
promising to uphold tax revenue by preserving "value" in measure, if
not in its original location.
The advantages of the additive approach, however, are offset by seri-
ous drawbacks, the most troubling being its departure from the definition
of "property" as the sum of all legal interests in a given parcel, a defini-
tion the advantages of which were demonstrated in the lease cases. The
emphasis of the additive approach upon the quality of the owner's title
runs counter to the concept of property utilized in mortgage, lease, and
title cases. It is a small step from this to assessment at realizable sale price
even absent a transfer of value justification-a transition evident in the
subsidized housing cases.
Given its status as a departure from general assessment principles, the
additive approach can ill afford to rest upon assumptions as unrealistic as
the transfer of value and the conservation of the tax base. The diminution
in value of the servient property by reason of the easement bears no nec-
essary relation to the enhancement in value of the dominant estate. Nor is
it necessarily realistic to assume, as have many tax sale cases, that assess-
ment of the dominant estate took into account whatever advantage it did
enjoy because of the encumbrance. 408
407. This step may be compared with eminent domain proceedings in which the calculation of
the value of the undivided fee precedes a determination as to allocation of that sum among parties
with an interest in it. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.




A summation-of-interests approach may be constructed for the valua-
tion of property subject to easements as well. The mill cases support such
an attempt by demonstrating that the "property" to be taxed need not be
the property as encumbered, just as it is not the property as leased; the
productive capacity of the land, even if bound by the owner to the use of
another, can affect its assessment. 409 Similarly, highest and best use need
not comprehend a gratuitous transfer of this capacity. "It should not be
assumed that taxing ... the right of the mill to have water power from the
dam... should reduce the tax.., upon the corresponding right of the
dam to receive compensation therefor. "410 The enhancement of property
value, "a question in commercial economics," 411 should not be confused
with a transfer of property rights; the former may properly affect the as-
sessment of a number of parcels without threatening double taxation.
These considerations lead, not necessarily to a single method of assess-
ing all encumbered parcels, but to a number of compatible approaches.
The encumbrance may be considered equivalent to a lease under the ma-
jority approach to the long-term lease question-not "disregarded" in
assessment, but treated as one piece of evidence as to the potentially prof-
itable uses of the land. As with leased property, the value should reflect
the price commanded from a purchaser contemplating receipt of full cur-
rent market value for rights granted to the dominant estate. The dominant
estate would then be assessed upon the price a willing buyer would offer
in light of the need to pay full market value for the easement.
This imposes a considerable burden upon the assessor, requiring a de-
termination of the "market value" of a rarely traded and possibly unique
commodity. Where, as in the mill cases, the actual consideration for such
a conveyance can be ascertained, the problem is minimal. At the other
end of the spectrum, where no comparable transactions afford any evi-
dence of market value, the encumbrance might be ignored in the assess-
ment of both the estates, upon the assumption that the imputed payment
could be no less than the burden to the servient estate and no greater than
the benefit to the dominant. 412 This assumption should generally produce
409. See supra note 374.
410. Union Water-Power Co. v. City of Auburn, 90 Me. 60, 37 A. 331,335 (1897) (Emery, J.,
dissenting), discussed supra at note 374.
411. 37 A. at 334.
412. This result was urged in a dissenting opinion to Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162, 172 (1972) (Barnes, J., dissenting), discussed supra at note 381:
[t]n valuing and assessing the land-including a consideration of the air rights as a possible
element of value-the assessing authority must necessarily consider the diminution in the value
of the land from the restriction of the use of the air rights for a very substantial period of time as
well as any addition to the value of the land from a capitalization of net rental from the lease of
those air rights. Logically, but not at all necessarily, in an arm's length transaction-and there is
no suggestion that the lease involved in the instant case is not such a transaction-the diminution
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error favorable to the taxpayers, ignoring as it does any net benefit they
enjoy from the arrangement. Realistically, perhaps the best that can be
said for it is that it will often produce enough distortion to provoke a
determined search by some party, assessor or taxpayer, for more direct
evidence of value. In many cases, sales of one or both estates after impo-
sition of the encumbrance may provide a first step in that direction. The
point is not that such computations are feasible in all events, but rather
that where they are they provide a superior alternative to the additive ap-
proach.
Assessment of the dominant and servient estates as a single unit offers
a less complicated alternative where an arbitrary division of total value
between the two parcels is acceptable. A separate assessment of subdivi-
sion common areas may treat the homeowners' association or corporation
holding title to the space as a representative of its members, permitting a
summation of legal and beneficial interests in the property. This would
require a corresponding adjustment to assessments of the residential lots,
because use of their realizable sale price as the tax base would produce a
double assessment of the beneficial interest in the common areas. Where
an entire development is encumbered by a plan of mutual restrictive co-
venants, use of realizable sale price in assessment requires no conserva-
tion of value theory and implies no necessary consequences as to the qual-
ity of title afforded by a tax sale. 4 13 The restriction may be likened to the
benefits of a neighborhood association, or other amenity provided by joint
action, raising the sale price of all affected residential property. If at a
future time it is discontinued, or ceases to enhance the market value of the
property, later assessments should reflect that change.
The summation-of-interests approach to assessment does carry certain
implications as to the effects of a tax sale. By defining the property sub-
ject to tax as the aggregate of all legal interests in a given parcel, it sug-
gests, absent statutory directives to the contrary, that the property subject
to a lien for unpaid taxes encompasses the same interests, including ease-
ments appurtenant to other land. The equation is not a necessary one,
however. The fact that the legislature has conferred preferential status
upon certain interests, such as easements, preserving their effect after a
tax sale, does not in itself bar a highest and best use assessment of the
type suggested above. Conversely, assessment reflecting the effect of an
easement, as an aspect of the productive capacity or desirability of the
in value by the lease of the air rights should be roughly equivalent to the value of the rent
reserved in the lease. At least, the Machts should have the opportunity to establish the factor of
such diminution in value. It is clear, however, that they have had no such opportunity and the
assessors, in fact, gave no consideration to such a factor.




land, carries no commitment to preservation of this arrangement upon
foreclosure of a tax lien. The contrary assertion in many cases adopting
the majority view414 echoes their emphasis upon ascertaining the geo-
graphic location of the easement, viewing it as a unit of value to be at-
tached to one estate or the other. If, instead, its effect upon both is viewed
as a "question of commercial economics," 415 the requirement of consis-
tency leads only to an assessment based upon the situation at the time of
valuation.
Some of these points may aid valuation of federally subsidized housing
subject to rent restrictions. Such a limitation, voluntarily assumed, run-
ning with the land in fact if not in theory, and enforced by government
agencies although not initiated by them, poses the same question as does
a conventional easement: is the "property" to be taxed the property as
encumbered? It also illustrates the link between the easement and long-
term lease questions, for it lends itself almost equally well to interpreta-
tion under either rubric. This suggests that a summation-of-interests ap-
proach would base assessment upon fair market rent rather than contract
rent. This is, if anything, less difficult than the standard lease problem,
for the owner is no victim of changing economic circumstances, and has
received numerous income tax benefits to offset the rent limitations.
Would such assessments result in decreased maintenance of housing
projects, or, as the Massachusetts court seemed to fear, 416 force worthy
developments to cease operation altogether? The straightforward answer
is that such predictions require more than valuation theory for support,
and the policy choices implicit in them should not be made by assessors,
nor by courts ostensibly passing on assessment questions. Prospectively,
a clear rule governing valuation would diminish the possibility that future
investors might rely upon incorrect property tax projections. As with
many valuation questions, the unsettled state of the law in this area casts
doubt upon the justification for past reliance upon a given method. 417
414. See id.
415. Union Water-PowerCo. v. City of Auburn, 90 Me. 60, 37 A. 331, 334 (1897) (Emery, J.,
dissenting), discussed supra at note 374.
416. In Community Dev. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 377 Mass. 351, 385 N.E.2d 1376, 1378
n. 10 (1979), discussed supra at text accompanying note 360, the court commented: "At the board [of
assessors] hearing, there was evidence that the company would be forced to default on the mortgage
for the housing project if the valuation of the project were based on 'fair market rentals.' "
417. Unfortunately, a factual investigation might well reveal that most housing projects of this
type are in such poor repair as to greatly diminish the excess of market rent over actual receipts. The
taxpayers in Community Dev. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 377 Mass. 351, 385 N.E.2d 1376 (1979),
discussed supra at text accompanying note 360, argued that the condition of their buildings, con-
structed in 1974, was "very poor, with a very advanced stage of physical deterioration," that ameni-
ties promised in their advertising brochure were never installed, and that advertised "fair market
rentals" bore no relation to the fair rental value of the apartment units ("it is possible that the use of
the words 'fair market rental' may have misled the [Appellate Tax] Board"). Brief for Appellant at 5,
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These considerations provide no single rule for the valuation of any
given parcel of encumbered property, but they suggest the type of ques-
tions with which such an inquiry must begin. Many of the cases examined
here have avoided these steps. They have simultaneously exhibited an
extreme respect for the fact of the encumbrance, treating it as an immut-
able attribute of the property like elevation or latitude, and an insufficient
sensitivity to the unstated definitional issues being resolved through the
valuation process.
In the end, confusion as to the nature of the tax base unites the lease,
specialty, and easement cases. How, for example, should a "flagship"
department store, designed in part to draw business to other tenants of a
shopping center, be classified? It is in part a specialty, designed for a
specific use, valuable to the owner of the entire shopping center but not
commanding a market price reflecting its cost. But it exhibits as well
many elements of the transfer of value theory so important to the ease-
ment cases. In such a situation, the New York Court of Appeals, which
had pioneered the majority approach in both specialty and easement
areas, was unable to do better than to compromise the claims of the asses-
sor and the taxpayer, blaming the confusion on the unpredictable nature
of property "value.' 418 Similarly, the Massachusetts court found that its
adherence to the majority approach in the lease area and its recognition of
restrictions in the easement area left it no ground for a coherent and con-
sistent response to the subsidized housing question. 419 The only way to
16-17, app. 42, Community Dev. Co. The appraiser hired by the taxpayers reported, "The general
quality of construction is very poor, with the partitions and the floors being thinner and less substan-
tial than that found in most apartment buildings of comparable age .... The appraisers have rarely,
in their experience, viewed a property of this age in such an advanced state of physical deteriora-
tion." Id. app. 94-95.
418. G.R.F., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 41 N.Y.2d 512, 393 N.Y.S.2d 965, 362 N.E.2d 597
(1977), determined that, in such a situation, the income approach understated the value of the depart-
ment store and the cost approach overstated it:
Construction of the Gimbel's store would not have been justified, economically, on the basis
of the expected return from the Gimbel's store alone. Instead the improvements were justified in
part by Gimbel's status as a "flagship" store, drawing shoppers to the remainder of the shop-
ping center. The developer, eager to increase the rental value of the smaller stores, subsidized
the construction ....
Id. at 514, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 967, 362 N.E.2d at 599. The court ridiculed the notion that a compro-
mise value could not be justified: "Logic and economic analysis suggest the incongruity of combin-
ing what are on their face incompatible theories of valuation .... Pragmatism, however, requires
adjustment when the economic realities prevent placing the properties in neat logical valuation boxes
... "Id. at 515, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 968, 362 N.E.2d at 599.
419. Community Dev. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 377 Mass. 351, 385 N.E.2d 1376 (1979),
discussed supra at text accompanying note 360. One year later, in Mashpee Wampanoag Indian
Tribal Council, Inc. v. Assessors of Mashpee, 379 Mass. 420, 398 N.E.2d 724 (1980), the Massa-
chusetts court faced the confluence of the specialty and easement problems. The Council members
claimed that deed restrictions preventing conveyance of their property deprived it of taxable value.
The court rejected that view, directing that the fair cash value of property in such circumstances be
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avoid arbitrary and unpredictable results in such hybrid cases is to address
the definitional questions common to the three areas. Consistent reliance
upon the concept of property developed in the lease cases can be the cru-
cial first step in that process.
V. POSTSCRIPT: A ROLE FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS IN
VALUATION CONTROVERSIES
The legal aspects of valuation for property tax purposes have attracted
limited attention in the decades following publication of Bonbright's
treatise-perhaps in part due to his own skepticism toward such efforts.
Bonbright's pessimism arose from his belief that progress upon method-
ological questions required a prior and explicit determination of the na-
ture and purposes of the tax, a task beyond the power of appraisers and
value theorists. "The trouble lies far too deep to be cured by either of
these economic skin specialists. It lies in the absence of any valid philoso-
phy for the general property tax or for the general real-estate tax.' '420
The issues examined here, however, reveal an important role for legal
analysis. They suggest that, contrary to Bonbright's view, valuation in-
quiries may proceed inductively, from the study of specific assessment
disputes to general conclusions as to the tax itself. In a fairly simple set-
ting, the lease cases offer a workable definition of the tax base as the sum
of all legal interests in the assessed parcel, a value not limited by the
realizable sale price of the rights retained by the owner of the fee. Al-
though the specialty cases dispel any premature hope that all valuation
questions might be this easily resolved, they do illuminate the definitional
issue in a negative fashion by demonstrating conclusively that the sale
value of the owner's interest forms no universal ceiling upon assess-
ments. Finally, the easement cases present the summation-of-interests
definition with its most severe test, for seventy years of case law has
taken a different approach. But the demonstrably mistaken premises guid-
ing the first such cases, the unacceptable conclusions reached by later
decisions adopting this reasoning, and the willingness of a number of
later courts to re-examine and reject that precedent, all urge adoption of
the summation-of-interests definition of the tax base in the easement con-
text as well.
ascertained "from the intrinsic value of the property." 398 N.E.2d at 726. This result is as confusing
as the New York Court of Appeals decision in G.R.F., but lacks that case's frank acknowledgment of
illogic and inconsistency: The Maryland Supreme Court was similarly unable to reconcile the lease
and easement aspects of a conveyance of air rights in Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md.
602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972), discussed supra at note 381.
420. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 508.
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Harmonization of assessments in these three areas, although an impor-
tant goal, is secondary to a better understanding of the nature of the tax.
The long-term lease and specialty cases provide such clarification, pre-
cisely the type of contribution to the "philosophy" of the tax sought by
Bonbright. In this way they offer a means of resolving many of the prob-
lems first identified in his pioneering study.
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